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Abstract 
This thesis explores how the problem of governance should be solved in the divided city of 
Kirkuk. As a microcosm of Iraq, Kirkuk has invariably refracted the overall climate of the 
country. Accordingly, one of the main problems of Kirkuk is its unresolved governance 
model that, if solved, could positively affect the political stability in the city. To solve this 
problem, this research suggests the adoption of a specific form of a consociational power-
sharing arrangement. In the literature, a contrast is often drawn between ‘corporate’ and 
‘liberal’ forms of consociations. However, this study argues that the adoption of a 
combination of both the corporate and the liberal forms of consociational power-sharing is 
crucial to addressing the demands of each ethnic group in the city and for maintaining 
political stability and diversity. But it also argues that building a lasting peace in Kirkuk 
cannot be achieved only by focusing on a top-down elite-level solution, rather bottom-up 
initiatives through creating bridging social capital at the grassroots level are necessary. In 
other words, it argues that the problem of governance can be solved in Kirkuk by taking 
advantage of the elements of two main theories of conflict management, accommodation 
(consociationalism) and integration (bridging social capital). This conclusion is based on 
two sources of evidence. First, the Iraqi legal documents such as the constitution and the 
laws issued by the Iraqi Council of Representatives, and secondly, empirical evidence 
collected from the political elites of Kirkuk, the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad. 
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1 
Introduction 
If they [the political leaders of plural societies] wish to establish or strengthen democratic 
institutions in their countries, they must become consociational engineers. 
                                                                                                           Lijphart (1977: 223) 
The American-led coalition forces began the invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003 and ended 
the twenty-four year reign of Saddam Hussein on 10 April 2003. Kirkuk fell on 10 April 
2003 and thus a new chapter in the history of the city began. The post-2003 period can be 
characterized as a point of contention among Kirkuk’s groups to gain more power and hold 
significant political positions within the city to exercise their agendas. Each of the three 
main groups in the city – Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen – maintains its own history that lays 
claim to the origins of the city and thus their right to control over it.1 The identity of the 
city is contested, but the question of how to govern the city and governorate of Kirkuk has 
also remained unresolved. Kirkuk governorate is the only governorate that has experienced 
only one election since 2005 and thus the Kirkuk Provincial Council (KPC) is now the 
longest-serving provincial council in Iraq. Other governorates have held three elections by 
now. Currently there is an interim and an informal power-sharing arrangement in the city, 
but it is unlikely to remain stable.  The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) captured 
Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, on June 9, 2014. This event changed the political 
landscape in Kirkuk by putting the Kurds in a stronger position relative to the other groups. 
This has had the effect of changing the balance of power in that the current temporary 
political arrangement may not endure in the governorate. Therefore, the central claim of 
this dissertation is that a formal and permanent power-sharing system is necessary to be 
adopted to resolve the governance problem. More especially, it seeks to defend the view 
that consociation offers an appropriate institutional mechanism for managing conflict and 
building a stable government in the city. 
This introduction is divided into four sections. In the first section, I present the problem of 
Kirkuk by placing emphasis on its disputed status between its local communities on the one 
hand and the Kurds and the central government in Baghdad on the other. In the second 
section, I deal with the problem of governance in Kirkuk which is the primary focus of this 
                                                          
1 Christians also live in the city, but they are too small to have any effective political and military impact in 
the city and governorate of Kirkuk. 
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dissertation. In this section, I present a background on how the city has been governed since 
2003. This sets the stage for my main proposal in section three. In this section, I present 
my own proposal to solve the problem of governance in Kirkuk and how political stability 
could be realized and sustained in the long run. Several concepts and terms pertinent to the 
central research question will also be defined in section three. Section four explores the 
methods that are employed in this research. A particular emphasis will be put on my 
interviews as my primary source in this study along with a brief discussion on my secondary 
data. Finally, I present the structure of my thesis by explaining the content of each chapter 
briefly and clearly. 
The Problem of Kirkuk 
Kirkuk is an oil-rich city. Today, it is the epicentre of an area where control is hotly 
contested by its ethnic groups on one hand, and the central government of Baghdad and the 
Kurdistan regional government (KRG) on the other. The city can be seen as a microcosm 
of Iraq, and is known throughout the region for its distinctive ethnic, linguistic, religious, 
and cultural diversity. As Liam Anderson (2013: 365) notes ‘it is seemingly impossible for 
a journalist to write an account of Kirkuk that does not include the terms “oil rich” and 
“ethnically divided”.’ The city’s diverse ethnic and religious groups include Kurds, 
Turkmen, Arabs and Assyro-Chaldeans, all of who have lived peacefully together for 
centuries. Currently, the status of the city in terms of both administration and governance 
remains unsettled, endangering the historic peaceful coexistence of the groups and posing 
the threat of communal violence. In this section, I present an overview of the problem of 
Kirkuk by locating it in the broader context of disputed territories in Iraq between the Kurds 
and the central government. The multidimensional nature of the problem of Kirkuk with 
reference to some other case studies will also be dealt with in this section. Finally, I will 
briefly examine how Kirkuk was dealt with in the legal documents in the post-2003 Iraq 
under the interim and the permanent constitution. 
At the outset, it is worth noting that numerous factors such as ethnicity, religion, language 
and race can be the defining features of deeply divided societies or places.2 Divided society, 
                                                          
2 O’Leay (2013: 5-6) argues that the term ‘deeply divided places’ is more accurate than ‘deeply divided 
societies,’ for all moderate societies are divided that may matter politically, for example, by income, wealth, 
class, status, etc. However, these divisions within deeply divided places are further reinforced by divisions of 
ethnicity, nationality, language, race, or religion. For him, it is the ‘deeply divided places’ that are sites for 
actual or potential civil or intergovernmental wars. However, many other scholars use ‘deeply divided 
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as Benjamin Reilly (2001: 4) puts it, is a ‘society which is both ethnically diverse and where 
ethnicity is a politically salient cleavage around which interests are organized for political 
purposes, such as elections’. In this sense, therefore, Kirkuk is a divided place. For 
Anderson and Stansfield (2009: 9), Kirkuk is ‘a place in which groups are rivals for power 
and resources’ (and indeed they conclude that Kirkuk is ‘the divided city par excellence’). 
One, however, can go further and consider Kirkuk not only a ‘divided’ place, but also a 
‘deeply divided’ one. For example, Lijphart (1995: 276) defines a deeply divided society 
as ‘a society that is sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, 
or racial lines into virtually separate subsocieties with their own political parties, interest 
groups, and media of communication.’3In line with Lijphart’s definition, Adrian Guelke 
(2012: 32) remarks that deeply divided societies are characterized by ‘a lack of consensus 
on the framework for the making of decisions and a contested political process in which 
the legitimacy of outcomes is commonly challenged by political representatives of one of 
the segments.’ Or, alternatively, as Allison McCulloch puts it, when membership in an 
ethnic group becomes ‘overtly politicized and relations between segments continue in 
antagonistic and potentially violent fashion, a polity can be considered as deeply divided’ 
(McCulloch, 2014: 3). Considering the above definition and remarks by Lijphart, Guelke 
and McCulloch, one can consider Kirkuk as a deeply divided place. Moreover, ethnicity 
has been strongly politicized, particularly in the post-2003 period.  In addition, Kirkuk can 
also be characterized as a polarized city around ethnicity, language and religion. As such, 
the city falls well within the definition of a polarized urban centre, where ‘two or more 
ethnically conscious groups—divided by religion, language, and/or culture and perceived 
history—coexist in a situation where neither group is willing to concede supremacy to the 
other’ (Bollens, 2013: 328). Thus, Kirkuk can be considered to be a polarized deeply 
divided city where ethnic and national cleavages can be seen as reinforcing rather than 
cross-cutting. One clear indication of reinforcing cleavages in Kirkuk is that the elections 
are very competitive and the triumph of an ethnic group is usually seen to have been 
achieved at the expense of other groups.  
The Kirkuk question is an integral part of the disputed territories between Baghdad, the 
country’s official capital city, and Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish region. As Peter Bartu 
                                                          
societies’ rather than ‘deeply divided places’ (See, for example, Lijphart 2004, Guelke 2012 and McCulloch 
2014). To avoid confusion, I will stick to using ‘divided societies’ in this dissertation. 
3 Lijphart uses the terms ‘deeply divided society’ and ‘plural society’ as synonyms. 
 
 
4 
(2010: 1330) observes, the disputed areas ‘cross Iraq in a north-west–south-east line from 
Sinjar on the Iraq–Syria border to Khanaqin and Mandali on the Iraq–Iran border, with 
Kirkuk governorate at the dispute’s epicentre.’ He rightly argues that the disputed territories 
have been a persistent fault-line in Iraq and rapidly emerged as a core dispute between the 
Kurds and the Arabs in post-2003 Iraq with Kirkuk governorate at the dispute’s epicentre. 
Historically, Kirkuk’s status has been disputed between Kurds and the successive Iraqi 
governments since the creation of the country in 1920. For example, the Kurds and Ba’ath 
Party concluded the March Manifesto or ‘Autonomy Accord’ in 1970 which was an 
agreement that granted many of the rights that the Kurdish revolutions were trying to 
achieve at the time including autonomy. However, this agreement was not implemented 
and the main reason for its failure was the problem of the status of Kirkuk and its 
administrative boundaries (Romano, 2007; Bolden and Fussnecker, 2008).  Today, 48% of 
the Kurdistan region’s land is still disputed between Baghdad and Erbil (Ihsan, 2014). 
Marwan Ali (2014), director of political affairs of the United Nations Assistant Mission for 
Iraq (UNAMI), argues that if the problem of these disputed areas had been settled, ISIS 
would not be able to control Mosul in June 2014. This is because these areas have become 
a grey area that made the involved parties unwilling to defend them like other areas and 
thus a space created which was exploited by ISIS. In the same line of argument, Stansfield 
(2014) argues that ‘there will be no resolution of the threat of the Islamic State without a 
resolution of the problem of the disputed territories’. Thus, looking at a solution for Kirkuk 
can simultaneously be seen as finding a solution for the country as a whole. Indeed, the 
conflict over Kirkuk has multiple dimensions besides. 
The problem of Kirkuk is a multi-level and a multidimensional dispute. It has not only local 
and national dimensions but also regional and international ones. Locally, the dispute is 
among the three main communities (Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen) and to a lesser degree 
Christians. Within each community there is a severe competition among political parties to 
take the lead of their community. Nationally, the dispute is between Baghdad and Erbil (the 
capital of the Kurdistan Region) over the city. Regionally, the neighbouring countries 
engage with Kirkuk issue, especially Turkey. Internationally, both the US and UNAMI are 
actively involved in the problem of Kirkuk. The problem of Kirkuk, as Stefan Wolff 
(2010:1364) notes, has two dimensions which are ‘the territorial–political status of Kirkuk 
in Iraq and the internal governance arrangements’ in the city. Anderson (2013: 368) also 
states that three elements constitute the problem of Kirkuk, namely: oil, future 
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administrative status and future governance. Although the territorial control of Kirkuk and 
its internal governance are at the heart of disputes over the city, the role of oil cannot be 
overlooked. The discovery of vast amount of oil was the main reason for annexing Kirkuk 
to the Iraqi kingdom in 1925 as part of Mosul Vilayet (Galleti, 2005: 22). The Kirkuk oil 
field alone is estimated to be 10 billion barrels (Sevim, 2014: 14). It is the second-largest 
oilfield in the country, containing 20 percent of Iraq’s known oil reserves (Stansfield and 
Anderson, 2009: 137). Kirkuk is potentially one of the richest cities of the world and its 
wealth of resources- estimated by some to near 4 per cent of the world’s known oil and gas 
reserves (Bilson et al, 2011). Thus, oil makes Kirkuk quite unique in comparison to other 
contested cities around the world. In short, the historical, political and economic 
dimensions of the problem of Kirkuk makes it a unique and fascinating, but at the same 
time a difficult and complicated case study.  
 
 
Figure 1 A figure showing three factors that constitute the problem of Kirkuk 
The polarized city of Kirkuk has an effect on reconciliation, stability, and enduring peace 
at the national level. This is common to many other polarized places.  For example, in a 
comparative analysis of  seven  polarized  cities (Brussels,  Johannesburg,  Belfast,  
Sarajevo,  Jerusalem,  Baghdad,  and  Kirkuk)  Scott Bollens (2013) classifies  these  cities  
into  three  categories:  (1)  sustainable  cities  which  includes Brussels (Belgium) and 
Johannesburg (South Africa) where there is power-sharing and stability of  the  local  and  
national  state;  (2)  fragile  cities  covering  Belfast  (Northern Ireland) and Sarajevo (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina), where although there has been some progress, local  governance 
The Problem of 
Kirkuk 
Oil
Future
administrative 
status
Future
governance
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arrangements are not sufficiently stable and are vulnerable to relapse; and (3) the 
combustible cities of Jerusalem  (Palestine), Baghdad and Kirkuk, where it is not only the 
cities but also power-sharing itself which is contested and has the  potential  for  further  
instability.  He concludes that these combustible cities can be major obstacles to national 
peace agreements or conflict management. This is a fair and a convincing conclusion in the 
case of Kirkuk, because whether the contested lands of Kirkuk will join the Kurdistan 
region or remain with the rest of Iraq ‘positions Kirkuk as a flashpoint of ethnic and 
sectarian conflict and a key element of national negotiations over the future status of the 
country’ (Bollens, 2013: 355). In short, Kirkuk has been and still is in the heart of the 
conflicts between the Kurds and the successive Iraqi governments that has invariably been 
seen as a threat to the integrity of Iraq. This has been noted repeatedly by scholars and 
researchers. Anderson and Stansfield (2009: 4) go so far as to say that ‘it is no exaggeration 
to assert that the future of Iraq hinges on finding a resolution to the problem of Kirkuk’s 
status,’ while Sevim (2014: 16) argues that ‘Kirkuk is the last castle for the Baghdad 
government for the  protection  of  Iraqi  territorial  integrity  and  the  high-energy  capacity  
of  the country.’ Bearing this in mind, solving the problem of Kirkuk means solving one of 
the most intractable problems in the country. Therefore, this thesis, which attempts to find 
an appropriate solution for one part of that problem (i.e. the problem of governance), can 
contribute in finding a way to stability and enduring peace not only in the governorate but 
also in the country as the whole.  
In terms of similarity, Kirkuk seems most like the Brčko district in Bosnia. As Wolff (2010: 
1364) points out, both areas are disputed between groups within a sovereign state. While 
Kirkuk is contested by the central government of Baghdad and the KRG in Iraq, Brčko is 
claimed by the Muslim-Croat Federation and Republica Srpska in Bosnia.  Both cases are 
flashpoints within their respective countries; Brčko remained so divisive that the issue of 
governance was left unresolved in the Dayton Peace Accord (Dahlman and Tuathail, 2005). 
However, while the future of Kirkuk has not yet been settled, that of Brčko, thanks to 
international arbitrators, has been granted a special status. Another relevant example is the 
case of Mostar (Bosnia), which is similar to Kirkuk in its pre-war diversity and post-war 
division. While these provide insightful comparison, Kirkuk has more stakeholders and a 
greater ethnic and religious diversity than any of the cities or regions under consideration.  
Even more important, it is the only one of the cities with abundant natural resources, 
making it unique among disputes over territorial ‘ownership’ (Anderson and Stansfield, 
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2009: 9). The above mentioned-factors make Kirkuk so special that it warrants, at least, a 
PhD dissertation.  
Particular attention was paid to Kirkuk by the Iraqi and non-Iraqi policy makers in the post-
2003 period.  This was mainly due to the fact that the city has been the point of disputes 
between the Kurds and the successive Iraqi governments for more than seventy years in the 
twentieth century. After the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime, for example, the U.S. 
coalition established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in May 2003 to govern Iraq 
under the leadership of Paul Bremer. The CPA established the Iraqi Governing Council 
(IGC) on 13 July 2003. The IGC was an interim Iraqi government composed of 25 members 
from Iraq’s main religious and ethnic groups: thirteen Shi‘ite Arabs, five Sunni Arabs and 
five Kurds, one Turcoman and one Assyrian (Yildiz, 2004: 119-21). The IGC adopted the 
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) in March 2004 which served as Iraq’s provisional 
constitution until the adoption of Iraq’s current and permanent constitution on October 15 
2005 (Bolden and Fussnecker, 2008: 4). Article 58 of the TAL committed the Iraqi 
government to ‘act expeditiously to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime’s 
practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk’ (TAL, 
2004). In 2005, the new Iraqi Constitution was adopted and ratified. Article 140 replaced 
the TAL’s Article 58, calling for a three-step process in Kirkuk and other disputed 
territories involving ‘normalization,’ to be followed by a census, and finally a referendum 
to determine whether or not the citizens of Kirkuk want to join the Kurdistan region.4 
According to Article 140 of the Iraq constitution, the executive authority was to undertake 
the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of Article 58 (Iraqi 
Constitution, 2005). In accordance with Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, the future 
status of Kirkuk was set to be settled through conducting a referendum by 31 December 
2007. But that deadline has long passed and the status quo of Kirkuk has still remained as 
it is.5  
Thus, while this study deals with the internal politics of Kirkuk rather than the general 
question concerning the stability of Iraq as whole, the internal stability of Kirkuk has 
                                                          
4 The constitution has identified three options to settle the future status of Kirkuk: (1) a governorate under the 
authority of the central government, (2) an autonomous region and (3) as part of the Kurdistan region. Each 
of these options is supported by one of the three main groups: the Kurds wish to incorporate Kirkuk into the 
Kurdistan region, the Turkmen want Kirkuk to be an autonomous region, and the Arabs want Kirkuk to be 
under the authority of the central government, albeit with a special status.  
5 I shall discuss this article in more detail in chapter 1. The whole article will be attached in the appendices.  
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consequences for the stability of the whole country. Hence, addressing the problem of 
Kirkuk is vitally important. However, while there are different institutional mechanisms 
for managing conflict in deeply divided places, none have been formally adopted in Kirkuk 
(Saeed, 2015). The decision about which model to support is crucially important, since 
different institutional choices favour or disadvantage one group over another, and each has 
distinct consequences in particular for divided societies. The central claim of this research, 
however, is that consociation can solve the problem of governance in the city. But, before 
discussing the solution, it is important to firstly discuss the city’s governance problem. The 
following section deals with this problem specifically.  
The Problem of Governance 
The future governance of Kirkuk is the focus of this dissertation. Before discussing the 
most appropriate and the most likely scenarios for governing the city in the future, it is 
important to firstly give an overview about the political system that has been in place in the 
city since 2003. In this section, I focus specifically on the political arrangements that have 
been used to govern the city since 2003. 
Under the Ba’ath rule, as other governorates, Kirkuk was governed unilaterally by the 
Sunni Arab Ba’athists, excluding other groups from power and even expelling a large 
number of them from the city. After the fall of the Ba’ath party in 2003, however, unilateral, 
one faction rule was over. For example, two months after the removal of the Ba’ath regime 
in Kirkuk, the first municipal council was formed in Kirkuk in which the U.S military 
appointed 30 members indirectly from the four communities in the city to govern the city 
(Anderson, 2009: 13). The second municipal council was expanded to 40 members from 
all of the communities and continued for a year between 2004 until 2005. 
 In 2005, the first election at the governorate level was held. In Kirkuk, 41 members were 
elected in a public election for the Kirkuk Provincial Council (KPC) and those members 
have held office since then (these three councils will be further discussed in chapter one 
and chapter three). According to the Law of Governorates not Incorporated into a Region 
(Law 21/2008), the KPC plays the role of the legislative body of Kirkuk, whereas the 
positions of governorship and deputy governorship are deemed as executive offices. For 
nearly two years, since June 2003 until January 2005, the four communities of Kirkuk were 
included in the first two municipal councils mentioned above. In the first municipal council, 
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the senior positions included ‘mayor’, ‘deputy mayor’, and ‘assistants of the mayor’. The 
mayor was a Kurd, his deputy was an Arab and he had three assistants (a Kurd, a Christian 
and a Turkman) (Anderson and Stansfield, 2009: 215). In the second municipal council, a 
Kurd became a governor, his deputy was an Arab and a Turkman became the KPC 
chairman. However, after the first governorate election in Kirkuk, some change occurred. 
Both the governor and the KPC chairman were Kurds and the position of governor deputy 
was left vacant. In short, all the communities were included in the legislative and executive 
bodies in Kirkuk for the first two years after the fall of Saddam’s regime. However, the 
Kurds controlled the executive body after the first governorate election in 2005.  
As noted in the previous section, the territorial dispute over Kirkuk, according to article 
140 of the constitution, was set to be settled by the end of 2007. Given this and the fact that 
the Kurds dominated most of the positions including the positions of governor and the 
chairman of the KPC, the Arabs and Turkmen resorted to boycotting the KPC’s 
proceedings during 2006-2007. In other words, while all the groups were included in the 
legislative and executive bodies in the first two years after the collapse of the Ba’ath regime, 
the Kurds dominated most of the position in the latter two years, i.e. 2005-2007. The Kurds 
managed to do that because they won 26 seats out of the 41 seats of the KPC in the 2005 
governorate elections (further discussed in chapter three). Taking this new situation into 
consideration (i.e. approaching the deadline of article 140 and the boycotts of the Arabs 
and Turkmen), various recommendations were presented by different Iraqi and non-Iraqi 
parties to find a solution for the problem of governance and the future status of Kirkuk 
because the two issues are closely linked.  
 The International Crisis Group (ICG), for example, has recommended several solutions for 
the issue of disputed territories and Kirkuk to date. In 2006, the ICG suggested that Kirkuk 
should become a stand-alone federal region for an interim period of ten years with sharing 
power between its four communities. However, this suggestion did not contain any real 
incentive for the Kurds and was therefore overlooked. The ICG outlined another solution 
in 2008 entitled ‘oil for soil deal’. This deal would allow the Kurds to exploit the oil fields 
within the Kurdistan region in return for deferring its exclusive claim to Kirkuk. This deal 
was also rejected by the Kurds, because ‘the Kurdistan Region already has the power to 
manage its own oil and gas fields, so this deal gives them nothing they do not already have’ 
(Anderson, 2013: 379). The UN was also involved in trying to find a solution for the 
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administrative and governance issues of Kirkuk. In April 2009, the UN Special 
Representative, Staffan de Mistura, formally presented UNAMI’s report on disputed 
territories to the officials of the Iraqi central government and the KRG president (ICG, 
2009: 7). Four possible options for resolving the dispute over Kirkuk were given: 1) 
reformulating Article 140 to make it unambiguous and clear. This would mean resolving 
key questions related to a referendum, such as the referendum question, eligibility and voter 
registration, and the boundaries of the ‘referendum area’; 2) retaining Kirkuk’s status as a 
governorate that is not organized into a region, as with the other Iraqi governorates; 3) ‘dual 
nexus’ which administratively links Kirkuk to both Baghdad and the KRG; and 4) ‘special 
status’ that gives Kirkuk special administrative powers different from any other province 
in Iraq with high degree of administrative self-rule and less direct influence from Baghdad 
and Erbil. However, the report did not receive a particularly enthusiastic welcome and was 
rejected equally by both Baghdad and KRG (Wolff, 2010). The inability of the disputing 
parties to agree upon one of the above options was a major reason for overlooking the 
UNAMI’s report. 
Nationally, the Council of Representative (CoR) issued law 36 regarding the Elections Law 
of the Provincial, Districts, and Sub-Districts Councils in 2008. According to article 23 of 
this law, the elections of Kirkuk governorate was to be held only after implementing the 
process of dividing the administrative and security powers and senior positions including 
the position of the chairman of the KPC, governor and deputy governor among the 
communities of Kirkuk governorate in equal percentages. Based on article 23, a committee 
of seven CoR members representing the Kirkuk governorate (two representatives from each 
of the three main ethnic groups of Kirkuk and one representative for the Christians) was 
established to submit its report to the CoR about several issues, mainly the mechanism of 
local power-sharing arrangements in the city. The committee should have prepared a report 
by 31 March 2009 and the CoR was expected to create a special elections law for Kirkuk 
after that. However, the committee failed to design a mechanism for the division of power 
among the groups (further discussed in chapter three). Therefore, elections were not held 
in 2009 and 2013 in Kirkuk. Thus, the KPC is now the longest-serving provincial council 
in Iraq, indicating the difficulty and the complexity of governance in the city. As I shall 
explain below, I suggest consociational power-sharing as a way to get out of this impasse. 
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The only relative success on governance arrangements was achieved as a result of the local 
Kurdish-Arab agreement of 02 December 2007. Based on that agreement, the deputy 
governor position was given to the Arabs and both sides agreed on allocating power equally 
on the basis of 32-32-32-4 for the three main ethnic groups and the Christians (Anderson 
and Stansfield, 2009: 161). After that, the Friedrich Nauman Foundation6 organized two 
workshops for the local representatives of Kirkuk in Amman and Berlin in 2008 and 2009 
which were known as the ‘Dead Sea Declaration’ and the ‘Berlin Accord’, respectively, in 
which the local representatives of the city committed themselves to cooperation and power-
sharing. In the ‘Berlin Accord’, the participants agreed upon the distribution of senior posts 
in the provincial administration as mandated under article 23 (Collins and Wolff, 2009). 
The Arabs was already given the position of deputy governor in 2008 and the Turkmen 
were given the position of KPC chairman in 2011. However, the equal power-sharing of 
32-32-32-4 for the public sector employment which was mandated in article 23 and 
confirmed in both the Dead Sea Declaration and the Berlin Accord was never implemented, 
because the KRG blocked it (Knights and Ali, 2010: 7).  
The status quo, however, is temporary and based on a local and an informal agreement. 
Therefore, it is too fragile to be able to continue for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Iraqi 
Supreme Court, at the request of a Kurdish member of KPC, annulled article 23 in August 
2013. In other words, the article on which the current political arrangement has been based 
was already deemed unconstitutional. Therefore, the current arrangement in which the three 
senior positions have been divided among the Kurds, Arabs and the Turkmen respectively 
might not continue like that. Moreover, Stefan Wolff, who was one of the organizers of the 
both the Dead Sea Declaration and the Berlin Accord, acknowledges that these two 
agreements were ‘unofficial and organized by a small outsiders group’ (Collins and Wolff, 
2009). Therefore, the agreement is likely to be abolished by the Kurds at any time. 
Secondly, as noted in the previous section, the problem of Kirkuk is not only a local dispute 
rather it is also a national one. Therefore, no genuine solutions would be reached without 
the involvement of Baghdad and the KRG. In other words, due to the influential role of 
both Baghdad and Erbil in the city, any local bargaining over power-sharing arrangements 
                                                          
6 For more information on the Friedrich Nauman Foundation, see: http://fnf-amman.org/en/about-fnf 
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or any other institutional mechanism would be complex and far from being able to endure 
in the long run. 
Thirdly, as noted earlier, the issues of governance and future administration of the city are 
linked. In other words, as long as article 140 of the constitution remains unimplemented, 
the problem of governance will also remain unsettled. Clearly, article 140 has not been 
implemented yet. The current existing arrangement with respect to the division of the three 
senior positions between the three main groups, therefore, may not continue not just 
because it has been reached locally, but also because it has been agreed upon without any 
reference to the future status of Kirkuk and article 140. As Anderson (2015) points out, if 
the Kurds are denied the incorporation of the city into the Kurdistan region, ‘then why 
should they be expected to share power with other, smaller groups?’ According to 
Anderson (2015) the fact that the Kurds have permitted a sort of power-sharing in the city 
was to reassure ‘other groups that they have nothing to fear from the Kurds if or when 
Kirkuk becomes part of the Region.  The Kurds will share power, but only if Kirkuk is 
reunited with the Kurdistan region.’ For Anderson (2013: 376), the Kurds as a majority 
group can ‘win elections and govern Kirkuk alone’ and they have ‘a strong geographical, 
historical and moral claim to Kirkuk’, then why would they ‘voluntarily share power with 
Arab and Turkmen political leaders?’7 Moreover, he (2015) continues ‘there are no power-
sharing arrangements in Baghdad [province], or Diyala, or other mixed provinces, so why 
should we expect the Kurds in Kirkuk to be the only ones to share power?’ In short, the 
current existing governance approach in the city is temporary and might not be viable, 
especially if Kirkuk will not join the Kurdistan region in the future. 
Finally, with the fall of Mosul and the rise of ISIS, a new era has started in Iraq in which 
the Kurds appear the main winner and makes them strong enough not to have to 
compromise on the status of Kirkuk and its governance issue. Now, the Kurdish fighters 
(Peshmerga) have taken over Kirkuk and 99% of Kirkuk oil is under their control 
(Basnews.com, 2014). If Kurdish forces maintain their current control over Kirkuk, the 
KRG may push for a resolution of the disputed status of Kirkuk from a position of strength 
regardless of the prevailing demographics of the city (Bet-Shlimon, 2014). Soon after 
                                                          
7 Based on the December 2005 national election outcome in Iraq, Anderson (2013) argues that the Kurds, 
Arabs and Turkmen constitute ’53-27-13’ percentage of the governorate respectively. He believes that the 
percentage of the Kurds is, by now, higher than 53 percent ‘given that displaced Kirkuki Kurds have 
continued to return to Kirkuk under the provisions of article 140 since the December 2005 election.’ 
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taking control of Kirkuk, the president of the Kurdistan region made a visit to the city and 
vowed that he will never withdraw Peshmerga from it and said ‘we are not ready to 
relinquish even a hand’s width of Kurdish land’ (financial times.com, 2014). After the fall 
of Mosul, the Kurdistan region expanded its territory by some 40% and created a new 
reality which seems unlikely to change in the short term (Romano, 2014). In addition, the 
Arab majority districts and sub-districts of Hawija, al-Zab, Riyadh and Abbasi are now 
under the control of ISIS. A recent report by the Middle East Research Institute (MERI) 
which was released on 7 September 2015, illustrates that the areas under the Kurdish 
Peshmerga in Kirkuk areas has been expanded in the post-Mosul period (see map 2). Thus, 
the Kurds have become the single biggest winner in the present crisis in Iraq 
(Dohainstitute.com, 2014). Kurdish politicians are committed to the new status quo and 
now, frankly, tout ‘a new reality’ (the guardian.com, 2014). Under this new circumstance, 
it is highly unlikely that the Kurds will make any compromise over the governance and the 
future status of Kirkuk. 
 
Map 1. Adapted from Middle East Research Institute (MERI) (2015) ‘The future of Kirkuk: 
a roadmap for resolving the status of the governorate’, Erbil, p. 13.  
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There is evidence which show that the Kurds are reluctant to continue committing to the 
previous local agreements with Arabs and Turkmen. For example, as noted earlier, the 
position of KPC’s chairman was given to the Turkmen based on a Kurdish-Turkmen 
agreement in 2011. Thus, Hasan Turan from the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) took the 
position. Nevertheless, he resigned in 2014 from his position after winning a seat for CoR 
in the 2014 Iraqi elections.8 His Kurdish deputy, Rebwar Talabani, replaced him 
temporarily. However, a year passed and the Turkmen have not regained the chairmanship 
of the KPC. The ITF has called for regaining their position several times, but the Kurds 
seem to have intentionally delayed and overlooked their demand. More recently, on 8 
September 2015, Rebwar Talabani spoke about this issue and told a major Kurdish media 
outlet ‘Rudaw’ that the Peshmerga forces protect all the communities in Kirkuk which have 
led to political and military changes on the ground and ‘the ITF should acknowledge that’ 
(Rudaw, 2015) He also added ‘we have to hold a new political agreement and not talk about 
the agreement that took place in 2011’, i.e. the agreement according to which, Hasan Turan 
became the chairman of KPC. In that interview, Talabani asserts that this new reality will 
become the basis for their discussions with the Turkmen. This illustrative indication 
confirms the above discussion on the possibility that the Kurds will renounce their 
agreements with the Arabs and Turkmen in the new environment. 
                                                          
8 According to article 49 of the Iraqi constitution, it is not permissible to combine membership in the Council 
of Representatives (CoR) with any work or other official position. Therefore, Hasan Turan had to choose 
either remaining in his post as the chairman of KPC or becoming a member of Cor. 
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Map 2. Adapted from Middle East Research Institute (MERI) (2015) ‘The future of Kirkuk: 
a roadmap for resolving the status of the governorate’, Erbil, p. 13.  
Several broad conclusions can be drawn from the above discussions on the issue of 
governance in the post-2003 period in Kirkuk. Firstly, there has been a kind of power-
sharing in the city since 2003. Secondly, the existing power sharing has been temporary, 
informal and vulnerable to collapse at any time, particularly under the current situation in 
which the Kurds have controlled the city and the Arab have lost most of their areas to ISIS. 
Thirdly, the inability of the local political parties to reach a formal and legally embedded 
power-sharing has mainly been due to the fact that the governance problem is linked to the 
future status of the city. In other words, the governance problem cannot be tackled without 
addressing the disputed future administrative status of the city. To do so, the involvement 
of both the central government and the KRG is necessary.  
Different Options for Kirkuk 
Maintaining the status quo is not an adequate solution for the governorate. As noted above, 
although the currently existing system is largely a power-sharing arrangement, it remains 
an interim one. Kirkuk needs to have a more clearly defined status both legally and 
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politically not only on its future status but also with regard to its internal governance 
between its local communities.  Conducting only one election within ten years in the 
governorate (other governorates held three elections in 2005, 2009 and 2013) is a clear 
indication of the depth of disputes among the three main ethnic groups regarding the 
governance of the city. 
It is noteworthy that there are different institutional mechanisms for managing conflicts in 
deeply divided places. As McGarry and O’Leary (1993: 4) note, two main methods are 
usually used by countries for the regulation of ethnic conflict: the elimination of differences 
and the management of differences. The elimination of differences includes genocide, 
forced mass-population transfers, partition or secession and integration or assimilation. 
While the management of differences includes hegemonic control, arbitration, 
federalization and power-sharing. This distinction has been made in various ways such as 
‘integration’ and ‘devolution’; ‘repression’ and ‘accommodation’; ‘denial’ and 
‘acceptance’ (For more detail about these terms, see Heraclides 1997).  
Assimilationist strategies favour majorities and try to make the minorities conform to the 
culture of the dominant group. According to McGarry and O’Leary (1994: 102), 
assimilation ‘aims eventually to create a common ethnic identity through the merging of 
differences (the melting pot)’. This strategy can work when targeted at migrants who have 
left their homelands and they wish to be assimilated (such as many of the migrants in UK 
or Canada). However, this is unacceptable in divided societies. The Turkish policy to 
assimilate its sizeable population of Kurdish citizens for nearly a century has been proven 
dangerous and unsuccessful as well. In other words, it is coercive assimilation that is 
morally and politically problematic not voluntary assimilation (O’Leary, 2014).  
Unlike assimilation, under an integration strategy people are free to preserve their private 
cultural differences. In other words, the government or public policy do not seek to promote 
the full cultural homogenization of minorities into the dominant culture. Under integration, 
people are free to have their own schools in their own languages or religions, but they do 
not receive public subsidies to do so (O’Leary, 2014). This means that there is recognition 
of the difference in the private sphere. However, the public sphere is homogeneous in the 
sense that a common public language and public symbols are preferred there. Minority 
participation, under integration, is encouraged in the public life, but they are expected to 
leave their cultures at the doors to public places ‘in the way some institutions and peoples 
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expect visitors to leave their shoes’ (O’Leary, 2013: 17). Integration, as O’Leary (2014) 
argues, is the dominant norm among European nation states.  
Majoritarian democracy is another option for divided societies. Majoritarian democracy is 
the most common types of democracy which are also called the British or ‘Westminster’ 
model. In a majoritarian democracy, there is government-versus-opposition in which the 
leaders are divided into a government with majority support and a large (though minority) 
opposition. The style of leadership in British model is competitive or adversarial.  In a 
majoritarian democracy, candidates that represent society’s majority generally form the 
government, and the opposition is formed of minority groups. 
Federalization and power-sharing are two other options for managing differences in divided 
societies. McGarry and O'Leary (2011: 249), for example, identify two types of 
accommodation on the territorial and non-territorial basis. Territorial forms of group 
difference can be managed through federal systems or ‘territorial pluralism.’ Weller and 
Wolff (2005, 12-13) argue that in territorial autonomy the autonomous entity is defined in 
territorial terms and thus ‘a population living in a certain territory is granted an autonomous 
status regardless of whether the individuals living on this territory belong to one or another 
ethnic group.’ However, centripetal and consociational forms of powersharing are the two 
best-known forms of managing differences that do not necessarily rely on territory.  
Centripetalism is mainly associated with the works of the American political scientist and 
legal scholar Donald Horowitz. Horowitz (2014:5) argues that centripetalists attempt to 
‘create incentives, principally electoral incentives, for moderates to compromise on 
conflicting group claims, to form interethnic coalitions, and to establish a regime of 
interethnic majority rule.’ In other words, centripetalism would encourage the election of 
moderate representatives through various electoral mechanisms such as ‘alternative vote’ 
(AV). AV allows voters to rank order preferences at the ballot box to facilitate the election 
of moderate ethnic politicians who should reach out and attract votes from a range of ethnic 
groups other than their own (Reilly, 2011: 290-291). In short, as O’Flynn (2007: 736) notes, 
the hope is that an inter-ethnic coalition of moderates will be formed that is strong enough 
to repel the extremists. 
Consociationalism, on the other hand, is closely associated with the works of Arendt 
Lijphart. Complete consociational systems have four features, namely: grand coalition 
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government, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy (Lijphart, 1977). 
Consociational theory favours ‘the formal public recognition and organization of ethnic, 
religious, and linguistic minorities’ (O’Leary, 2013: 19). Consociation, as a mechanism of 
conflict management, is seen by its defenders as an appropriate mechanism for resolving 
the problem of governance and bringing about political stability in divided societies (See, 
for example, Lijphart 1977, 2002, 2004; McGarry & O’Leary 2004; and O’Leary 2005, 
2013). Power-sharing is such an effective institutional mechanism for managing conflict 
that has been included in nearly all the peace accords signed in the last two decades in one 
form or another (McCulloch, 2014: 1). In addition, consociation is the preferred choice of 
the international community, including for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Finally, the key research question that this study tries to answer is whether consociation 
can offer an appropriate institutional mechanism for managing conflict and building a 
stable government in Kirkuk. The question is about how to implement consociation, but 
before making that case, one has to establish why consociation is applicable. I examine the 
applicability of consociationalism in greater detail in chapter three and I also discuss how 
best to implement consociation in the remaining chapters. In other words, the research 
question deals with two important issues. Firstly, examining the applicability of 
consociationalism in Kirkuk. Secondly, determining how best to implement consociation 
in the city, i.e. determining the precise form that consociation needs to take.  
In the above question, several terms need to be defined and explained such as 
‘consociation,’ ‘managing conflict,’ and ‘political stability’. The key concept of 
‘consociational democracy’ had already been defined by Lijphart (1977) in terms of four 
basic principles: grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy. 
Conflict management is dealt with in this dissertation as ‘a process that aims at channelling 
the violent manifestation of an incompatibility of goals between two or more parties into a 
political process where their disputes can be addressed by non-violent means’ (Yakinthou 
and Wolff, 2012: 1). Political stability is used in the way identified by Lijphart (1977: 3-4) 
as a multidimensional concept which combines system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy 
and effectiveness. 
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Methodology 
This section is concerned with the methods that I have used for this research. Social science 
scholars use different methods to study social phenomena and their debate over which 
method can be better than others continues in academia. In this research, I chose to employ 
a qualitative research approach. I have used two qualitative methods in this research which 
are interviews and official legal documents. My interviews can be considered as elite 
interviewing, because I have interviewed people who are close to power and policy-making 
processes such as the members of Kirkuk Provincial Council (KPC) and the members of 
Council of Representatives (CoR) in Baghdad. 
My interviews are my primary data as I have conducted them personally. Appendix (E) 
illustrates the names, ethnic background and the position of my 29 respondents along with 
the date and the place of the interviews. The interviews were conducted in two stages: 
between August to October 2013 (24 interviews) and January to April 2015 (5 interviews). 
I initially planned to conduct all the interviews in 2013, but things did not go as planned. 
Therefore, I was compelled to do five other interviews in 2015. I have undertaken 
interviews with elites from different ethnic groups both within and outside Kirkuk in three 
languages (Kurdish, Arabic and English). The majority of my interviewees are from Kirkuk 
but as the question of Kirkuk is also related to Baghdad and the Kurdistan region, I 
conducted four interviews with politicians in Sulaimani and Erbil and three interviews from 
Baghdad via the telephone and Facebook. My interviewees include almost all the key 
political actors inside Kirkuk such as the former and current governor, the former and 
current chairman of Kirkuk’s provincial council (KPC), a number of KPC’s members and 
political party leaders. Outside Kirkuk, my respondents include members of Iraq’s Council 
of Representatives (CoR), politicians and academics. 
The role that this primary qualitative data is playing in the thesis to generate an evidential 
basis for the arguments put forward. Consociation is mainly an elite-oriented theory. 
Therefore, conducting interviews with political leaders of different communities of Kirkuk 
for this research was essential to understand whether there are prospects for adopting 
consociational power-sharing. In addition, most of the literature on the problem of Kirkuk 
has mainly focused on the future status of the city rather than its unresolved governance 
problem. In other words, taking the views of the elites was vital to understand the problem 
of governance in the city and the different options to solve that problem. The rich data that 
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I collected on the nature of governance in the city since 2003 and learning about the points 
of agreement and disagreement among the elites are very helpful to have a profound insight 
into the problems of governing Kirkuk.   
In terms of the representativeness of my interviews, my interviewees’ ethnic backgrounds 
are as follow: 17 Kurds, 6 Arabs, 5 Turkmen and 1 Christian. This is somewhat a reflection 
of the proportional number of each group in the KPC. The number of KPC’s members are 
41 in which the Kurdish Brotherhood List (KBL) have 26 members, 9 Turkmen and 6 
Arabs9. Within each group, I have tried to take the views of all influential parties. For 
example, my Kurdish interviewees include members of all influential political parties such 
as Patriotic United of Kurdistan (PUK), Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Movement of 
Change (Gorran), Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) and Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) and 
independent people.10 My Arab interviewees include respondents from the two major Arab 
parties in Kirkuk, i.e. the Iraqi Republic Gathering (Arab) with 5 seats in KPC and Iraqi 
National Gathering with one seat. Most of my Turkmen respondents are from the Iraqi 
Turkmen Front (ITF) which is the main Turkmen political coalition that have 8 seats in 
KPC followed by Turkmen Islamic Coalition (TIC) with one seat. 
I used different approaches to recruit my participants. In the first step, for example, I 
officially submitted a written letter to the Kirkuk Provincial Council (KPC) requesting an 
interview appointment. In that letter I covered several issues briefly such as introducing 
myself as a neutral researcher and my research topic, the manner of my questions in general 
and requesting an hour for interview. Moreover, in case of not having time for face to face 
interviews, I had proposed other alternatives for conducting interviews such as telephone, 
email, Facebook and Skype. Along with that letter, I attached a support letter from 
Newcastle University and submitted it to some officials’ secretaries who served as ‘gate 
keepers’ in order to find and organize a time for the interviews. This technique worked in 
few cases but then I realized that this way is not effective as I had to follow up and make 
many phone calls later with no guarantee of accessing my respondents in most of the cases. 
In addition, as Mikecz (2012:  482) notes ‘gaining access to elites is hard enough; gaining 
their trust and building rapport with them is even more difficult.’ Taken this into 
                                                          
9 There is one Christian within KBL. Moreover, although there is no reliable census in Kirkuk, the number 
of Arabs are more than the Turkmen. The reason for larger Turkmen representations in Kirkuk than Arabs is 
because of the low Arab Sunni turnout in the 2005 Kirkuk governorate election. 
10 These five political parties have dominated Kurdish politics in the Kurdistan region and have 
representatives in the CoR in Baghdad as well. 
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consideration, I resorted to the snowball sampling technique in the second step. This 
technique is ‘a sampling technique in which the researcher samples initially a small group 
of people relevant to the research questions, and these sampled participants propose other 
participants who have had the experience or characteristics relevant to the research. These 
participants will then suggest others and so on’ (Bryman, 2012: 424). This strategy proved 
very effective and useful.  
Not all of the 29 interviewees for this research were initially planned. I initially planned to 
do most of the interviews via phone or Skype and to avoid visiting the city as much as 
possible, mainly for security reasons because, as a fragile divided city, Kirkuk is subject to 
frequent violence and terrorist attacks. Once I returned to Iraq, however, I realized that 
without personally visiting Kirkuk, collecting empirical data was almost impossible. It did 
not take me long to understand that being personally present is still not sufficient. Given 
this and knowing the importance of personal relations and friendship as part of the Iraqi 
culture, I decided to depend on the snowballing strategy. Snowball sampling is ‘a 
recruitment method that employs research into participants’ social networks to access 
specific populations’ (Browne, 2005: 47). I used this method to access people who were 
difficult to access by myself. At the end of an interview with a respondent, I would ask if 
the respondent could help me in reaching out to other people. As Mikecz (2012: 491) 
observes, at the end of the interviews ‘it helps to ask for names of contacts that they think 
would be able and willing to provide information in the form of an interview’. This strategy 
made gaining access to some busy politicians easier and avoided the long and possibly 
fruitless bureaucratic waiting period. To gain access to my respondents, I depended on 
different people from different ethnic backgrounds. Using this technique, I found that the 
elites were far more receptive and open to talk than they might have been if I had 
approached them by myself as a researcher. Following each interview, I sent a mobile 
message to my interviewees thanking them for their cooperation. I noticed that this gesture 
would encourage my interviewees in some cases to help me in reaching political leaders 
who were otherwise very difficult or even impossible to access directly by an independent 
researcher.  
Data collection were carried out following guidelines of ethical research. I made it clear to 
my respondents at the outset that I am an independent researcher and before commencing 
any of my interviews I clarified some essential points to the respondent regarding the nature 
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of my research, the employment of the data and the dissemination of the research outcome 
(See, for example, Harvey, 1984: 9-10). Moreover, I designed a consent form based on a 
previous consent form example provided by Newcastle University. In that form, the 
respondents were given complete freedom to: ask any question about my research and my 
aims in doing it; withdraw from the interview at any time without giving reasons; and 
disclose their names or keep them confidential. The respondents were informed that this 
research may be used by other researchers in the future. It is worth mentioning that all of 
my respondents, without exception, agreed to my recording the interview and to mentioning 
their names in my research, either by signing the above-mentioned consent form or by 
giving their consent over phone, skype, etc. This is not surprising as elite members are 
generally confident people and used to speaking in front of microphones, so they tend not 
have reservations regarding sharing their insight for the subject under investigation and 
disclosing their names in general, particularly if researchers can establish trust with them 
before starting their interviews (Bozoki, 2011: 3-4). The above initial procedures were 
effective for a conversational breaking of the ice and in establishing basic trust with my 
interviewees. Although I was aware that politicians are generally confident people, I still 
made efforts to ensure that I would leave my respondents in the same position in which I 
found them so that my interview does not endanger and harm their political positions 
(Woliver, 2002). Briefly, I was aware that I needed some information which was not easy 
to garner from the available sources but at the same time I was fully aware of the need to 
consider ethical issue and explain everything clearly to my respondents.  
One of the main challenges in my research project was handling my ethnic identity. 
Conducting elite interviewing in a deeply divided society is clearly a challenge for 
researchers. In my case, my Kurdish identity could contribute in adding to the challenge 
even more. I shall turn to this point. However, one may agree that the author of this 
dissertation, as an ‘insider’ who originates from the region, was well qualified to gather 
hard data in Kirkuk. The reason for that, as Tamar Hermann (2001: 82) notes, is that the 
insiders are familiar with the socio-cultural and political contexts, proficient in the 
language, have better access to primary resources, and have detailed and sometimes first-
hand information regarding relevant events. Unlike the outside researchers, I did not need 
an interpreter during my interviews and thus the possibility of getting an erroneous 
impression from my interviewees regarding the problem of power-sharing in Kirkuk were 
reduced. 
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Being an insider is not, however, without its challenges. In my case, I had to avoid being 
biased and to handle my ethnic identity carefully. I was keen to be impartial and avoid 
seeming biased. Following McEvoy’s advice for researchers conducting interviews in 
divided societies, I tried to avoid or at least limit being biased by using techniques 
‘impartially’ and trying to be ‘as neutral as possible by carefully framing the interview 
schedule, keeping to the same themes with the different respondents and using neutral 
language’ (McEvoy, 2006: 187). Two points were useful to remove or lessen the effect of 
my ethnic identity on my non-Kurdish respondents. Firstly, as noted earlier, explaining my 
research project clearly and stating that I am a neutral researcher along with giving them 
the right to skip any question that they do not like to answer or even retreat from the 
interview completely if they wish to do so. Secondly, I noted that the support letter of 
Newcastle University was crucial as my respondents had, generally, the perception that my 
study in a well-established UK university could have put me in a position to avoid being 
biased and keep neutrality to a healthy extent. My Kurdish identity was, however, still an 
obstacle in some situations. For example, in the initial design of my interview questions, I 
planned to go to Hawija to interview some local Arab leaders but later I realized that this 
is simply impossible and physically dangerous. As Hermann (2001: 90) convincingly notes, 
‘some of the negative influences of the researcher’s identity cannot be remedied, but an 
awareness of them might mitigate their effects.’ Yet, being Kurdish was advantageous in 
relation to easier access to most of my Kurdish interviewees and thus gain rich data. 
In conducting the interviews, I faced various difficulties. Firstly, as noted above, the 
majority of these interviews were conducted between August and October 2013 at the time 
when the Kurdish politicians were getting ready for and busy with the aftermath of the Iraqi 
Kurdistan legislative elections which took place on 21 September 2013. Due to that 
election, I could not gain access to some of the senior Kurdish politicians in Erbil and 
Sulaimani that I initially planned to interview.11 Secondly, I had to travel nearly three or 
four times a week from my town (Chamchamall) into Kirkuk for nearly 50 minutes and 
once getting there I had to join a long queue and pass four security inspection points every 
time which was difficult and in some cases (depending on the mood of the inspector), I was 
not allowed to take any electronic devices into the building such as my mobile and my 
                                                          
11 Apart from that, I contacted the American and British consulates in Erbil via email, but I did not get any 
reply. I also made several phone calls with the UNAMI representative in Kirkuk, but he told me that he cannot 
speak to me on behalf of UNAMI. In several cases, despite their initial consent, some people declined to do 
the interviews for no clear reasons. Therefore, I had to add four other interviews later in 2015.  
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recorder which made conducting interviews very demanding. In several other cases, even 
if I passed the security inspections, I had to return home without being able to do any 
interview. This was either because the respondents were busy or they had to do another 
immediate thing such as attending a meeting or holding a press conference. In some of 
those cases, I had to leave my questions so that they would answer them later. However, I 
found that face-to-face interviews were better in terms of gaining richer data. Thirdly, I had 
to be very flexible for changing the time and place of the interviews. For example, in one 
case, one of my respondents called me late in the evening and told me that he had only time 
for the interview two hours later; therefore, I had no choice but to go to Kirkuk and find his 
house that night to do the interview. In a couple of interviews in Sulaimani, my respondents 
told me that they had only 15 minutes for interviews, so I had to determine my priority 
questions very quickly and compromise on some other questions and thus not gaining the 
sufficient information that I had hoped for. Last but not least, I had to leave Kirkuk as soon 
as undertaking the interviews because of security concerns and the fear of explosions which 
targeted governmental buildings in particular. In the middle of my last interview with an 
Arab member of KPC, a car bomb exploded a few hundred yards away from his office. 
Despite these difficulties, I believe that I have collected rich data.   
The interviews were recorded, transcribed and translated into English. Sixteen out of 
twenty-nine interviews were undertaken in Kurdish, twelve in Arabic and one conducted 
in English. The interviews with the Arab, Turkmen and the only Christian participant were 
conducted in Arabic language. I faced little difficulty in translating the interviews into 
English, partly because I already have experience of both translating and interpreting from 
Kurdish into English on the one hand and have also done Arabic-English translations on 
the other.12 As some elements of my interviews were not very useful because some of my 
interviewees were raising irrelevant topics, I saw little point in transcribing and translating 
those portions. As Bryman (2012: 486) notes, ‘this is a common experience among 
qualitative interviewers’: therefore following his suggestion, I chose to listen my interviews 
closely, at least twice and then transcribing only those portions that I thought are useful or 
relevant.  
                                                          
12 In 2005, I obtained my BA in English language and literature in the department of English language at 
Sulaimani University/ Iraq. After graduation, I worked with Mine Advisory Group (MAG) as English-
Kurdish and Kurdish-English translator and interpreter. In the past and also in many occasions in this research, 
I have done Arabic-English translations.  
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In analysing my transcripts, I followed two main procedures: thematic analysis and 
illustrative method. To reduce my data, I have employed thematic analysis in analysing my 
data which is one of the common approaches to the analysis of qualitative data. Although 
themes are often fuzzy abstract, it, in one of its meanings, can be viewed as a ‘category 
identified by the analyst through his/her data’ (Bryman, 2012: 580). To identify the themes, 
I read and reread the transcripts carefully and marked up the answers of my respondents 
about a particular question. For example, after reading the transcripts several times, I 
noticed that my respondents from different ethnic groups repeatedly referred to the 
importance of including all the groups to govern the city, therefore I concluded that 
‘inclusion’ is an important theme of my data. As Ryan and Bernard (2003) note, one of the 
common ways to identify themes is the topics that recur over and over again. Portions of 
my research themes come from my data, whereas in some other cases the themes have come 
from my prior theoretical understanding of the theory of consociation found in the literature 
(Ryan and Bernard, 2003: 88). This ‘a priori’ theme appears to be the equivalent of what 
Lawrence Neuman (2011) dubbed ‘illustrative method’. According to Neuman (2011: 519), 
illustrative method is ‘a method of qualitative data analysis that takes theoretical concepts 
and treats them as empty boxes to be filled with specific empirical examples and 
descriptions.’ 
In this research, the consociational theory provides the ‘empty boxes’ that I fill with 
empirical evidence. The four elements of consociationalism (Grand Coalition, segmental 
autonomy, proportionality and mutual veto), for example, can play the role of empty boxes 
and thus I treat each of them as an independent theme. Evidence in the boxes, as Neuman 
(2011: 519) notes, can ‘confirm, modify or reject the theory’. Based on this argument, I 
will show in the conclusion of this research how my empirical data might contribute to a 
possible modification in the theory of consociationalism. Finally, one of the common 
criticisms of qualitative data analysis, as Draper (2004:644) notes, is that ‘it is very 
subjective and merely reflects the researcher’s own biases and interests.’ In order to avoid 
this, I have tried to present the views of all the ethnic groups when discussing a specific 
topic or theme in my analysis. In addition, I have also tried to refer to the official documents 
when supporting one view against another. Now I turn to those documents and how I have 
used them in this research. 
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In terms of legal and policy documents, I mainly depend on the official documents of Iraq 
such as TAL and the articles of the Iraqi constitution. Moreover, the orders under Coalition 
Provisional authority (CPA) are also consulted. The laws by the Council of Representatives 
(CoR) and the orders by Council of Ministers (CoM) are also employed when necessary. 
Clearly, there are numerous articles and laws which are publicly available, but I choose 
those which are specific to Kirkuk such as Article 58 of the TAL and article 140 of the 
2005 Iraqi constitution.13 I also consulted those articles and laws that are not specific to 
Kirkuk but relevant such as the electoral laws for governorate elections. These documents 
are credible official state documents which are mostly available in the Arabic language and 
sometimes English and Kurdish as well. Therefore, the translations (when English versions 
are not available) and interpretations of the laws and articles are mine. These documents 
are especially useful to illustrate the post-2003 Iraqi political system as a consociational 
one. They are also vitally important to understanding whether there are any legal 
obstructions or leeway regarding the possibility of adopting a consociational power-sharing 
arrangement for Kirkuk governorate in the future. In addition, they should be referred to, 
particularly when the interviewees repeatedly point to a particular article in the constitution 
or a law by the CoR. In that case, they are supportive and enhance the empirical data. In 
short, these documents serve as additional values in this research on some occasions, 
whereas they are key in some others and without them the research would be incomplete.  
Finally, two general points can be drawn as a conclusion of this section. Firstly, 
interviewing is one of the common techniques of data collection in political science 
research to access the views and interpretations of issues under investigation (McEvoy, 
2006: 184). In this research, conducting interviews with elites was essential because 
consociationalism is originally an elite-oriented theory. Moreover, this research is a 
normative one which tries to conclude what should be done to govern the city in the future. 
Therefore, without sampling the views of political leaders who are the most knowledgeable 
people about the issue of governance in Kirkuk, this study would not make sense. Secondly, 
the official legal documents of Iraq are of great importance both to understand the past 
experience of the problems of administration and governance in the city and the future 
prospects for solving them.  
                                                          
13 It is worth noting that the laws that are issued by the CoR are usually published by the Iraqi official Guzzetti 
which can be found in the following link:  http://www.moj.gov.iq/facts/ 
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Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is composed of six chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one provides a historical 
and political background to the problem of Kirkuk in order to provide context for the 
discussions that follow. In this chapter, I discuss the issues of oil, Arabization policy, the 
identity formation of the ethnic groups and future administrative status of the governorate 
according to the Iraqi constitution. The importance of this chapter is that without 
understanding the past history of Kirkuk, it is difficult, if not impossible, to appreciate the 
current ethnic conflict over the city. I also try to identify variables that can explain the rise 
and persistence of ethnic conflict in Kirkuk and then relate those variables to the prospects 
for consociation. The chapter is organized over three main sections. In the first section, the 
pre-2003 history of Kirkuk and the factor of oil and its role in rising ethnic conflict are 
discussed. Particular attention is given to the Arabization policy here which is closely 
linked to the discovery of oil in the city in 1927. The second section will discuss how the 
identities of the groups have been formed over time in the light of the two dominant schools 
of ethnicity, i.e. primordialism and constructivism. Then, the ethnic identity formation of 
the groups is linked to the debates over which consociational form, i.e. corporate or liberal 
consociation, should be adopted in Kirkuk. The post-2003 history of Kirkuk is discussed in 
the third section where particular attention is given to the legal documents regarding the 
future status of the city and governorate.  
Chapter two discusses the theoretical framework that guides this work. I provide a general 
overview of consociational theory in four sections. In section one, I present the theory, its 
elements and favourable conditions. While section two states the developments that 
consociation has experienced over the course of nearly forty years, such as the debate over 
liberal v. corporate (or predetermined v. self-determined) forms of consociation and making 
distinctions between the two main characteristics of consociation, i.e. ‘grand coalition’ and 
‘segmental autonomy’ and the two secondary ones, i.e. ‘proportionality and mutual veto’. 
The third and fourth sections deal with the critiques of consociational theory and the 
responses by its advocates. The critiques and responses are examined in detail and their 
relevance to the case of Kirkuk is also identified. This review of the literature of 
consociation is important because, on the one hand, it helps to identify the most up-to-date 
discussion over the theory and, on the other, it helps clarify my basic research question.  
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To be able to answer whether consociation can actually offer an appropriate institutional 
mechanism for managing conflict and building a stable government in Kirkuk, one should 
understand the elements of consociation first. Chapter three examines in much greater detail 
the first element of consociation which is grand coalition. The first section of this chapter 
presents an overview on the principle of grand coalition. The second section explores the 
concept of ‘inclusion’ as a crucial feature of grand coalition governments in divided 
societies with particular focus on the post-2003 governments formed in Kirkuk. Elite 
cooperation as a prerequisite for working any grand coalition arrangement and with regards 
to the case of Kirkuk is dealt with in the third section of this chapter. Apart from the 
available literature, I also use my interviews to examine the extent of inclusion and elite 
cooperation in Kirkuk. In short, through investigating the governments formed in the post-
2003 period in Kirkuk, I aim to illustrate whether grand coalition government would be 
possible in Kirkuk in the future or not. Answering this question contributes, at least partly, 
in answering the main question of this research. 
Chapter four investigates group or ‘segmental autonomy’. It is essential to study segmental 
autonomy as one of the primary features of consociational theory for gaining a good insight 
on the role of consociation in maintaining political stability in Kirkuk. As an aspect of that, 
I will also argue for the importance of considering social capital theory in Kirkuk. I discuss 
how segmental autonomy can play a greater role in the stabilization of the city if it is 
enhanced with a civil society perspective such as that offered by social capital theory. The 
chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I provide an overview of 
segmental autonomy, its definition and its territorial and non-territorial forms along with 
presenting a number of relevant cases. The second section examines the situation of the 
groups and minorities in Iraq and Kirkuk with reference to the Iraqi constitution and other 
legal and law frameworks. The third section deals with social capital theory and focuses 
primarily on the importance of creating bridging social capital at the grassroots level in 
Kirkuk. Here, I argue that social capital theory is crucially important to be considered in 
Kirkuk as it can help supplement and deepen consociational theory and practice. 
Chapter five deals with the principle of proportionality. The focus of this chapter is on two 
main points, namely: the importance of the electoral system choice for divided societies 
and the representation of ethnic groups in the public sector. The chapter is divided into 
three sections. The opening section is about proportionality’s definition and the issues that 
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surround it. The second section compares proportional electoral system with majority 
electoral system. It also points out the centripetal vs consociation debate about the impact 
of electoral systems on producing inclusive government or a government by moderate 
politicians and eventually the impact of electoral systems on stability. The electoral systems 
used for elections held in Kirkuk up to this point are also discussed. The third section puts 
emphasis on the issue of ethnic representation in Kirkuk’s public sector and examines 
whether the groups’ representation in the public sector reflects their actual size on the 
ground.  
Chapter six examines the fourth and final element of consociational theory, which is Mutual 
veto. Mutual veto is considered as an important protection for minorities, as grand coalition 
alone might not sufficiently protect the minorities. This chapter is divided into three 
sections. I provide an overview of mutual veto in the first section by presenting the forms 
and the formal and informal status of veto rights in different cases along with its advantages 
and main drawbacks. In the second section, I explore a number of cases with mutual veto 
such as Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Macedonia and Belgium. Discussing mutual veto in these 
cases is important to learn whether they have any lesson for Kirkuk. In the last section, I 
discuss the feasibility of adopting mutual veto institutions in Kirkuk in the future. This 
discussion is made with reference to the way veto rights have been dealt with in the post-
Saddam Iraq by taking advantage of the lessons that can be learnt from the above-
mentioned cases for Kirkuk. Addressing the issue of veto rights can get us a step closer in 
answering the main research question. 
Finally, in the conclusion, I summarise the key findings and possible implications of the 
findings for policy makers with regard to solving the unresolved governance issue in 
Kirkuk. The conclusion is organized over three sections. In the first section, I outline the 
main findings of this research. The second section deals with the implications of those 
findings with respect to expanding or refining the theory of consociational power-sharing 
and how those findings can serve policy makers in finding a solution for governing the city. 
In the last section, I highlight the limitations of this research and propose some 
recommendations for further research. In the conclusion, I also discuss some general 
lessons that other divided societies might learn from Kirkuk: in short, I discuss lessons for 
comparative politics more generally. 
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Conclusion 
As a polarized and a deeply divided place, Kirkuk has three main problems which derive 
from its vast amount of oil, its future status and its unresolved governance. These problems 
have effects on the future stability of Iraq as a whole. Therefore, any solution for any one 
of those three problems can contribute to political stability of Kirkuk and Iraq as well. The 
problem of governance in Kirkuk, however, is the main focus of this study, though the other 
two problems will also be discussed in this dissertation where appropriate. I argue for 
Lijphart’s solution, presented at the outset of this introduction, that the only real choice for 
the political leaders for establishing or strengthening democratic institution in plural 
societies (Kirkuk in this research) is that they become consociational engineers (1977: 223). 
Although there is no single best or idealized model that should be applied universally, I 
argue that the consociation form of power-sharing is the most appropriate institutional 
mechanism for managing conflict, accommodating the grievances and demands of the 
ethnic groups and building a stable government in Kirkuk. The merits of consociation, as 
noted in section two, are evident when it is compared to its alternatives. 
The following six chapters of this work, with the support of employing both my primary 
and secondary data, will contribute to answering the main question of this research which 
tries to examine whether consociation can be an appropriate institutional mechanism to 
solve the problem of governance in the city. I will start with presenting an overview of the 
political history of Kirkuk and its ethnic groups and ethnicity mobilization in the coming 
chapter. This, on the one hand, will help us to understand the nature of the Kirkuk problem 
in a clearer and more detailed way and, on the other hand, pave the way to engage with the 
research more deeply. The following chapter is vital to understand how the political 
situation has evolved in Kirkuk over the last century and why this research attempts to 
investigate whether consociational power-sharing might be able to solve one of the difficult 
issues of the city, namely the governance problem.  
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Chapter 1. The Political History of Kirkuk 
The twentieth century was a turning point in the history of Middle East. In 1916, the 
representatives of Great Britain and France reached a secretly negotiated deal known as the 
Sykes-Picot agreement. According to that agreement, the territories under the rule of the 
Ottoman Empire were to be divided into British and French zones of influence by the end 
of World War I. At the time, Kirkuk was part of the Ottoman Vilayet (or province) of Mosul. 
Although the Vilayet of Mosul, according to the Sykes-Picot agreement, was firstly planned 
to be under French control, the extent of the region’s oil potential pushed the British to 
reach another deal with the French to change the Sykes-Picot agreement to be able to put 
the Vilayet under its control later (further discussed below). The discovery of oil in 1927 
marked a milestone for Kirkuk. The presence of the oil industry pushed the successive Iraqi 
governments to start the Arabization policy in which the Kurds and Turkmen were expelled 
from Kirkuk systematically in an attempt to shift the demography of the city. This policy 
awakened the ethnic differences in the city and thus the lines of ethnicity emerged and 
gradually hardened. After 2003, the Sunni-Arab domination ended, but a severe struggle 
started between the different ethnic groups in the city over the ownership of the city and 
the right to govern it. Neither the future of the city nor its governance problem have been 
settled yet. 
This opening chapter tries to present a political history of Kirkuk which mainly starts from 
the twentieth century. The point here is to familiarize the reader with some crucial stages 
of the history of the city and the governorate. Without this, understanding the current 
conflicts over Kirkuk would be very difficult, if not impossible. Once we understand the 
current political situation, the necessity and the importance of the main question of this 
research, which attempts to investigate whether consociation can be a suitable solution for 
the problem of governance in Kirkuk, will be more apparent. This chapter is divided into 
three sections. In the first section, I present an overview of the pre-2003 history with a 
particular focus on two events: the discovery of oil and the subsequent Arabization policy 
in the twentieth century.  In the second section, I examine how group identities of different 
ethnic groups have been formed in Kirkuk. Finally, I consider the post-2003 ethnopolitical 
situation in Kirkuk with emphasis on the nature of local governments formed in the city 
and how the interim and permanent constitutions of Iraq have treated the case of Kirkuk in 
the new stage after the fall of Saddam.  
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1.1 Pre-2003 History: Oil and Arabization 
In this section, I present an overview of the history of Kirkuk from ancient times until the 
fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003. The city experienced a particular economic and political 
shift in the twentieth century. It was in the past century when the lines of ethnicity emerged 
and hardened, on the one hand, and the Kurdish-Arab political and military rivalry over the 
city broke out, on the other. It is important to note that the roots of ethnicity are closely 
intertwined with the discovery of oil, as this historic event led to a major Arabization policy 
by different successive Iraqi governments. The Arabization policy, which resulted in the 
expulsion of thousands of Kurds and Turkmen from the city, awakened ethnic 
distinctiveness and pushed nationalist aspirations in a way that each of the ethnic groups 
have now their own story about their historic ownership for the city. The outcome of 
holding such different views sustains the different perspectives for solving the current 
governance and administrative problems of the city. In other words, the main explanation 
for the elusiveness of authentic political stability in the city is because of its past history. 
Therefore, before suggesting any solution for the problem of Kirkuk, particularly an 
institutional solution, understanding that history is essential. 
Kirkuk is an ancient city with a history of 5000 years. The Kirkuk region lies between the 
Zagros mountains in the north-east, the Lower Zab and the Tigris rivers in the north-west 
and west, the Hamrin mountain range in the south-west, and the Diyala (Sirwan) river in 
the south-east (Nouri Talabany, 2004: 7). Put differently, Kirkuk is located in the north of 
Iraq, 236 kilometres (147 miles) north of Baghdad and 85 kilometres (53 miles) south of 
Erbil (daftlogic.com, 2015). Over the years, Kurds of the adjacent Zagros Mountains 
moved to Kirkuk, at the same time Oguz Turks (in the eleventh century AD) and Ottoman 
officials came to form Kirkuk’s large Turkmen population; Arabs from the south and 
Christians from the earliest days of Christianity contributed to the city’s ethnic mix 
(Romano, 2007: 266). Thus, Kirkuk, as Anderson and Stansfield (2009:9) state, is ‘an 
ancient city in an ancient land’  which gained a reputation for cultural cosmopolitanism for 
many centuries and has been recognized for its distinctive ethnic, linguistic, religious and 
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cultural diversity (Galleti, 2005: 21). In short, Kirkuk is one of the most ancient cities of 
the world in which four ethnic groups and communities have lived together for centuries.14 
The groups of Kirkuk are divided along religious and linguistics lines. Religiously, there 
are Muslims and Christians and Muslims are further divided into Sunnis and Shiites. 
However, language has been and still is the key distinctive marker rather than religion to 
distinguish the groups from each other in the city. The city has been widely known for its 
multilingualism and each ethnic group has its own language. The Kurds, for example, speak 
and write in Sorani Kurdish, the Arabs speak and write in Arabic, the Turkmen speak 
Turkmen (a Turkish dialect) and standard modern Turkish as a written language, and the 
Chaldo-Assyrians speak Assyrian and sometimes write in Neo-Aramaic (The World 
Factbook, 2015; Bet-Shlimon, 2012: 927). Nevertheless, multilingualism and ethnic 
diversity did not cause ethnic tensions and violence in the city until the twentieth century 
and the discovery of oil (I elaborate on this point further in the next section).  
Due to its geographical and strategic location, Kirkuk changed hands many times during 
the wars between the Sunni Ottomans and the Shiite Safavids for a long period in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Galleti, 2005: 22). By the nineteenth century, Kirkuk 
became a very important cultural, political and economic centre for especially its Turkmen 
and Kurdish population (Romano, 2007: 266). Kirkuk was part of the Ottoman Empire until 
the end of World War 1 when the British occupied the city in 1918. As part of the 1916 
Sykes-Picot Agreement, Britain had planned to completely hand over Mosul province to 
the French but realizing the extent of the region’s oil potential as a precious resource made 
the British decide to take a different course of action (Heacock, 2010: 2). After that, the 
British reached an agreement with the French to alter the terms of the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement in the 1920 Sevres Treaty. This new treaty left Britain in control of the three 
Ottoman vilayets of Mosul (including Kirkuk), Baghdad and Basra which form the present-
day Iraq and it put Syria and Lebanon under the mandated authority of France (Anderson 
and Stansfield, 2009: 22). The British created Iraq in 1920 and attached Mosul Vilayet to 
it in 1925. 
                                                          
14 The Jews were also one of the ethnic groups of Kirkuk for a long time but they emigrated to Israel in 
1950–51. For further information, see: 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0012_0_11168.html 
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The discovery of oil in Kirkuk in 1927 marked a turning point in the history of the city. In 
October 1927, the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), which had been formed in 1911 by 
the Ottoman Turks, discovered oil in the Kirkuk field. The TPC was renamed the Iraq 
Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1929. The oil field contained reserves of nearly 16 billion 
barrels (Jaffe, 2007: 21). The discovery of such a vast amount of oil was the main reason 
for annexing Kirkuk to the Iraqi kingdom in 1925 as part of Mosul Vilayet (Galleti, 2005: 
22). Moreover, this was the main reason that persuaded the British stop their support of an 
independent Kurdish state (Letayf, 2011: 66).15 The Kirkuk oil field in northern Iraq is the 
second largest oilfield after the oilfields of Basra in the south, containing 20 percent of 
Iraq’s known oil reserves (Stansfield and Anderson, 2009: 137). Nearly a century on from 
the discovery of oil, the Kirkuk oil field today is estimated to be 10 billion barrels (Sevim, 
2014: 14). The oil discovery gradually turned the long history of diversity and peaceful 
coexistence among communities into divisions, particularly after the beginning of the 
policy of Arabization in the city.  
It  was  when  Kirkuk  became  the  centre  of  Iraq’s  oil  industry  that  the  first  phase  of  
its Arabization  began. Arabization – a deliberate political process that sought to change 
non-Arab cultural identity– was undertaken by various Iraqi governments following the 
discovery of oil in the city until the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003. The Kurds and 
Turkmen of the city became the policy’s main victims. By 1927, it became clear to the Iraqi 
government (under the British mandate 1920-1932) that Kirkuk was resting on a huge oil 
field, but the government was also aware that the Arabs were a minority in the city. 
Therefore, the obvious presence of the Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk pushed the 
government to think about consolidating its power through increasing the number of the 
Arabs in the governorate. The key concern for a succession of Arab regimes during the 
twentieth century, as Liam Anderson (2012: 113) notes, was to ensure that ‘one of Iraq’s 
major assets remained in Arab hands’. Thus, the growth of the oil industry was the main 
factor behind thinking about and practically starting Arabization policy to change the 
demography and geography of Kirkuk.   
Understanding the IPC role is particularly important to gain a deeper understanding of the 
early phases of Arabization in Kirkuk. Due to the presence of IPC in the city, people from 
                                                          
15 The reasons for not establishing a Kurdish state by now is beyond the purpose of this research, but this 
point is important to be considered by researchers once it comes to understand the roots of the Kurdish 
problem in Iraq. 
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all over Iraq moved there for work and thus Kirkuk’s population increased rapidly. For 
example, by the late 1940s, the company’s employees and their families were estimated to 
total about 30,000 people which means they constituted about 30 to 40 percent of Kirkuk’s 
population (Bet-Shlimon, 2011: 12). In other words, the population of the city was 
estimated to total about 25,000 in the mid- 1920s, however, that number increased to over 
120,000 in the 1957 census (Bet-Shlimon, 2013: 28). The reason for this rapid population 
growth was that the oil companies needed experienced cadre and highly trained technicians 
but few among the Kurds could meet these requirements. This was a suitable excuse for the 
government to bring people from other parts of Iraq to Kirkuk. New neighbourhoods were 
constructed to support the new labourers and large numbers of Arabs were settled in and 
around Kirkuk which led to a widespread social change in the city (Anderson and Stanfield, 
2009: 32-34). Thus, the massive oil reserves and the presence of IPC in the city were the 
beginning of the afore-mentioned Arabization policy which continued for more than 
seventy years.  
The Arabization policy gradually intensified, particularly after the 1958 coup d’état which 
overthrew the royal rule in Iraq. The first Kurdish war against the new republic of Iraq 
started in 1961. The 1957 census (see table 1 below) already showed the numerical 
dominance of Kurds in Kirkuk which became an ‘important strategic threat’ to the 
government (Anderson, 2012: 113). In 1963, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by 
Mulla Mustafa, demanded a formal recognition of Kurdish autonomy within the boundary 
of the old Vilayet of Mosul including Kirkuk oil fields with the exception of the city of 
Mosul itself (McDowall, 2004: 314). The KDP’s demand was rejected and Kurdish revolt 
resumed. After that, therefore, the Iraqi government intensified its efforts to weaken 
Kurdish hold and influence in the governorate of Kirkuk to ensure that the areas around the 
pipelines running from Kirkuk to the south west were protected. Therefore, the Kurds living 
around the pipelines were expelled and replaced with Arabs. During 1963-1968, further 
Arabization strategies were implemented to dilute the percentage of Kurds. For example, 
the predominant Arab district of Hawija (its population was 27,705 in the 1957 census, see 
Talabany, 2004) was incorporated into the Kirkuk governorate during that period.  
Furthermore, Arabization policy took a more organized and strategic shape in the 1960s 
that primarily targeted the Kurds. Arabization became more intense after 1963 when the 
second coup occurred in Iraq and Abd al Karim Qasim, the first Iraqi republic president, 
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was overthrown by the Arab Nasserists and Baathists. The Nasserist Abd al Salam Arif 
became president and the Baathist Ahmad Hasan al Bakr became prime minister. 
According to Nouri Talabany (2004: 39-41), during that period, some Arabization measures 
were taken by the new government in Kirkuk governorate, including the destruction of a 
number of Kurdish villages near the oil fields and resettling them with Arab tribes; some 
Kurdish neighbourhoods in the city were demolished which obliged some inhabitants to 
leave the city for ever; many elementary and secondary schoolteachers were transferred to 
southern and central Iraq involuntarily; large numbers of the oil company’s Kurdish 
workers were dismissed from their jobs and replaced with inexperienced Arabs; names of 
schools and streets of Kirkuk were changed into Arabic and the province became largely 
militarized. Even the name of the city was changed from Kirkuk into ‘At-Ta'mim’16. 
Moreover, the usage of Arabic language was rising as a result of ‘Baghdad’s effort to 
promote Arabic language primary and secondary education in predominantly non-Arab 
areas’ (Bet-Shlimon, 2012: 921). However, the next phase of Arabization became much 
more intense. 
The Ba’ath party consolidated their power in 1968 through a coup by excluding non-
Baathists from government. In 1970, the Kurds and the new Ba’ath government reached a 
deal which was called ‘11 March agreement’ that was supposed to grant the Kurds 
‘extensive powers of self-government and cultural autonomy in majority Kurdish areas’ 
(Anderson, 2012: 113). The agreement was supposed to culminate either in a plebiscite or 
a census to determine the boundaries of the Kurdish autonomous area. However, neither 
plebiscite nor census was conducted. Mulla Mustafa accused the government of resettling 
Arabs in Kirkuk and other disputed territories such as Khanaqin and Sinjar and declared 
that he ‘would not accept the census results if they indicated an Arab majority’ (McDowall, 
2004: 329). In other words, the fate of Kirkuk, mainly because of its oil resources which 
accounted for 70 per cent of the state's total oil output at the time, was seen by both sides 
as the litmus test of the ‘11 March agreement’ (McDowall, 2004: 335). Thus, the 1970 
agreement broke down over boundary issues in general and Kirkuk in particular and war 
resumed between the Kurds and Baathists. The Kurds were defeated militarily mainly 
because of the ‘Algiers agreement’ in March 1975 between Iraq and Iran in which Iran 
withdrew its support to the Kurds and caused the collapse of their rebellion in Iraq. After 
                                                          
16 From 1976 to 2006, Kirkuk was named ‘At-Ta'mim’ which means ‘nationalization’ and refers to the 
national ownership of the regional natural gas and oil reserves. 
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that, the Baathists intensified and extended the Arabization policy with even greater vigour 
to ensure an Arab majority in Kirkuk. 
The Ba’ath government embarked upon a deeper Arabization of the region in the 1970s. 
Thousands of Kurdish and Turkmen families were expelled from Kirkuk into the southern 
deserts. In this period, normal business was severely restricted for the Kirkuki Kurds. Kurds 
were not allowed to buy property under any circumstance and they could sell their property 
only to Arabs (Talabany, 1999: 35). Transferring the governorate’s administrative offices 
from the Kurdish to the Arabized section of the city can be seen as a clear indicator and 
evidence of political marginalization of the Kurds. In addition, to induce the Kurdish 
population to leave Kirkuk for towns in the south or centre of Iraq, a financial package was 
offered to anyone willing to do so. (Anderson and Stansfield, 2009: 38). On the other hand, 
10,000 dinars and  a piece of land was offered to any Arab family willing to move to Kirkuk 
from southern Iraq (Anderson, 2013: 13). Thus, thousands of Arabs were induced and 
moved to Kirkuk. Shorsh Rasool (2003: 46) notes that after the collapse of the Kurdish 
movement in 1975, the government implemented all types of Arabization. For example, 
modern villages were built around Kirkuk and Arabs were brought from the middle and 
south of Iraq to settle there. Moreover, the regime distributed ‘ethnic identity correction’ 
forms within Kirkuk city and governorate to Kurds, Turkmens and Assyrians that required 
them to register themselves as Arabs (Human Rights Watch, 2004: 15). 
It was during this phase of Arabization when the Ba’ath regime started the systematic 
redrawing of Kirkuk’s boundaries in an obvious effort to build an Arab majority. According 
to Republican Decree 608 of December 1975, the predominantly Kurdish and highly 
populated districts of Chamchamal (50,000), Kifri (50,000), Kalar (30,000) Tuz Khurmatu 
(80,000) were detached from Kirkuk and allocated Sulaymaniya, Diwaniya or the new 
province of Salah al Din. Other measures included ‘financial rewards to Arabs who took 
Kurdish wives, a deliberate encouragement of ethnic assimilation’ (McDowall, 2004: 340). 
In 1987, Arabization was given further impetus with the appointment of Ali Hassan Al-
Majid as secretary general of the Ba’ath Party’s Northern bureau with its headquarters in 
Kirkuk.17 Majid embarked a genocidal campaign of Anfal against the Kurds. According to 
Human Rights Watch (1993), during the Anfal campaign which was carried out in eight 
                                                          
17 Al-Majid was cousin of Saddam Hussein and known as ‘Chemical Ali’ due to using chemical weapons 
against Kurds in the Anfal campaigns of 1980s. al-Majid was sentenced to death and executed by hanging on 
25 January 2010. 
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phases, the Iraqi government massacred 50,000 to 100,000 Kurdish civilians including 
women and children. The third phase of Anfal (7-20 April 1988) targeted Garmian areas in 
Kirkuk governorate which is considered the most violent phase of the Anfal campaign. The 
purpose of the third phase of Anfal was to demolish all Kurdish villages in Kirkuk 
governorate and get rid of its inhabitants to complete the process of Arabization (Qadir, 
2006: 124-125). Arabization policy continued through the 1990s until the fall of Ba’ath 
party in 2003. According to Human Rights Watch (2003), between 1991 and 2003, between 
120,000 and 200,000 non-Arabs were displaced from Kirkuk and its environs. Most of the 
displaced people were living under harsh conditions in the camps of the Kurdistan region.  
The overall effects of Arabization were stunning. It resulted in an ethnic composition 
change in Kirkuk and reduced its geographical size from 20,000 km2 in the 1930s, to  9,679 
km2  today, roughly half its previous size (Anderson, 2009: 30). By 1987, Kirkuk had 
become an Arab-majority governorate (Natali, 2008: 435). Both the demography and 
geography of the Kirkuk governorate were fundamentally transformed. The purpose of 
Arabization process, as noted earlier, was to dilute the Kurds and Turkmens number in 
favour of the Arabs. The following table provides data from three censuses conducted in 
Iraq since 1957 and illustrates the impact of the Baath regime’s constant effort to change 
Kirkuk’s demographic identity.   
Table 1.1 Comparison of 1957, 1977, and 1997 censuses. 
Ethnic 
groups 
1957 
Census 
Percentage 1977 
Census 
Percentage 1997 
Census 
Percentage 
 
Kurds 
 
187,593 
 
48 
 
184,875 
 
38 
 
155,861 
 
21 
 
Arabs 
 
109,620 
 
28 
 
218,755 
 
45 
 
544,596 
 
72 
 
Turkmens 
 
83,371 
 
21 
 
80,347 
 
17 
 
50,099 
 
7 
Total 388,829  483,977  752,745  
Source: Anderson, L. and Stansfield, G. (2009) Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and 
Compromise.  Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 43.  Anderson and Stansfield have adapted 
these figures from the 1957, 1977 and 1997 censuses in Iraq.   
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Another effect of Arabization is that it played a negative role in hardening ethnic lines in 
the city. Now, each of the three major ethnic groups of Kirkuk (Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen) 
have their own ethnic narratives to claim their historic settlement in the city to prove that 
the city is historically their own and thus justify their present ownership claim for it. The 
Kurdish narrative emphasizes that Kirkuk is both historically and geographically a part of 
Kurdistan. In their argument to claim the city, the Kurds depend on the writings of the 
Ottoman encyclopaedist Shamsadin Sami on the ethnic composition of Kirkuk in the 
Ottoman era. Sami writes ‘three quarters of the inhabitants of Kirkuk are Kurds and the rest 
are Turkmens, Arabs, and others. Seven hundred and sixty Jews and 460 Chaldeans also 
reside in the city’ (Talabany, 2007: 1). Thus, the majority of Kurds consider Kirkuk to be 
a historical and geographical part of Kurdish region. They argue that there is no visible 
geographic demarcation between Kirkuk and the remaining areas of Kurdistan (Hanish, 
2010: 20). 
The Turkmens as the third largest ethnic group in Iraq, after Arabs and Kurds, also argue 
that Kirkuk is historically a Turkmen city. They argue that they were important leaders in 
Iraqi history and they played an important role in the Ottoman Empire. To prove that, they 
argue that they are populated in the centre of the province, while the Kurds are living in the 
north and east and the Arabs are living mainly in the south and west (Özmen, 2011). The 
Turkomans consider Kirkuk to be their cultural centre and ancestral capital and argue that 
the city was a majority-Turkmen city even in the first half of the twentieth century (Güçlü: 
2007:3). In their argument, the Turkmens mainly depend on the Palestinian historian 
argument Hana Batatu (1978: 913) when he notes that ‘Kirkuk had been Turkish through 
and through in   the   not   too   distant   past,’ but the Kurds gradually and by degrees 
moved into the city from the surrounding villages. By 1959, Batatu (1978: 913) notes that 
the Kurds ‘had swollen to   more than one-third of  the population, and the  Turkmen had 
declined  to  just  over half.’    
The Arabs, on the other hand, assert that Kirkuk is an Iraqi city with an Iraqi identity. The 
Arabs of Kirkuk are two types. There are Wafideen Arabs (or newcomers), mostly poor 
Shia who resettled in Kirkuk under Arabization policy, and Sunni nomadic families who 
have been in the city for centuries. The Arabs argue that the city has a long history of being 
Iraqi, with all ethnic groups living together peacefully prior to the discovery of oil and 
founding of the Iraqi state. According to Anderson and Stansfield (2009: 80), the Arabs 
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have three reasons for wanting to maintain Kirkuk as an Arab governorate. Firstly, like the 
Kurds and the Turkmens, they have had a long history and presence in Kirkuk. Secondly, 
they, like the Turkmens, believe that the Kurds are exaggerating the number of displaced 
Kirkuki Kurds and overstating their suffering. And thirdly, Arab Iraqi nationalists see a 
strong, autonomous Kurdistan with a Kurdish-controlled Kirkuk as a threat to Iraqi integrity 
and statehood. Thus, the three significant groups of Kirkuk retain different narratives. 
However, these narratives are relatively new which mainly date back to the early twentieth 
century, particularly after the discovery of oil and the hardening of the lines of ethnic 
identity in the city. 
To sum up, three general conclusions can be drawn from the above discussions. First, the 
problem of Kirkuk dates back to the early years of the twentieth century, more specifically 
to the discovery of oil in the city. As Hanauer and Miller (2012: 7-8) put it, ‘the conflict 
between Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomen in Kirkuk does not stem from “ancient hatreds” but 
is rather a manifestation of competition for political control, resources, and territory over 
the past 100 years.’ Second, oil has been a curse not a blessing for Kirkuk which led to the 
coercive ethnic expulsion, emerging ethnicity lines and severing ethnic tensions and 
violence in the city. Third, in the absence of power-sharing in the divided societies the most 
heinous crimes are likely such as genocide, forced expulsion and assimilation. Both the 
Anfal campaigns and the Arabization policy can be seen as the two extreme forms of 
eliminating ethnic difference exercised through the coercive domination of the Sunni-
Arabs, represented in successive Iraqi governments. Thus, the past injustices and the 
current grievances of the ethnic groups of Kirkuk are closely related. In the following 
section, I specifically examine the group identities and how, in the light of theories of 
ethnicity, they have been formed.  
1.2 Group Identities in Kirkuk 
Inter-ethnic conflict is hardly unique to Kirkuk in particular or Iraq in general. In the last 
two decades or so, ethnic division has torn Yugoslavia and Soviet Union apart and ethnic 
strife continues in many other divided places such as Lebanon, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, 
Burundi, Colombia etc. As Philip Yang (2000: 41) puts it ‘throughout the world, there is 
no sign that ethnicity is vanishing. In reality, the importance of ethnicity is even on the 
rise.’ Ethnic divisions have been the defining feature of the current political landscape in 
Kirkuk. In this section, I discuss ethnicity and the formation of group identities in the city 
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in the light of the two predominating theories of ethnicity, i.e. primordialism and 
constructivism. This is vitally important, because this has much to do with the question of 
choosing an appropriate institutional design to solve the problem of governance in the 
future. I also highlight the most crucial events in the city during the twentieth century that 
played important roles in emerging, hardening and politicizing ethnic identities. However, 
before discussing how ethnic identities have been formed in the city, it is vital to firstly 
define ethnicity.    
There is no clear-cut definition of the term ethnicity. For the purpose of this research, 
though, I use Donald Horowitz’s well-known definition which I think best defines the 
ethnic groups of Kirkuk. According to Horowitz (1985: 53) ‘ethnicity’ is a concept that 
‘easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers “tribes,” 
“races,” “nationalities,” and castes.’ (Horowitz 1985, 53). As noted in the previous section, 
language is the main distinctive marker of ethnicity in Kirkuk. As Liam Anderson (2012: 
2) notes, divisions of ethnicity tend to be ‘deeper and more permanent than other social 
cleavages.’ This is because ‘unlike other divisions, of social class, for example, individuals 
cannot easily change, or modify their ethnic attributes.’ Arguably, the theories of 
consociationalism and centripetalism, for example, advance their descriptive and then 
prescriptive solutions to the ethnically divided societies based on these assumptions about 
the nature of ethnic divisions (more on which later).   
To conceptualize and understand ethnicity or ethnic identity, scholars have developed two 
main theories, i.e. primordialism and constructivism. Constructivism asserts that ethnicity 
is socially constructed and it is commonplace among social scientists. Kanchan Chandra 
(2001: 8) claims that ‘it is now virtually impossible to find a social scientist who openly 
defends a primordialist position.’ However, the primordialist view cannot be overlooked 
so easily, mainly because ethnic groups often see or perceive their identity in primordial 
terms and it is still common outside academia. I generally take the constructivism side for, 
as we will now see, it is more convincing at explaining the existence of ethnic groups. 
However, I also think that primordialism is useful in the case if Kirkuk at least to understand 
how people themselves perceive their ethnicity (whether or not they are ontologically 
justified in doing so). In other words, in the case of Kirkuk, constructivism is generally 
more useful in terms of explaining the nature of ethnicity and ethnic groups in the city, 
while primordialism is also relevant when it comes to explaining and understanding the 
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deep implications of ethnic narratives on the thinking and behaviour of the members of 
ethnic groups. 
The essence of the primordialism vs constructivism debate over the nature of ethnicity lies 
in the question whether ethnicity is something that is inherited or something that is 
constructed. In academic literature, the primordialist tradition begins with Edward Shils 
(1957) and Clifford Geertz (1973). This school claims that among the members of an ethnic 
group certain kinds of attachments are felt towards each other. For example, in explaining 
primordialism, Geertz (1996: 43-44) adds primary kinship groups that rallied around (1) 
assumed blood ties, (2) race, (3) language (4) region, (5) religion and (custom). Thus, 
according to Eller and Coughlan (1996: 45), the concept of primordialism as elaborated by 
Geertz seems to contain three distinct ideas. First, primordial identities or attachments are 
‘given’. In other words, primordial identities are natural rather than sociological. Second, 
primordial ties are ‘ineffable’ which means that if an individual is a member of a group, he 
or she necessarily feels certain attachment to that group and its practices. Finally, 
primordialism is essentially a question of emotion or affect, they call it affectivity. Thus, 
according to this view, the concept has most often to do with feelings as Geertz speaks of 
primordial ‘attachments’, ‘sentiments’, and ‘bonds’. However, it must be noted that 
ethnicity is not merely a matter of what people feel, rather it is also taken as a biological or 
psychological given.  
The essence of the arguments of the primordialism school revolve around one’s ancestors 
and the rigidity of ethnic boundaries. For example, they argue that ethnicity is an ascribed 
identity which is inherited from one’s ancestor. In this sense, if my ancestors are Kurdish, 
then I am also Kurdish because I inherit physical and cultural characteristics from my 
forebears. Ethnicity, thus, is a very deeply rooted to one’s bloodline, i.e. common ancestry 
determines ethnicity. They also see ethnic boundaries as fixed or immutable. For example, 
if I were born Kurdish, I would be forever Kurdish, and I cannot change my membership 
to another group. So, according to this view, every single individual belongs to one and 
only one ethnic group, and that group membership remains fixed over a lifetime.  
The primordialist perspective was the dominant way of thinking until the 1970s, but since 
then the constructivist school has been in the ascendency. Constructivism, as referred to by 
Ian Lustick (2001:22), often described with terms such as ‘instrumentalism,’ 
‘hegemonism,’ ‘circumstantialism,’ ‘perennialism,’ or ‘strategic manipulation.’ According 
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to Kanchan Chandra (2001: 7), the constructivists, with all of these types and varieties, 
agree on two basic propositions: ‘first, individuals have multiple identities, not single, 
ethnic identities; and second, the identity with which they identify varies depending upon 
some specified causal variable.’  Yang (2000: 43) also notes that constructivists have 
developed three major arguments. First, ethnicity is socially constructed, something that is 
created. The name of the ‘constructivist’ school springs from the emphasis of this school 
on the social construction of ethnicity. Second, ethnicity as an extension of constructed 
identity is dynamic, i.e. ethnic boundaries are changeable and fluid. Finally, ethnic 
identification or affiliation is constructed or determined by society. Ethnicity is a reaction 
to the changing social environment. In other words, this school maintains that political 
identities are not stamped ‘primordially’ on groups or individuals within groups. Rather, 
identities are malleable and can be influenced by various social, political and economic 
factors. 
It is noteworthy that the question of institutional designs is greatly affected by the 
primordialist and constructivist views of ethnicity and ethnic conflict. If groups have ‘an 
identifiable and immutable essence,’ then ‘the rigid institutionalisation of competing ethnic 
identities’ may be the only way of resolving conflict (O’Flynn, 2006: 39). In his early work 
on consociation until the mid-1970s, Lijphart took the primordial view, but from about 
1980 on, he reassessed his theory and shifted his interpretation of ethnic identity from 
primordialism to constructivism (Lijphart, 2001). This shift influenced his thinking on 
questions of institutional design for divided societies. Now, Lijphart (1995) suggests an 
alternative form of consociational democracy, in which individuals and groups would be 
free to ‘self-determine’ rather than ‘pre-determine’, that is, to freely organize themselves 
into political groupings rather than treating political groupings as fixed or preordained. 
Preferring ‘self-determination’ to ‘pre-determination’ is to prefer ‘liberal’ consociation to 
‘corporate’ consociation once it comes to institutional design. Liberal consociation rewards 
‘whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections’ whether these are 
‘ethnic, religious, linguistic, or based on other criteria’ (O’Leary, 2013: 27-28). Corporate 
consociational, on the other hand ‘accommodates groups according to ascriptive criteria, 
such as ethnicity or religion, on the assumption that group identities are fixed, and that 
groups are both internally homogeneous and externally bounded’ (McGarry and O’Leary, 
2007: 675). I will discuss this distinction further in chapter two. As Lijphart (1995: 284) 
 
 
44 
argues, ‘unless there are compelling reasons to opt for pre-determination, the presumption 
should be in favor of self-determination.’  
Consociationalists argue that group identities tend to be durable once created. This singles 
them out from those constructivists who contend that ‘individuals can change identities 
relatively easily, even once identities appear “crystallized” in society’ (Hale, 2004: 462). 
O’Leary (2013: 19), for example, argues that ‘group identities are often resilient, durable, 
and hard, rather than malleable, fluid, soft, or quickly transformable, as suggested by self-
styled “social constructionists”’.18 Once collective identities are formed based on 
‘ethnicity, nationality, language and religion,’ they generally tend to be fairly durable 
(O’Leary, 2005: 8). O’Leary (2013: 19) criticizes social constructionists for having 
unconscious ‘assimilationist or integrationist biases.’ He concludes that where the divisions 
are enduring, ‘attempting either assimilation or integration is unjust, and unfeasible, unless 
much blood is shed’ (O’Leary, 2013: 19). For consociationalists, ethnic identities are unlike 
other identities such as social class, for example, that can be changed easily once created. 
Therefore, they privilege ethnic identities over other identities by designing institutional 
mechanisms to manage them. Keeping this theoretical background in mind, now it is 
important to understand how the identities of ethnic groups in Kirkuk have emerged.  
As mentioned above, my view is that the constructivism rather than primordialism 
argument can better explain the creation of ethnic identities of the groups. However, the 
primordialist explanation has merits, especially once it comes to understanding how the 
members of an ethnic group think about their identity in present day Kirkuk. Kirkuk was 
famous for its diversity and the peaceful coexistence among its communities for centuries 
until the early years of the twentieth century. As already explained, the emergence of strong 
ethnic lines generally dates back to the 1920s when oil was discovered in the city. The lines 
of ethnicity hardened further as a result of the Arabization policy. According to Arbella 
Bet-Shlimon (2012), a historian of the modern Middle East who pays particular attention 
to the history of Kirkuk, group identities did not exist in hardened forms among Kirkukis 
in the early twentieth century. However, during the early to mid-twentieth-century, ethnic 
group identities crystallized in the city mainly because of oil and Baghdad’s policies. In 
other words, she argues that at the time of the formation of the Iraqi state in 1920 ‘group 
                                                          
18 O’Leary views identities as ‘socially constructed’, but he also thinks they can be extremely durable once 
constructed. However, that doesn’t commit him to primordialism, even if some people read him in that way. 
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identities were fluid and local politics did not align clearly with ethnicities or other self-
identities’ (Bet-Shlimon, 2012a: iii). Ethnic identities, as Esman (2004: 6) notes, does not 
imply ‘ethnic conflict’ and ethnic conflict ‘is not necessarily violent.’ In Kirkuk, ethnic 
groups and identities have been existent for a long time but ethnic conflict dates back to the 
1920s and the first violent ethnic conflict occurred in 1959, as I will discuss later. 
As mentioned earlier, constructivism better explains the creation of ethnic identities of the 
groups in Kirkuk than primordialism. Multilingualism and intermarriage were so prevalent 
in Kirkuk that it made identifying the ethnic identity of the people very difficult in the early 
years of the twentieth century. In 1921, the British High Commissioner for Iraq as cited in 
Bet-Shlimon (2012: 916), for example, acknowledged the difficulty of separating Kurds, 
Turkmens and Arabs from each other as the lines between them were ‘very blurred’.  This 
difficulty was later emphasized by the Mosul Commission of the League of Nations that 
was tasked to settle the future status of Mosul Vilayet (whether it joins the new Iraqi state 
or the republic of Turkey). In order to understand public opinion about the future fate of 
their Vilayet, the commission tried to identify people in terms of ‘race’ but admitted in their 
report that multilingualism and intermarriage rendered such a simplified approach 
impossible (Bet-Shlimon, 2012: 918). In short, after the creation of Iraq and then attaching 
the predominantly Kurdish Mosul Villayet to the new country in 1925, the lines of ethnicity 
gradually emerged. 
The initial signs of ethnicity emerged when the Kurds and Turkmen declined to vote for 
Amir Faysal who was chosen by the Britain to be the Monarch of Iraq. In 1921, the vast 
majority of the voting population of Iraq voted for Amir Faysal as the first King of Iraq 
after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War 1. The referendum results showed 
that 96 per cent in favor of accepting Amir Faysal, the remaining 4 Per cent that rejected 
voting in favor of Amir Faysal was ‘coming mainly from the Turcoman and Kurdish 
communities of Kirkuk’ (Bell, 1927: 432). The Arabs and Christians supported the new 
Iraqi state controlled by Arabs in Baghdad, however, the Kurds and Turkmens were against 
the new country which was supported by Britain. The Turkmens had no affiliation for the 
Arab government in Baghdad but rather wanted to be part of the newly-formed republic of 
Turkey (Heacock, 2010: 3).  The Kurds, on the other hand, were striving for self-
determination and independence. Both Kurds and Turkmen were concerned about their 
future treatment by the government controlled by the Arabs in Bagdad. As noted in the 
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previous section, after the discovery of oil and the initial stages of Arabization, the 
grievances of the Kurds began. As William Zartman (1995: 5) points out, ethnic conflicts 
‘begin with the inability or unwillingness of the government to handle grievances to the 
satisfaction of the aggrieved; that is, they begin with the breakdown of normal politics.’ 
That is exactly what happened with regards to Baghdad’s response to Kurdish demands and 
grievances in the Kurdish areas, especially in Kirkuk. Baghdad became increasingly 
centralized and Kurdish demands for better representation in local government were largely 
neglected, while many Turkmen civil servants were appointed in Kirkuk at that initial stage 
after the creation of Iraq (Bet-Shlimon, 2012). Thus, Kurdish-Arab, on one hand, and 
Kurdish-Turkmen conflicts on the other hand gradually but steadily arose. In 1959, the 
Kurdish-Turkmen ethnic conflict turned into violent ethnic conflict. The point here is that, 
while the different ethnicities in Kirkuk are best explained using a constructivist model, 
political changes on the ground led to a hardening of those identities.  
To understand how the violent conflict between the Kurds and the Turkmen erupted in 
1959, it is important to give a brief background of the change to the political system in the 
country. For example, the monarchy was removed in a military coup by Brigadier Abd al-
Karim Qasim on July 14, 1958 and he declared the establishment of the Republic of Iraq. 
In the early days of his rule, Qasim built good relations with the Iraqi Communist Party 
(ICP), as he was aware that the ICP had a deep-rooted base in Iraq which was beneficial 
for his unstable rule.19 As the affiliates of the ICP were mainly Kurds in Kirkuk, the Kurds 
benefitted from Qasim’s coup as they gained the legal and political positions in the city and 
took most of the senior positions such as the chief of the municipality, the president of the 
court and military positions which increased Kurdish influence in the city (Batatu, 1978: 
913-14). The Turkmen who dominated the economic and political situation of the city while 
the monarchy was in power, perceived this new change against their interests. Therefore, 
the political situation of the city was tense and the atmosphere was highly-charged between 
the Kurds and Turkmen. The tensions and intercommunal violence erupted between the 
Kurds and Turkmens in July 1959. To celebrate the first anniversary of the 1958 coup (later 
known as the July 14, 1958 revolution), the ICP (predominantly Kurdish) decided to 
organize a demonstration in Kirkuk on July 14, 1959. The Turkmen also planned to stage 
their own demonstration, apparently in response to the Kurdish one, for the same day (Bet-
                                                          
19 See, e.g., Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From revolution to dictatorship 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), 47-66; Tripp, A History of Iraq, 143-57. 
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Shlimon, 2012: 926). The two demonstrations passed by each other in the center of the city 
and a shot was fired near a Turkmen coffee shop which provoked the Kurdish 
demonstrators. The Kurdish demonstrators, who were joined by the Kurdish soldiers of an 
army division in Kirkuk, attacked the coffee shop and attacks on other Turkmen shops and 
houses continued for two days. These events explain how ethnicity has been transformed 
into ethnic conflict in the city the mid of the twentieth century. 
After the arrival of military reinforcements from Baghdad, order was restored to the city 
on 17 July 1959. As a result of that tragic event, 32 people were killed (28 of them were 
Turkmen), 130 were injured and 120 houses, coffee houses and stores were destroyed or 
plundered (Batatu, 1978: 913-14). The government executed 28 people for their 
involvement in that event, 24 of them were Kurds and 4 were Turkmens (Anderson and 
Stansfield, 2009: 34). The event is known among Turkmen as the ‘Turkmen massacre’ (Al-
hurmzi, 2014). In the aftermath of the event, as Anderson and Stansfield (2009: 34) note, 
secret organizations were formed to assassinate the most prominent Kurds in an attempt to 
push them out of the city. The Kurds, this time, thought that they were persecuted by both 
the government and the Turkmens. This event was a landmark in the history of Kirkuk as 
it resulted in communal violence for the first time and set the scene for polarizing the city 
with a mobilization of people around ethnic identities. This was the first violent ethnic 
conflict between the two largest groups in the city over issues of power and resources.  
These events show that the politicization of ethnicity or ethnic identity of the groups is 
relatively new in Kirkuk. In other words, ethnic identity of the groups in Kirkuk has been 
constructed rather than innate. The British colonialism20, the discovery of oil and Baghdad 
policy towards non-Arabs in the city played roles in mobilizing people around ethnicity. 
As Ashley Heacock (2010: 7) notes, Kurdish identity is currently shaped by two primary 
factors: lost autonomy and past grievances, while Turkmen identity is shaped by 
unacknowledged identity and past grievances. The Arab identity, on the other hand, is 
shaped by loyalty to the new Iraq which was created from the remnants of the Ottoman 
Empire by the British in 1920. The twentieth century violence by successive Iraqi regimes 
under Arabization policy had a powerful role in the politicization of ethnicity. Such 
violence could be identified as an ethnic violence for it was motivated by animosity towards 
                                                          
20 The British colonial rule in Iraq (1920-1932) prepared the ground for ethnic politics in Kirkuk by attaching 
Mosul Vilayet into the new Iraq and ignoring the demands of Kurds and Turkmen. 
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the Kurds and Turkmen and the victims were targeted due to their ethnic identity. However, 
if we accept that ethnic identity is socially constructed in the city, why and for what reason? 
The instrumentalist approach can provide a good answer to explain the politicization of 
ethnicity for political and economic benefits. This approach tries to explain how identity is 
put to use in the service of political goals. The instrumentalists assert the significance of 
ethnic affiliation and ethnicity in social, economic and political competition with the focus 
on the role of elites. In their view, ethnicity is a resource used by elites to regulate group 
membership and boundaries, define group identity, and make claims and extract (state) 
resources (Brown and Langer, 2010: 413). In Kirkuk, as noted earlier, ethnic distinctions 
were not politicized prior to the formation of the Iraqi state. This means that politicizing 
ethnicity is relatively new in the city.  
It is important to note that people become receptive to political mobilization along ethnic 
or religious lines when they find themselves disadvantaged because of their language, 
religion or race. It was in the twentieth century that the people of Kirkuk, especially the 
Kurds and Turkmen, perceived that they were disadvantaged because of their language 
difference. As Kaufmann (1996: 154) points out, ‘even if constructivists are right that the  
ancient  past  does  not  matter, recent history does.’ He (1996: 154) argues that ‘intense  
violence  creates  personal  experiences  of  fear,  misery, and loss  which  lock  people  into  
their  group  identity  and  their  enemy  relationship with  the  other  group.’ In Kirkuk, the 
Arabization policy and the 1959 ethnic violence pushed people to gather around their ethnic 
group identity. In such a situation, it would be easy for elites to manipulate ethnicity for 
political ends. One reason is that members of ethnic groups have a psychological bias that 
leads them to ‘discount or ignore their own leader’s involvement in producing ethnic 
conflict so that the other takes all the blame’ (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 847). Taking more 
than seventy years of Arabization into account, it is not difficult to understand the 
psychological bias of Kurdish and Turkmen people towards the policy of their political 
leaders. The Sunni Arabs, on the other hand, see themselves as the main victims in the post-
2003 Iraq. Thus, the perceptions of people towards an outgroup can easily be manipulated 
by unscrupulous elites in the current political situation both in Iraq and Kirkuk.  
To conclude, ethnic lines have hardened in the city and, now, each ethnic group holds a 
strong ethnic identity. Therefore, the key issue is not what political scientists and academics 
think about the origins and foundation of ethnicity and identity in Kirkuk. What matters is 
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how the members of ethnic groups perceive their identity in practice and how they think 
about the future of their city and its unresolved governance status. In other words, although 
constructivism can better help us to explain how ethnicity has been created over time in 
Kirkuk, the current perceptions of the members of the different groups are the vital element 
for consideration by the constitutional designers of Kirkuk future. Each ethnic group, as 
noted in the first section, has its own ethnic narrative that is used to legitimize its right in 
the future and people tend to vote along ethnic lines and believe in those narratives.21 In 
such a situation, therefore, dealing with how people actually think about their ethnic 
identity is more important than the arguments by academics who generally discredit 
primordialism (see, O’Flynn, 2006: 41; Anderson and Stansfield, 2009: 74). This has 
become more apparent in the post-2003 period in Kirkuk to which I now turn. 
1.3 Post-2003 Kirkuk 
After 2003, a new political situation started in Kirkuk. On March 1, 2003, the National 
Parliament of Turkey decided not to allow the U.S. 4th Division to pass to northern Iraq 
through Turkey to open a second front in the north. This was a good opportunity for the 
Iraqi Kurds to prove their loyalty to the U.S. (Peltier, 2005: 24). Kirkuk fell on 10 April 
2003 and 10,000 Peshmarga entered the city. As Anderson and Stansfield (2009: 91-96) 
note, due to the insufficient numbers of U.S. forces on the northern front and their inability 
to maintain order in Kirkuk, the Kurds emerged as the leaders of the city. Their reliable 
security forces and their past experience in running governments played important roles in 
consolidating their political and military power in the city. As noted earlier, the population 
of Kirkuk changed substantially as a result of Arabization policy by various Iraqi regimes, 
especially the Ba’ath party. Therefore, after the fall of Ba’ath party, tens of thousands of 
displaced Kurds and Turkmens returned to Kirkuk and other Arabized areas. The Kurds 
have retained control over most of the important political and security posts of the city since 
then. 
                                                          
21 For example, see: Yücel Güçlü, ‘Who Owns Kirkuk? The Turkoman Case,’ The Middle East Quarterly 
(Winter 2007), http://www.meforum.org/article/1074 (accessed 15 February, 2012); Nouri Talabany, ‘Who 
Owns Kirkuk? The Kurdish Case,’ The Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2007), 
http://www.meforum.org/1075/who-owns-kirkuk-the-kurdish-case (accessed 15 February, 2012); Anderson 
and Stansfield (2009) Crisis in Kirkuk: The ethnopolitics of conflict and compromise. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 56-87. 
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Since 2003, three provincial councils have been formed in the city which have been 
inclusionary. The first government lasted nearly six months between June 2003 and 
December 2003. During this period, the U.S military appointed 30 members indirectly for 
the municipal council to govern Kirkuk (Anderson, 2009: 13). That council was made up 
of five blocks (Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Christians, and independents), and each consisted 
of 6 members (Hanish, 2010: 18). Of 6 seats for the independent block, the Kurds held five 
of them. The second government was expanded and continued from January 2004 until 
January 2005. That was called a governorate council which consisted of 40 members from 
all of the segments of the governorate. Considering a sort of equal power-sharing for that 
time was understandable, particularly as there was not any reliable census available and 
elections were still to be held. However, the equation changed thereafter. The third 
government started from January 2005 in which 41 members were elected in a public 
election for the governorate council and they have held office since then. In other words, 
the third government which has been in place since 2005 was formed on the basis of 
provincial elections outcome. The seats were taken by the political parties on the basis of 
the election results. There was not a previous agreement to distribute the provincial council 
seats among Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and Christians on a fixed formula basis. Thus, the 
system has been inclusive in the sense that none of the four main communities has ever 
totally been excluded from power in the city since 2003. Moreover, as I will clarify in 
chapter three, the first two governments were somewhat similar to what is called ‘corporate 
consociation’ while the third one moved towards a more liberal one (consociation has not 
been adopted formally yet, though). 
After 2003 conflict over claimed population sizes began intensively. Each group was 
intentionally overestimating its size and claiming that it was the majority in the city. 
However, the population of Kirkuk and the relative size of its ethnic groups at present can 
only be estimated. It is not easy to cite exactly the ethnic composition of the present day 
Kirkuk governorate since no reliable figures are available after the 1957 census which is 
considered the least politicised census and its validity is not seriously disputed by the three 
main groups. It is generally accepted, however, that the Kurds comprise either the majority 
or the plurality of the population (Anderson, 2013). The International Crisis Group (2006: 
2) estimates the total population of Kirkuk close to 1.5 million in the governorate in which 
800,000 of them live inside the city. Stefan Wolff (2010: 1369) notes that the Kurds are 
estimated at just over half of the UN’s figure, while Turkmen and Arabs constitute roughly 
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12 per cent and 35 per cent of the population respectively; other communities are around 1 
per cent. For Rydgren and Sofi (2011: 29), however, although the Kurds are currently the 
largest group in Kirkuk, with approximately 40–45 percent of the population, they do not 
constitute a majority. According to their estimate, Arabs make up approximately 30–35 
percent of the population, Turkmens 20–25 percent and 1–2 percent are Christians. One 
indication for confirming Kurdish plurality, at least, are the results of the successive 
elections results since 2005 in the governorate in which the Kurds have been the major 
winner. For example, the Kurds constitute nearly two thirds of the KPC and out of the 13 
seats assigned for Kirkuk governorate in the Council of Representatives (CoR), the Kurds 
won 8 seats, Arabs have two seats and the Turkmen also have two seats while the Christians 
have been given one quota seat by law. Thus, although there is no official and reliable 
census at the moment, election results indicate that the Kurds are larger than other groups. 
In the new era, Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) reached power-
sharing agreements at the level of the state, but they have been unable to reach a similar 
mutual understanding over the status of Kirkuk. The main dispute over Kirkuk between the 
three main ethnic groups is in determining who should administer the governorate (Natali, 
2008: 433). After the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the U.S. coalition established 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in May 2003 to govern Iraq under the leadership 
of Paul Bremer. The CPA established the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) on 13 July 2003. 
The IGC was an interim Iraqi government composed of 25 members from Iraq’s main 
religious and ethnic groups: thirteen Shi‘ite Arabs, five Sunni Arabs and five Kurds, one 
Turcoman and one Assyrian (Yildiz, 2004: 119-21). The ICG adopted the interim Iraqi 
constitution or Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) in March 2004 which served as 
Iraq’s provisional constitution until the adoption of Iraq’s current and permanent 
constitution on October 15, 2005 (Bolden and Fussnecker, 2008: 4). Both TAL and the 
Iraqi constitution paid particular attention to solving the problem of Kirkuk. 
 The Kurds worked closely with the US-led coalition to address the issue of Kirkuk and 
their efforts resulted in Article 58 of the TAL (Janabi, 2008). Article 58 committed the Iraqi 
government to ‘act expeditiously to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime’s 
practices’ (TAL, 2004). The article identifies how to reverse the policy of Arabization 
through the process of normalization to settle the administration of the disputed territories. 
The article outlined steps of normalization including the return of the displaced people, the 
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recovery of their properties and homes and the reversal of border alterations, i.e. changing 
the administrative boundaries of Kirkuk to the pre-1968 borders before Arabization became 
an official policy of the Ba’ath party (Bolden and Fussnecker, 2008: 4).22 The article 
deferred the permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, until after the 
ratification of the permanent constitution. The disputed territories, as Peter Bartu (2010: 
1330) puts it, ‘cross Iraq in a north-west–south-east line from Sinjar on the Iraq–Syria 
border to Khanaqin and Mandali on the Iraq–Iran border, with Kirkuk governorate at the 
dispute’s epicentre.’ 
In 2005, the new Iraqi Constitution was adopted and ratified. Article 140 replaced the 
TAL’s Article 58, calling for a three-step process in Kirkuk and other disputed territories 
involving ‘normalization,’ to be followed by a census, and finally a referendum to 
determine whether or not the citizens of Kirkuk wish to join the Kurdistan region. 
According to Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, the executive authority was to undertake 
the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of Article 58 (Iraqi 
Constitution, 2005). Thus, Iraq’s new constitution gives the right to the people of Kirkuk 
to settle the fate of their city through a referendum. This was a victory for the Kurds who 
support the accommodation solution for Iraq.  Article 140 is not specific to the Kirkuk issue 
but deals with all disputed territories in the country such as the areas in Mosul, Salah al-
Din, Diyala and Kirkuk (Hanish, 2010: 19). As argued by O’Leary and Bateman (2008: 3), 
this article was necessary because both the CPA and the Iraqi transitional government failed 
to rectify the relevant injustices ‘expeditiously’. 
Normalization (reversing Arabization policies) as the first step of implementing Article 140 
is undoubtedly problematic. Bolden and Fussnecker (2009: 6) argue that failure to define 
and achieve normalization is one of the main reasons Iraqis have failed to conduct a 
referendum by the deadline set forth in the constitution, i.e. December 31, 2007.  As Natali 
(2008: 436) points out, normalization process requires: (1) resettling Arabs to their original 
areas; (2) returning the expelled Kurds (and Turkmen) to Kirkuk; (3) changing 
administrative units in Kirkuk to their pre-1976 borders, i.e. the four districts of 
Chamchamal, Kalar, Kifri and Tuz-Khurmatu should be returned to the governorate of 
Kirkuk which were annexed to the neighbouring governorates by the regime in 1975. After 
                                                          
22 For the background to the July 1968 coups by the Ba’ath Party, see: Sluglett, P., and Farouk-Sluglett, M., 
2003. Iraq since 1958: From revolution to dictatorship. London: I.B. Tauris; and Tripp, C., 2002. A history 
of Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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implementing the above three steps, a census and a referendum should be conducted to 
decide the future administration of the city: whether it should remain as a governorate under 
the authority of the central government; become an autonomous region; or join the 
Kurdistan Region. 
The process of normalization needs a long time in order to be able to remove the deep 
impacts of the Arabization process. In the meantime, neither the census nor the referendum 
mandated by the constitution have yet taken place. In the view of the Arabs and Turkmens, 
the main problem of the census has been the process of Kurdification since 2003. They 
believe that the KRG is paying Kurds to move back to Kirkuk to offset the ethnic balances 
to ensure that they are the majority in the city for when the census takes place. This 
allegation is usually rejected by the Kurds.23 Moreover, there is lack of clarity on the aspects 
of referendum in both Article 58 of the TAL and Article 140 in that they do not provide 
specific requirements or steps on how to conduct it. Elizabeth and Stoltz (2008: 3) raise 
three concerns in this regard. Firstly, they argue that the language of Article 140 is vague 
and it is not clear which areas are eligible with Kirkuk for the referendum; this is a result 
of not defining ‘disputed territories’ in the constitution. Secondly, it is unclear what would 
be the potential results of a Kirkuk referendum. Finally, a disagreement over registration 
or eligibility could prevent a vote for years, if not indefinitely. Furthermore, the local 
communities of Kirkuk have not reached any suitable settlement for the future of their city. 
On the contrary, they increasingly depend on their patrons outside Kirkuk. Thus, Kurds 
have aligned themselves with Erbil, Arabs must seek support in Baghdad and Turkmen rely 
highly on help from Ankara. Accordingly, due to the local communities’ dependence on 
external sponsors, ‘the latter, in turn, have invested much of their own political capital in 
particular ‘solutions’ of the Kirkuk dispute’ (Wolff, 2010: 1372). The administrative 
problems of Kirkuk, thus, have yet to be resolved. 
Due to the conflicting views on the validity of the article, a legal solution to settle this issue 
seems necessary. Bolden and Fussnecker (2009) argue that it is the duty of the Federal 
Supreme Court to address the validity of article 140 and declare that the Iraqi political 
bodies’ failure to execute a constitutional article does not invalidate the article. To put an 
end to this legal dispute, the Centre for Kirkuk Referendum Operations (CKRO) at 
                                                          
23 Romano (2007) and Anderson and Stansfield (2009) also deny the ‘Kurdification’ allegation by the Arabs 
and Turkmen.  
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Georgetown University, in a detailed analysis on Kirkuk’s future referendum (2012: 59-
60), suggests three options: the first option is to have a parliamentary vote to extend the 
deadline. This already happened with Article 142 which was extended by a vote in the 
House of Representatives. However, such a vote does not have the weight of a 
constitutional amendment. The second option is similar to the earlier suggestion by Bolden 
and Fussnecker (2009), which recommends submitting the article to the federal court as the 
highest judicial power to decide whether the article is valid or not. This appears to be an 
appropriate solution, as the decisions of the Supreme Court, according to Article 94 of the 
Iraqi constitution, are ‘final and binding for all authorities’. Nevertheless, the decisions of 
the Supreme Court are often seen as politically driven, partly because its members have 
been appointed by the powerful political parties. The last option is to seek international aid, 
such as a resolution by the United Nations Security Council to endorse the extension of 
Article 140. But this option might encounter severe internal, regional and even international 
objections, as it would be interpreted as interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq. Despite 
objections, therefore, resorting to the Supreme Court might be the most appropriate option 
for it is the highest judicial authority in the country and its decisions are binding and not 
seen as external interference. 
Each of the three aforementioned options regarding the future of Kirkuk is supported by 
one of the three main groups: the Kurds wish to incorporate Kirkuk into the Kurdistan 
region, the Turkmen want Kirkuk to be an autonomous region, and the Arabs want Kirkuk 
to be under the authority of the central government, albeit with a special status. As a 
governorate under the control of Baghdad, the status of Kirkuk would be defined by the 
Iraqi constitution and the Provincial Powers Law (Law 21/ 2008).24 Under this option, the 
Provincial Council of Kirkuk would have powers to elect and remove the head and deputy 
head of the council , to issue laws, instructions and by-laws, to develop policies and set 
strategic priorities, to prepare and approve a budget, to monitor all the provincial executive 
bodies, to elect and remove the governor and his or her two deputies, to approve 
nominations for senior positions and remove senior managers of the provincial 
administration, to approve local security plans, to approve administrative boundary changes 
                                                          
24 This law has been amended twice, the first occasion was in 2010 with slight changes regarding the tasks of 
governorates’ council members and the termination of their membership. However, the second 
comprehensive amendment was done in 2013. This law was put in place in Kirkuk in 2015. Prior to that, 
Kirkuk was governed under the provisions of Order Number 71 by the Coalition Provisional Authority on 
local governmental powers (CPA 71/2004) which, comparing to other governorates, gave Kirkuk less power. 
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within the province, to select the symbols for the governorate, and to collect taxes, duties 
and fees. The governor and his or her executive team, however, would have the power to 
draft a general budget; to execute decisions by the provincial council; to execute federal 
government policy; to oversee and inspect public facilities; to represent the governorate in 
the international conferences and forums; to establish universities, colleges and institutes 
in coordination with the ministry of higher education of the federal government and subject 
to approval by the Provincial Council; to appoint, promote, reward, and remove civil 
servants and directors of the governorate (subject to council approval); to direct local 
security services and request their reinforcement; and to direct the work of up to five 
assistants and seven advisers. (Law 21/ 2008; Wolff, 2010: 1373). More importantly, with 
regard to the powers shared between the federal government and the governorates, priority 
shall be given to the law of the governorates in case of dispute.25  
However, this scenario (Kirkuk under the authority of central government), which is 
integrationist in its nature, faces serious domestic objections and barriers. This implies the 
non-realization of both Kurdish and Turkmen projects which would be a huge blow for the 
Kurds and Turkmen. However, under the new reality in which the Kurds have dominated 
the city both politically and militarily, it is highly unlikely that they would accept this 
option. The Kurds support the implementation of article 140 and argue that the people of 
Kirkuk themselves should decide the future of their city in a plebiscite. As Nasri and Salimi 
(2013: 92) note, this option will be ‘the most likely case for the outbreak of a civil war and 
the most unlikely in terms of probability.’ However, the Arabs are now in a weak position, 
particularly after ISIS seized control of Hawija which is a predominant Arab district and 
the largest Arab populated area of Kirkuk governorate. Therefore, this scenario has little 
chance of being successfully pursued. 
The second scenario for Kirkuk is that it becomes an autonomous region. The Turkmen 
group are the main advocates of this option. Their view is based on article 119 of the 
constitution that allows governorates to become regions. They want to be protected from 
both a strong central government and a powerful Kurdish regional government. As noted 
                                                          
25 These powers include all powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of federal government such as 
formulating foreign policy; formulating and executing national security policy; fiscal and customs policy; 
regulating standards, weights and measures and regulating issues of citizenship, residency and asylum; 
regulating the policies of broadcast frequencies and mail; general and investment budget; planning policies 
relating to external water resources; and general population statistics and the census (Article 110, constitution 
of Iraq). 
 
 
56 
by International Crisis Group (ICG), (2008: 28), they are ‘in an intense borderland struggle 
between Arab and Kurdish nationalism and feel squeezed.’ The Turkmen believe that this 
is the best solution for themselves but they also think that it can help maintain the political 
stability of Iraq as well. The ICG (2011: 6) note that ‘Turkmens as a large ethnic group in 
the disputed area are looking for a suitable political ground including Kirkuk’s becoming 
an autonomous governorate in such a way that it is not controlled by Baghdad and Erbil’.  
It is worth mentioning that Kirkuk as an autonomous region would enjoy more executive 
and legislative powers than as a governorate. As an autonomous region, it would enjoy the 
rights of a federal region rather than given decentralization by the central government. The 
constitution lists the competencies that the federal and regional authorities share together 
which include: managing customs, electric energy sources and distribution, environment, 
general development and planning, public health, education and internal water resources 
(Article 114, constitution of Iraq). However, priority is given to the regional law over 
federal law in case of any dispute between the region and the centre. If the option of an 
autonomous region were to succeed, Kirkuk would become a single-governorate region or, 
based on article 119 and the Law on the Executive Procedures Regarding the Formation of 
Regions. It could then form a region with any other governorate regardless of whether it is 
a neighbouring governorate or not. (Law 13/2008; Wolff, 2010: 1374). In short, according 
to the constitution of Iraq, the regions have more powers than the governorates. For 
example, the Kurdistan region as a federal region enjoys much more power than other 
governorates in Iraq.  
The third option derives from article 140 of the Iraqi constitution of which the Kurds are 
the main advocates. The main reason for the Kurdish persistence on implementing Article 
140 is that it allows a legal attachment of Kirkuk to the Kurdistan Region. The Kurds have 
a deep sentimental and historical attachment to Kirkuk, viewing it as a Kurdish city. Due 
to the centrality of Kirkuk to Kurdish history and the Kurds’ national story, the former Iraqi 
Kurdish president, Jalal Talabani, has gone as far as calling Kirkuk ‘our Jerusalem’. Article 
2 of the draft constitution of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region has identified Kirkuk as part of the 
region. According to this article, the administrative borders of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region 
include the governorates of Dohuk, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and parts of Nineveh 
(Mosul) and Diyala (Article 2, the draft constitution of Kurdistan region 2009). Thus, 
winning Kirkuk has a ‘mythical status’ for the Kurds because incorporating Kirkuk into the 
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Kurdistan Region would ‘be the ultimate proof that they have finally succeeded in their 
question for meaningful autonomy’ (Anderson and Stansfield, 2009: 77). By looking at the 
current political situation of Iraq and the disputed territories, one may conclude that the 
realization of this option is most likely in such a way that other scenarios may be regarded 
as secondary options. This is because, as noted in the introduction of this research, the 
Kurds have dominated the city both politically and militarily and do not intend to relinquish 
it in any foreseeable future. Under this situation, it is hard to expect that the Kurds will 
agree to the first two above-mentioned options. 
Finally, from the above discussions we may conclude that overthrowing Saddam’s regime 
in 2003 by the American-led coalition forces marked a new history both in Iraq and Kirkuk. 
In the new era, the Kurds and to a less degree (the Turkmens) emerged as the main winners 
while the Arabs lost their historic coercive control over the city. However, the future status 
of the city remained unresolved. Neither the interim constitution under CPA nor Iraq’s 2005 
permanent constitution have been able to solve the problem of Kirkuk. The main reason for 
this are the conflicting views of the three main ethnic groups regarding settling the future 
of the city and governorate. While settling the future administration of the city has proved 
to be the most difficult issue pertinent to the problem of Kirkuk since 2003, the unresolved 
governance issue has complicated the problem further. 
Conclusion 
The current problems of Kirkuk are rooted in the past discriminations and injustices. The 
discovery of oil in 1927 is of great importance to understand the beginning of ethnicity 
awakening and the perception of ethnic distinctiveness in the city. Kirkuk witnessed the 
most extreme policies aimed at eliminating ethnic differences such as genocide, ethnic 
expulsion and coercive assimilation attempts under both the Anfal campaigns in the 1980s 
and the Arabization policy over more than 70 years. In other words, ethnic distinctiveness 
changed into ethnic conflict and then to ethnic violence in the twentieth century. Now, 
ethnic division is apparent and has become the defining feature of the city. In the post-2003 
period, the problem of Kirkuk manifested itself in the inability of the local and national 
parties to solve the problems settling the future administration of the city and how the city 
should be governed.   
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Thus, different methods have been used in the past to overcome ethnic differences in the 
city through a variety of coercive techniques, from the forcible suppression of ethnicity to 
the elimination of ethnic differences. Those methods, however, proved to be both 
ineffective and dangerous. Therefore, a new democratic arrangement should be found to 
resolve the city’s ethnic conflict peacefully in a way that leads to alleviating rather than 
exacerbating ethnic divisions. Bearing this in mind, this research suggests that, compared 
to its alternatives, the consociational power-sharing arrangement is the most appropriate 
institutional mechanism for managing ethnic conflict and building a stable government in 
Kirkuk. Now I turn to explain the theory of consociational democracy which I suggest 
should be adopted in the case of Kirkuk. 
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Chapter 2. Options for Governing Kirkuk 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the main concern of many political scientists of the Western World 
was over the question of establishing and maintaining stable democratic government, 
especially in a plural society. The dominant view was that a stable and democratic regime 
is more difficult to achieve and sustain in divided societies than in homogeneous societies. 
The prevailing view of the political scientists at the time was largely compatible with John 
Stuart Mill’s scepticism with regard to the possibility of democracy in such societies when 
he asserted that democracy is ‘next to impossible in a country made up of different 
nationalities’ (Lijphart, 2004: 96-97; Wolf and Cordell, 2011: 300). For example, in a 
famous article entitled ‘Comparative Political Systems’, Gabriel Almond (1956) 
distinguished three types of Western political systems: Anglo-American political systems 
(homogeneous secular political culture exemplified by Britain and the United States); 
Continental European Political Systems (fragmented political culture exemplified by 
France, Germany and Italy) and the Scandinavian and Low Countries. For Almond (1956: 
405), the countries belonging to the third type ‘stand somewhere in between the Continental 
pattern and the Anglo-American.’ Almond came to the conclusion that the Anglo-American 
model is effective and stable while Continental European democracies are weak and 
unstable. However, Lijphart challenged the dominant belief that only Anglo-American 
model of democracy is stable and effective. 
This chapter presents the different strategies that the governments use to deal with ethnic 
differences with a particular focus on consociational power-sharing. This focus on 
consociation is vitally important in order to be able to answer the main question of this 
research which seeks to understand whether consociation can be an appropriate institutional 
mechanism for managing conflict and building a stable government in Kirkuk. To do so, I 
choose to organize this chapter over five sections. In the first section, I present the ways in 
which governments can respond to ethnic, national and religious differences and I rule out 
those strategies that are undemocratic or unlikely to work in Kirkuk. In the second section, 
I present a theoretical background on consociational theory. While in the third section, I 
focus on the advancements that the theory has witnessed since its establishment. I review 
the most common critiques of consociational critics against consociationalism in the fourth 
section. In the last section, I provide the responses of advocates of consociational theory.  
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2.1 Different Strategies for Managing Differences 
As noted in the introduction of this research, there are two main methods for the regulation 
of ethnic conflict: the elimination of differences and the management of differences. The 
elimination of differences includes genocide, forced mass-population transfers, partition or 
secession and integration or assimilation. While the management of differences includes 
hegemonic control, arbitration, federalization and power-sharing. 
In terms of eliminating differences, partition and secession cannot be applicable in Kirkuk 
as it is a mixed city that has three options according to the Iraqi constitution: a governorate 
under Baghdad, an autonomous region and joining the Kurdistan region. Genocide is the 
worst possibly outcome of eliminating the differences followed by coercive expulsion. 
According to the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 1948, genocide refers to ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’ (Art. 2). In contrast, forced 
mass-population transfers are designed to move or remove ethnic groups from a given 
territory, but genocide is viewed as the most deadly due to its focus on human destruction 
(Jenne, 2011: 113). 
In Iraq both genocide and forced mass-population transfers as two extreme forms of 
elimination of ethnic differences were tried by the former Iraqi Ba’athist party led by 
Saddam Hussein, particularly against the Kurds. According to Human Rights Watch´s 
comprehensive report, ‘Genocide in Iraq - The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds’, 
originally published in July 1993, around 100,000 Kurds were murdered in a systematic 
and deliberate way on the basis of their ethnicity in 1988. Kirkuk was one of the targets of 
that campaign.  Kirkuk was also the site of the coercive expulsion of the Kurds and, to a 
lesser extent, Turkmen under Arabization policy.   Moreover, the attempts to assimilate the 
non-Arab people through forcing them to register themselves as Arabs were also made. 
However, such attempts ended in failure and proved to be ineffective to govern the city. 
The above strategies can realize political stability in divided societies but not a democracy. 
Therefore, they are not appropriate solutions for divided societies, if democracy and 
political stability are to be achieved.  
To combine both political stability and democracy in divided societies, other alternatives 
such as integration, federalism, majority rule, and power-sharing (centripetalism and 
consociation) are still available. As noted in the introduction of this research, under 
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integration, ethnic differences are recognized in the private sphere which means people are 
free to have their own schools in their own languages or religions but they do not receive 
public subsidies to do so (O’Leary, 2014). Minorities are encouraged to participate in the 
public life, but as O’Leary (2013: 17) states, they are expected to leave their cultures at the 
doors to public places ‘in the way some institutions and peoples expect visitors to leave 
their shoes.’ This is unlikely to be accepted in divided societies. In Iraq, for example, the 
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) in 2004 marked an overall defeat for the 
integrationists who were arguing for a national, centralist, and majoritarian federalist in 
Iraq. In other words, the TAL was a victory for the supporters of accommodation approach 
who were seeking a consensual, decentralized and a multi-national federation for Iraq 
(O’Leary, 2005b: 68-69). On the other hand, the possibility of territorial federalism is 
unlikely in places where the segments are geographically intermingled. In places where the 
members of the segments are intermingled or interspersed, non-territorial autonomy is the 
most appropriate option. Thus, in a divided place like Kirkuk, integration is highly unlikely 
to be accepted by the different groups and federalism is not an option in the first places as 
Kirkuk is an intermingled city.  
The most common types of democracy is the British or ‘Westminster’ model which is 
called ‘majoritarian democracy’. In this model of democracy, there is government-versus-
opposition in which the leaders are divided into a government and opposition. The style of 
leadership in British model is competitive or adversarial.  In a majoritarian democracy, 
candidates that represent society’s majority generally form the government, and the 
opposition is formed of minority groups. This involves the monopolization of power by a 
party, group, faction or even a person—the opposite of powersharing (O’Leary, 2013: 2). 
However, majoritarian democracy is, frankly, a nightmare situation for the minorities in the 
divided places. As Lijphart (1999: 31-32)  argues, in the divided societies, ‘majority rule is 
not only undemocratic but also dangerous,’  since minorities are repeatedly denied access 
to power, and this creates a situation in which they feel excluded and discriminated against, 
which in turn might make them disloyal to the government. Therefore, Lijphart (2008: 78) 
states that ‘there is a scholarly consensus against majoritarian systems in divided societies.’  
Or as O’Leary (2005: 10) puts it, ‘consociationalists want majorities – rather than the 
majority or the plurality’ (emphasis in original). 
Lijphart, therefore, puts forth consociational democracy as an alternative to majoritarianism 
in divided societies. He (1999) suggests plural societies need a democratic regime that 
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privileges and promotes consensus instead of opposition, inclusion rather than exclusion, 
and that maximizes the size of the governing majority. The possibility of simple majority 
rule in those places gives rise to a tyranny of the majority or the dominant nationality 
(O’Leary, 2014). Such an undesirable outcome should be avoided in divided societies. 
Power-sharing (more particularly consociational power sharing) is generally better than its 
alternatives for divided societies. For Lijphart (1999), consociational power-sharing is 
‘kinder and gentler’ for deeply divided societies than the majoritarian democracy in which 
the winner takes all.  
Following O’Leary’s typology, there are two main types of powersharing, namely: 
centripetalism and consociation. At the outset, it is important to note that both 
centripetalism and consociation aims at an interethnic power sharing arrangement in the 
divided societies (O’Leary, 2013). The difference, however, arises on whether ‘conflict 
regulation should be driven by building up moderates among the majority (centripetalism)’ 
or ‘by building up moderates among the hard-liners from all groups (consociation)’ 
(O’Leary, 34-35). As noted earlier, centripetalism is mainly associated with the works of 
the American political scientist Donald Horowitz, which suggests a ‘pre-electoral 
interethnic coalition of moderates,’ whereas consociationalists aim at ‘post-electoral 
governing coalitions’ of all significant groups in divided societies (Horowitz, 2014: 6). 
Centripetalism disincentivises extremism and urges moderation by seeking institutional 
incentives such as an alternative vote (AV) electoral system. AV allows voters to rank order 
preferences at the ballot box to facilitate the election of moderate ethnic politicians who 
should reach out and attract votes from a range of ethnic groups other than their own 
(Reilly, 2011: 290-291). To gain the votes of other groups apart from its own group, 
political parties have to soften their stance on the matters of social concern. The hope is 
that an inter-ethnic coalition of moderates will be formed that is strong enough to repel the 
extremists (O’Flynn, 2007: 736). In short, centriptalists believe that inclusion without 
moderation does not foster political stability in divided societies. 
This approach, which is alternatively called the integrative or incentive-based approach, 
claims that consociationalism cannot realize political stability in divided societies as its 
main focus is on inclusion while it gives little attention to moderation. Centripetalists 
consider the inclusion of the extremes in the grand coalition government as a threat to the 
government’s stability. According to Horowitz (2014:5), the centripetal approach attempts 
to ‘create incentives, principally electoral incentives, for moderates to compromise on 
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conflicting group claims, to form interethnic coalitions, and to establish a regime of 
interethnic majority rule.’ In other words, this approach aims at the election of moderate 
representatives and the formation of governments by moderate interethnic coalitions, i.e. it 
supports moderates against extremists (Horowitz, 2008: 1217).  
Furthermore, consociational power-sharing, centripetalists argue, face the adoption 
problem. For example, Horowitz (2014) argues that the issue of adoptability is one of the 
big problems of both centripetalism and consociation. He lists five obstacles to adoption of 
either centripetal or consociational institutions. First, there are asymmetric preferences in 
the sense that ‘majorities want majority rule; minorities want guarantees against majority 
rule. Consequently, minorities may prefer consociation; majorities do not.’ Second, as 
ethnic politics is a high-stakes game, there are strong inclinations to avoid risk and stay 
with what is familiar. Third, biased negotiators tend to rule in some models and rule out 
others. Fourth, the presumed visibility of interests by group leaders that ‘they can foresee 
the relative benefits and costs for their group of alternative courses of action’ even though 
‘they may later be proved wrong about those choices’ also narrows choices. Finally, the 
availability of alternatives such as returning to armed conflict if negotiations and peace 
agreements prove disadvantageous for the groups involved in armed conflict.  
Centripetalism, even if it is a form of power-sharing could be in favour of the majority 
group in the divided societies. Lijphart (2004: 98), for example, argues that if Horowitz’s 
model was applied to the Iraqi Governing Council, it would produce a majority Shi’ite body 
but with the condition that most of the Shi’ite members of that body would be moderate 
and sympathetic to the interests of Kurdish and Sunni minorities. He convincingly points 
out that Kurds and Sunnis were unlikely to agree to a constitution that would set up such a 
model. This is because groups prefer to be represented by the members of their own 
communities, not the moderate members of other groups, particularly in the post-conflict 
places where interethnic distrust is high. Lijphart’s argument could be applicable to the 
case of Kirkuk as well. If Horowitz’s model were adopted in Kirkuk, then a majority of 
Kurdish moderate representatives were likely to be elected for Kirkuk provincial council 
(further discussed in chapter five). In that case it is hard to imagine that, in the long run, 
the Arabs and Turkmen would be satisfied with the scenario of being represented by the 
moderate Kurdish representatives, instead of being represented by the members of their 
own communities. It is equally hard to imagine that they would ever agree to a constitution 
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that will try to set up such a system in the future. Therefore, it is difficult to expect that the 
Turkmen and Arabs would ever accept centripetalism arrangements in Kirkuk.   
Nevertheless, consociation is still the preferred institutional mechanism by the United 
Nations for managing conflict in divided societies. Moreover, consociational powersharing 
has a better track record than centripetalism. In the following section, I shall discuss 
consociational powersharing and explain that comparing to its alternatives, it is the most 
appropriate institutional mechanism for managing conflict in divided societies.  
2.2 Consociational theory 
O’Leary (2013: 14-15) argues that powersharing is, unlike strategies of genocide, 
expulsion, partition and control, intended to hold the existing state with the active 
participation and consent of its minorities.  He also notes that the advantages of power-
sharing turn out more clearly when it is considered in comparison with its possible 
alternatives. I shall discuss consociational power-sharing in a greater detail below. 
Consociational theory is most closely associated with the work of Arend Lijphart. As noted 
above, the dominant perception among political scientists until the 1950s and 1960s was 
that democracy can work only in homogeneous societies. However, Lijphart opposed this 
view and argued (in the late 1960s) that it is possible to have democracy in heterogeneous 
and plural societies as well. For Lijphart, consociational power-sharing is ‘kinder and 
gentler’ for deeply divided societies than the majoritarian democracy. Since its inception, 
consociationalism has attracted much criticism, but at the same time it has been attractive 
to policy makers and international actors and thus it has been widely applied in post-conflict 
societies, including Iraq. Consociational theory was originally an empirical theory to 
describe and analyse democracy and political stability in plural societies. However, it 
gradually became a normative and prescriptive theory which was recommended for 
managing conflict in plural societies.  
By making reference to the political systems of Almond’s third category- the Low 
Countries, Switzerland and Austria— Lijphart began to examine consociational democracy 
in the late of 1960s. Almond had argued that ‘that subcultural and mutually reinforcing 
cleavages made stable democracy very difficult, if not impossible’, however, the puzzle for 
Lijphart was why these countries, especially the Dutch democracy, was ‘far from unstable 
and dysfunctional, in spite of the deep religious and ideological divisions in Dutch society’ 
 
 
65 
(Lijphart, 2013: 3). In his words, ‘according to the theory of crosscutting cleavages, one 
would expect the Low Countries, Switzerland, and Austria, with subcultures divided from 
each other by mutually reinforcing cleavages, to exhibit great immobilism and instability. 
But they do not’ (1969: 211). This was the beginning of his theory of consociationalism. 
His basic argument was that cooperation at the elite level could assuage conflict and 
overcome deep communal differences. The importance of elite cooperation as explained by 
Matthijs Bogaards (2006: 119), comes from the assumption that democracy is possible in 
divided societies only if elites cooperate, even if the grassroots remain divided. This view 
assumes that leaders will be strong enough to discipline their respective supporters. Lijphart 
firstly used the term ‘politics of accommodation’ in his book The Politics of 
Accommodation (1968), which later changed to ‘consociational democracy’ in his 1969 
article. He followed up with looking at other cases of consociational democracy which 
culminated in his ground-breaking work Democracy in Plural Societies in 1977. In his early 
work, Lijphart focused on the single case of the Netherlands with the emphasis on the role 
of the behaviour of the political elites in political stability. In his 1977 book, he analysed 
nine cases which were the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Lebanon, Malaysia, 
Cyprus, Suriname, and the Netherlands Antilles. Based on his analysis, he proposed explicit 
recommendations for constitutional-writers in divided societies. For example, after 
analysing the nine case studies he (1977: 223) explicitly stated that if political leaders of 
plural societies wish ‘to establish or strengthen democratic institutions in their countries, 
they must become consociational engineers.’ In other words, analysing different cases 
helped him to link his empirical conclusions to policy recommendations. He later expanded 
his empirical cases and included more and more countries until his case studies reached 36 
countries in his 1999 book Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 
36 Countries. In his words, ‘this increase in the number of cases made for a change in my 
basic research approach: from the case-study method, to the comparative method, to the 
statistical method’ (Lijphart, 2013: 3-4). In other words, consociational theory was 
originally an empirical theory to analyse democracy and political stability in divided 
societies. Nevertheless, it gradually became a normative and prescriptive theory which was 
recommended for managing conflict in divided societies and has been widely applied in 
post-conflict societies.  
Lijphart (1977: 25) defines consociational theory in terms of four basic principles:  
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1- Grand Coalition: The first and most important element of consociational democracy 
is that all significant groups have effective representation. In other words, the significant 
communities share in executive power. This can take various forms, such as grand coalition 
cabinet in a parliamentary system, a grand coalition of a president and other top office 
holders in a presidential system, or a grand council or committee with important advisory 
functions. It may be contrasted with the government-versus-opposition model of 
democracy in that the advocates of consociationalism argue that a grand coalition is more 
appropriate than the Westminster pattern for the achievement of political stability in those 
plural countries.  
Two crucial principles must be present before and after the establishment of any grand 
coalition government: inclusion and elite cooperation. In a deeply divided society, the 
principle of inclusion is vitally important because the groups prefer to guarantee positions 
and share power in government rather than being overruled by their rival in a competitive 
government. In other words, the groups opt for power-sharing over majority rule and the 
exclusions that the latter might bring. As explained by Binningsbø (2004: 40), because 
there is a lack of trust among the segments after civil war, it is better for them to jointly 
govern with their counterparts. This could also be applicable for countries that have 
experienced regime change such as Iraq. Consociationalists support the representation of 
the main groups in an inclusive government in the divided places and advocate a broad-
based decision making among communities in those places. Such forms of joint-decision 
making between the major groups are important to achieve political stability in divided 
societies (Allison, 2014: 4). In short, the inclusion of the significant groups in government 
is crucially important for managing conflict and achieving stability in the divided societies.   
In terms of elite cooperation, Lijphart considers accommodation among political leaders to 
be the essence of consociational theory. For him (1977: 25) ‘the primary characteristic of 
consociational democracy is that the political leaders of all significant segments of the 
plural society cooperate in a grand coalition to govern the country.’ He states that 
accommodation should be taken as a non-competitive style of elites, i.e. as the opposite of 
elite-competition. Consociationalism is fostered by the tradition of elite compromise and 
accommodation. Lijphart (1977: 99-100) emphasizes that ‘plural societies may enjoy stable 
democratic government if the political leaders are engaged in coalescent rather than 
adversarial decision-making’ In short, if elites do not opt for cooperation in a grand 
coalition government, the government will face immobilism and would be dysfunctional. 
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The principles of ‘inclusion’ and ‘elite cooperation’ will be further discussed in the context 
of Kirkuk in chapter three. 
2- Mutual Veto: This means the right for each segment to prevent changes that 
adversely affect their vital interests. This right is important for protecting minorities as their 
presence in the coalition alone does not guarantee complete protection of their rights and 
their projects or cases may be outvoted by the majority. When the majority decision affects 
the significant interests of a minority segment, such a decision is deemed unacceptable as 
it can threaten intersegmental elite cooperation. In such a case, only a minority veto can 
give each segment an absolute guarantee of political protection. It must therefore be added 
to the grand coalition principle.  
3- Proportionality: The principle of proportionality means that each segment is a 
proportional beneficiary in political representation, key public institutions and they are 
proportionately represented in public sector employment. It, like the mutual veto, is closely 
connected with the principle of grand coalition. It is a way of allocating scarce financial 
resources and civil service appointments as well.  In other words, it is to avoid the 
unrestrained majority rule principle in which the winner takes all.  
4- Segmental Autonomy: This principle indicates that each minority enjoys some 
distinct measure of autonomy, especially in the area of the minority’s cultural concerns. In 
grand coalition government, decisions should be made on all matters of common interest 
by all of the segments together with proportional degrees of influence. However, decisions 
should be left to the various segments on all the other issues which are particular to them. 
In plural societies, as mentioned earlier, representative organization of the society (e.g., 
political parties) follow segmental cleavages. This means that the plural nature of an 
already plural society is increased by the segmental autonomy. In other words, this feature 
serves one of the basic characteristics of consociational democracy which does not attempt 
to abolish or weaken but to recognise the segmental cleavages explicitly in order to turn 
them into constructive elements of stable democracy (Lijphart 1977: 42). 
In order to speak about fully-fledged consociational power-sharing, the above four 
elements have to be more or less clearly present (Schneckener, 2002: 205). These features 
were existent in the consociationalism classic examples such as the Netherlands, Austria, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Lebanon, Cyprus, Fiji and Malaysia. Some of these consociations 
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have succeeded, as in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium, and others have 
failed, like Lebanon, Cyprus, Fiji and Malaysia (Wolff, 2011: 300). As already noted, the 
role of elites is clearly a crucial element for the success of the above four basic 
characteristics of consociational democracy. Without elite co-operation among the leaders 
of different segments, this model of democracy cannot work (Cordell and Stefan, 2010: 
141). Therefore, the behaviour of political elites has been identified by Lijphart to be the 
main reason for bringing about and maintaining political stability.  
Lijphart (1977: 53-103) also lists a number of favorable factors conducive to consociational 
democracy: these are a multiple balance of power among the segments of a plural society; 
a small number of political parties in each segment; a multiparty system, the small size of 
the territory to which a consociational arrangement is applied; the existence of some cross-
cutting cleavages with otherwise segmental isolation; and overarching loyalties. Moreover, 
the prior existence of a tradition of elite accommodation is a factor which enhances the 
stability of the consociational settlement. Although, these factors are ‘neither indispensable 
nor sufficient in and of themselves to account for the success of consociational democracy’, 
they can improve the ‘explanatory and predictive power of the consociational model’ 
(Lijphart, 1977: 54). These factors, therefore, can be seen as both favourable conditions 
and explanatory variables at the same time, though Schneckener (2002: 218) argues that 
‘the combined impact of favourable conditions is mainly decisive for success or failure of 
consociationalism.’ 
In short, consociationalism is a relatively new theory which dates back to the 1950s and 
1960s. It has had a big impact within the field of political science, however, partly because 
of its unique ability to combine both democracy and stability in divided societies and hence 
its logical rebuttal of the previous dominant view that would consider democracy as nearly 
impossible in those societies. Consociational theory puts much emphasis on the significant 
role of the behaviour of elites with particular attention to its four institutional components, 
i.e. grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy along with 
pointing to several favourable factors. Finally, it should be noted that the theory has 
experienced important advancements since its inception. The following section will discuss 
those developments. 
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2.3 Developments in Consociational Theory  
Consociational theory has undergone revisions, refinements and developments over the 
years by its advocates. Lijphart’s thinking, for example, on consociational theory has 
evolved and developed over time and made considerable changes to some of his earlier 
writings. Other consociational advocates such as John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary have 
also played important roles in advancing consociational theory.  The refinements and 
developments in consociational theory, which I will discuss below, have been partly 
influenced by the challenges that the critics of consociationalism have made against 
Lijphart’s theory for the last forty years or so. Due to the constant revisions and expansions, 
consociational theory has been able to survive, on one hand, and it has remained an 
attractive choice for policy makers in the post-conflict societies on the other hand.  
As part of the theory’s refinement, the definition and the significance of the four elements 
of consociational democracy have seen growth and change. In his 1969 article, Lijphart 
defined ‘consociational democracy’ as ‘government by elite cartel designed to turn a 
democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy’ (Lijphart, 1969: 
216).  However, in his 1977 book, he defined consociational democracy in terms of four 
basic characteristics and discussed each one of them extensively. Moreover, now he makes 
a distinction between primary and secondary characteristics of consociation and argues that 
‘grand coalition and autonomy are the most crucial, whereas the other two occupy a 
somewhat lower position of importance’ (Lijphart, 2008: 4). The reason for this revision, 
as his contribution to Andrew Reynolds’s The Architecture of Democracy subtly implies, 
is that most experts on divided societies and constitutional engineering are in broad 
agreement that ‘the two key ingredients for successful democracy’ in divided societies are 
the ‘sharing of executive power and group autonomy’ (Lijphart, 2002: 38-39). In other 
words, agreements on these two elements transcend the borders of the consociational 
school.  
Lijphart’s emphasis on executive power-sharing and group autonomy as primary 
characteristics of consociational theory could be because of the fact that they have been 
‘repeatedly and independently re-invented and re-discovered’ by both politicians and social 
scientists (Lijphart, 1995: 275; 2002). Nevertheless, Lijphart (2002) still maintains that the 
proportionality and mutual veto are important for they strengthen executive power-sharing 
and group autonomy. He (1995: 275) states that these principles can be implemented in 
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various ways and must be thought of as broad guidelines, but at the same time warns that 
not all of them are of ‘equal merit and can be equally recommended to divided societies.’  
The grand coalition principle, as the major feature of consociational theory, has been 
refined and developed by, amongst others, Brendan O’Leary. In particular, O’Leary argues 
that (2005: 13) what matters for a democratic consociation is not that every leader from 
every community is included in the grand coalition, but rather ‘that leaders have at least 
plurality levels of support within its segment’. To make this case, he distinguishes 
complete, concurrent, and weak democratic consociational executives from each other. By 
complete consociational executive, he means ‘the leaders of all significant segments of an 
ethnically differentiated territory are represented’ (O’Leary, 2005: 13). This means that 
‘complete consociation’ is equivalent to what might be traditionally thought of as Lijphart’s 
‘grand coalition’. However, he maintains that ‘grand coalition’ does not demand the 
representation of every community in the executive, or that representatives within every 
community in the government are supported by all individuals of that community, or that 
all ethnic parties have representatives in the executive (O’Leary, 2013: 25). In a ‘concurrent 
executive’, O’Leary (2013:25) argues, ‘representatives of the majority within each of the 
main partner groups is in government’.  By ‘weak’ or ‘plural’ executive, he means that at 
least the plurality representatives of each significant segment are in government (O’Leary, 
2005: 13; 2013: 25). Thus, grand coalition today has a broader meaning than that suggested 
by Lijphart in his oeuvre.  
Another important modification is that consociationalists now distinguish between pre-
determination and self-determination forms of consociationalism. Lijphart (1995: 280), for 
the first time, argued that one of the most important choices that consociational engineers 
have to make is ‘the difference between pre-determination and self -determination of the 
segments of a plural society’.  In other words, he raised the question whether the segments 
in divided societies be identified in advance so that power would be shared based on these 
pre-determined segments or not. McGarry and O’Leary (2007) have labeled this difference 
as ‘corporate’ and ‘liberal’ consociations. The main difference between the two, as noted 
in the previous chapter, is that a ‘corporate consociational accommodates groups according 
to ascriptive criteria, such as ethnicity or religion, on the assumption that group identities 
are fixed, and that groups are both internally homogeneous and externally bounded’ while 
‘A liberal or self-determined consociation, by contrast, rewards whatever salient political 
identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic or religious 
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groups, or on sub-group or trans-group identities’(McGarry and O’Leary, 2007: 675). Most 
consociationalists are in favour of self-determination consociation. For example, Lijphart 
(2008: 71) states that ‘unless there are compelling reasons to opt for pre-determination, the 
presumption should be in favour of self -deter-mination’ as ‘self-determination has a 
number of great advantages over pre-determination’.  As Stefan Wolff (2011: 1783) points 
out, this turn from ‘corporate’ to ‘liberal’ consociationalism displays an ‘important 
modification of consociational theory that addresses one of its more profound, and 
empirically more valid, criticisms,’ that is consociations ‘further entrench and 
institutionalise pre-existing, and often conflict hardened, ethnic identities, thus decreasing 
the incentives for elites to moderate.’ 
Another development in consociational theory is what O’Leary terms as ‘complex 
consociation,’ which is also called ‘consociation plus’. Apart from the four basic 
characteristics, complex consociations have four additional features which are the source 
of that complexity (O’Leary, 2005: 34-35). First, they attempt to address self-determination 
disputes by institutional recognition of more than one people or nation in a polity. This can 
be done constitutionally by defining a state as multinational such as Bosnia. As Allison 
McCulloch (2014: 19) notes, such provisions ‘highlight the point that many such conflicts 
are about the struggle for national self-determination rather than simply about ethnicity, 
religion or class within the confines of a single state.’ Second, they are political settlements 
that are included as part of peace processes to halt conflicts and prevent recurring violence 
in the future such as the mechanisms of confidence-building measures, restructuring of the 
security system and human rights protection mechanisms. Third, complex consociations 
‘involve at least one additional strategy other than consociation’ (O’Leary, 2005: 34). This 
means that the political settlement encompasses ‘consociation plus territorial autonomy or 
consociation plus integration’ (McCulloch, 2014: 20, emphasis in original). The fourth 
element of complexity is international involvement in adopting and maintaining 
consociational settlements. This may involve neighbouring countries, regional states, great 
powers, the UN, etc. Complex consociation or consociation plus is an important 
advancement in consociational theory, partly because these four additional configurations 
are ‘likely to proliferate in future crisis zones’ (O’Leary, 2005: 35). If one day consociation 
were to be adopted in Kirkuk, it should be ‘consociation plus’ rather than simple 
consociation. I will elaborate this point further in the following chapters.  
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To conclude, this section has given an account of the various developments that the 
consociationalists have made to consociational theory. Although the original emphasis of 
consociationalism on the role of elites and the necessity of protecting the political and 
cultural rights of minorities have remained the same, there have been considerable changes 
and additions to the theory. For example, the initial definition of consociation and its 
original framework is no longer the same, but stretched to cover broader points and issues.  
However, the two most prominent and effective developments are probably those which 
relate to making distinctions between pre-determined (corporate) and self-determined 
(liberal) forms of consociation, on one hand, and inventing the concept of ‘consociation 
plus’, on the other. This vital change has shifted consociational theory from a fixed and 
narrow theory into a flexible and broad one that, in turn, has given consociation the power 
to adapt itself to different contexts within different historic stages. Nevertheless, 
consociational theory, prior and after these advancements, has attracted a lot of criticisms 
by different critics. The following section reviews the most common of those criticisms in 
detail. 
2.4 Critics of Consociational Theory  
Lijphart’s consociational theory has received a great deal of criticism over the past forty 
years for various theoretical, empirical and methodological reasons. The theory has been 
attacked and deemed primordialist, segregationist, futile, perverse and even dangerous and 
its proponents have been accused of racism, promoting apartheid, institutionalizing 
fallacious ethnicity and ‘academic entrepreneurs’ (See, for example, Taylor, 1992 and 
Dixon 2011, 2012). Most criticisms against consociationalism, as Stefan Wolff (2011: 
1789) notes, have been from one of three perspectives: a theoretical criticism that ‘it is 
based on a changing and an uncertain conceptual foundation’; a normative one, i.e. ‘it is 
undemocratic’; and a pragmatic one that ‘it does not lead to stable conflict settlements.’ In 
Lijphart’s own words ‘some critics have argued that power-sharing democracy is not 
ideally democratic or effective; others have focused on methodological and measurement 
issues’ (Lijphart, 2004: 97-08). Generally, as Choudhry (2008: 19) rightly points out, ‘the 
consociational model has generated an enormous literature’. In the following section I 
discuss the most common objections that have been raised against consociational theory. 
Some of the early critiques of consociationalism revolve around the definition deficiencies 
and the problem with the classical cases of consociational democracy.  For example, Brian 
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Barry (1975b: 480) points out that on the one hand, Lijphart describes ‘government by elite 
cartel’ as the explanation for stability in plural societies. On the other hand, he goes on to 
say that consociational democracy has four requirements. In addition, his definition of 
consociational democracy was criticized for being too overloaded and puts together in a 
package stability, segmentation, elite accommodation, dissensus and some mix of 
‘consociational device’ which makes it hard to do any substantial explanatory work (Barry, 
1975: 480; Lustick, 1997: 100-101). In terms of the cases, Barry (1975b: 481) argues that 
this theory fails to consider clear cases of consociationalism. He argues that: 
‘1. That Switzerland provides no support for the consociational democracy, 2. That the 
Austrian case is less clear-cut than is often assumed 3. That Belgium and the Netherlands, 
although plausible supporting cases, still fall short of fully bearing out the theory, and 4. 
That the relevance of the consociational model for other divided societies is much more 
doubtful than is commonly supposed’.  
In the same line of argument, Rudy Andeweg (2000: 517-518) maintains that many of the 
countries classified as consociational democracies have been contested. For example, he 
indicates that there was no such division in Dutch society as Lijphart tended to present; the 
Dutch segments were not so far apart, the risk of political instability was relatively minor 
and the class and religious cleavages were actually cross-cutting. Additionally, he asserts 
that a grand coalition, including representatives from all segments, never existed at the level 
of government. Moreover, the consociational approach is sometimes alleged to generalize 
from European models to Asian and African conflict conditions, i.e. consociational is based 
on European or Western experiences and therefore it is not suitable for divided societies in 
other parts of the world (e.g. Horowitz, 1985: 571). 
Further, Bogaards (1998, 2000) raises theoretical critiques against consociational power-
sharing. On the basis of terminological, conceptual and typological problems within 
consociational theory, Bogaards focuses on two limitations of Lijphart’s argument. His first 
criticism is that Lijphart’s empirical analysis of the performance of consociational 
democracy in plural societies cannot support his recommendation of this model rather than 
majoritarian democracy. His second one is that the considerable changes of the favourable 
factors for the successful consociational theory, both in terms of number and content in the 
course of time, shows the lack of theoretical coherence of the theory. He remarks that 
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Lijphart’s favourable factors are deterministic in essence which are clearly in contrast with 
his voluntaristic stance. 
One of the normative objections against consociationalism is that consociational theory is 
not sufficiently democratic. The allegation that consociationalism is undemocratic was 
originally raised by Barry (1975a, 1975b) and has been repeated by other critics over and 
over again. The objection is based on the opinion that forming a grand-coalition 
government conflicts with the view that considers a strong opposition as a prerequisite of 
contemporary democracy. Van Schendelen (1984) and Ian Lustick (1997), for example, are 
concerned about the consequences of consociationalism for the quality of democracy. The 
concerns of these authors about consociationalism are that it creates a predominance of 
elites, an absence of opposition, and mass political apathy resulting in a lack of political 
vitality. In other words, consociationalism is criticized for excluding opposition and 
overpowering minorities at the expense of majorities. Moreover, consociationalism is 
accused of being an elitist model which privileges ethnic elites by entrenching and 
maintaining their power and taking top state positions, while this ‘falls short of the minimal 
democratic standard’ which expects that ‘positions of power must be determined by a 
competitive vote’ (Howard, 2012: 156). The allegation that consociation is undemocratic, 
as O’Leary (2005:6) points out, is ‘the biggest stick with which consociationalists are 
beaten’ and it is ‘the strongest normative objection to consociation.’  
Furthermore, consociationalism is criticized for focusing on group rights rather than 
individual ones. The broad and widely shared criticism of consociational power-sharing, as 
Stefan Wolff (2011: 1791) notes, is that consociationalism favours and embodies 
communal identities at the expense of individual rights and identities. The core of this 
critique is that liberal democracy and consociationalism pull in different direction. Liberal 
democracy focuses on the individual political rights while ethnic groups and the ways in 
which their political and cultural rights are manifested in political institutions are the main 
concerns of consociationalism. In some consociational cases such as Bosnia and Lebanon, 
for example, the defining feature of the political landscape is the prevailing group and 
community rights over individual rights. Ian O’Flynn (2003) raises this point in the context 
of Northern Ireland and argues that the Belfast Agreement restricts individual freedom, or 
equal treatment, particularly once it comes to group vetoes which privilege designated 
groups over individual members of the Belfast Assembly. Similarly, he (2003: 144) 
observes that “by effectively discounting the votes of the ‘others’ on certain important 
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issues, the agreement privileges national over individual identities.” Rupert Taylor (2006: 
220) also makes a similar point when he argues that the individual right to freedom of 
association is directly violated by the Belfast Agreement because ‘individuals do not have 
the autonomy of exiting from group designation.’ This argument can also be true for Iraq, 
as the three groups of Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs and the Kurds have dominated Iraqi 
politics with little attention to individual rights. 
Consociation has also been criticized for placing more emphasis on elites’ statesmanship. 
Consociationalists assume that consociational power sharing would work because the elites 
are pragmatic and recognise that it is in their best interest to choose a system in the first 
place that allows them to manage ethnic divisions. However, Horowitz (2002: 20-21), one 
of the prominent critics of consociation, points out that consociationalism is ‘motivationally 
inadequate’ for it fails to explain the elites’ self-interested motives that guide their 
behaviour. In other words, while Lijphart puts much emphasis on the pragmatism and 
statesmanship of elites, Horowitz believes that elites are rational and their behaviours are 
guided by their self-interested motives. On the other hand, he (2002: 20) raises the majority-
minority situation and argues that under such situations, the consociational approach cannot 
offer an adequate explanation of why the majority group should share power with other 
minority groups. He (1997: 195) argues that ‘those who have all of state power within their 
reach have no incentive to take a large fraction of it and give it away.’ In the same line of 
argument, Anderson (2012: 372-4) argues that in a situation where no one group constitutes 
a majority, the incentive issue is not a big concern, but under majority-minority conditions, 
why should a majority group willingly acquiesce in arrangements that are deliberately 
designed to dilute its power? Horowitz (2002:20) asks the question, ‘but why should 
majority-group leaders, with 60 per cent support, and the ability to gain all of political 
power in a majoritarian democracy, be so self-abnegating as to give some of it away to 
minority-group leaders?’ Elites in Horowitz’s incentive-based model (2002:21), are 
rational and driven by self-interest motives; therefore ‘it is very risky to count on 
statesmanship’. Thus, consociationalism is criticized for having too much faith in elites and 
their ability to reach compromise, particularly when one ethnic group enjoys a clear 
majority in a divided society.  
Another related criticism is that consociation does not resolve conflict but institutionalizes 
divisions. For example, Taylor (1992) claims that consociationalism is not only undesirable 
but ‘dangerous’ because, through rewarding ethnic parties with seats in legislatures and 
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government, it entrenches ethnic divisions. Consociation, in this perspective, does not 
resolve ethnic conflicts rather it freezes those conflicts for a while but they might erupt 
again at any time. This is partly because most parties have a narrow ethnic support base 
and parties do not need to ‘compete for votes among their former foes’ (Jarstad, 2008: 125). 
Therefore, critics argue that the institutions of consociationalism tend to deepen existing 
divisions and do not promote moderation. The charge, thus, is that consociation reinforces 
ethnic divisions and empowers ethnic leaders who, in turn, exploit the situation by 
maintaining divisions and entrenching communalism to consolidate their positions. As 
Anderson (2012: 70) points out, ‘once empowered by the institutions, ethnic leaders have 
no incentive to change the system’s architecture’, rather they have ‘every incentive to 
defend the system that empowers them.’ The cases such as Belgium, Macedonia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Iraq are good examples to support this critique. Thus, consociational 
institutions, in this view, may offer a way to reduce ethnic conflict in the short term, but it 
does not curb them: in the long run there is always the possibility of the conflicts erupting 
again. Worse still, as Howard (2012, 162-165) observes, ‘the problems become very hard 
to solve once ethnocratic institutions are put in place,’ for example, ‘once a principle such 
as group rights becomes institutionalized in a constitution, it becomes very difficult to 
banish.’ This could be true, especially ‘when power-sharing institutions are combined with 
territorial autonomy for aggrieved groups’ such as the case of the Kurdistan region in Iraq 
(Sisk, 2013: 11).  
In addition, consociationalists are sometimes accused of being primordial pessimists. 
Rupert Taylor (2001: 39-40), for example, argues that the consociational approach deals 
with ethnicity as a social fact that makes consociationalists not prepared to look beyond 
those ‘existing facts’ and ‘concrete realities’. Ethnicity, according to him, is not seen by 
consociationalists as a choice made by people or produced by political processes; as he puts 
it, ‘the point that consociationalism has not grasped, but that has been central to both 
liberalism and Marxism, is that human freedom is a power, a Promethean force; and as such 
it is not something to be limited to ethno-national aggregates and inter-elite institutional 
structures’ (Taylor, 2001: 40). For Howard (2012, 159), Lijphart is explicit ‘in basing his 
theory on an assumption of immutable identity’ in divided societies when he raises a 
‘tenacity of primordial loyalties’ in his 1977 book.  In short, the advocates of consociational 
theory are blamed for dealing with ethnic groups as fundamental units of their analysis and 
for their primordial thinking and assumptions. 
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Another major criticism is by the centripetalism approach which challenges the inclusion-
oriented consociational approach. This approach, which is closely associated with the work 
of Donald Horowitz and alternatively called the integrative or incentive-based approach, 
claims that consociationalism cannot realize political stability in divided societies as its 
main focus is on inclusion while it gives little attention to moderation. Centripetalists 
consider the inclusion of the extremes in the grand coalition government as a threat to the 
government’s stability. According to Horowitz (2014:5), the centripetal approach attempts 
to ‘create incentives, principally electoral incentives, for moderates to compromise on 
conflicting group claims, to form interethnic coalitions, and to establish a regime of 
interethnic majority rule.’ In other words, this approach aims at the election of moderate 
representatives and the formation of governments by moderate interethnic coalitions, i.e. it 
supports moderates against extremists (Horowitz, 2008: 1217). Centripetalism 
disincentivises extremism and urges moderation by seeking institutional incentives such as 
an alternative vote (AV) electoral system. AV allows voters to rank order preferences at 
the ballot box to facilitate the election of moderate ethnic politicians who should reach out 
and attract votes from a range of ethnic groups other than their own (Reilly, 2011: 290-
291). To gain the votes of other groups apart from its own group, political parties have to 
soften their stance on the matters of societal concern. The hope is that an inter-ethnic 
coalition of moderates will be formed that is strong enough to repel the extremists 
(O’Flynn, 2007: 736). In short, centriptalists believe that inclusion without moderation does 
not foster political stability in divided societies. 
Furthermore, consociational power-sharing, critics argue, face the adoption problem. For 
example, Horowitz (2014) argues that the issue of adoptability is one of the big problems 
of both centripetalism and consociation. He lists five obstacles to adoption of either 
centripetal or consociational institutions. First, there are asymmetric preferences in the 
sense that ‘majorities want majority rule; minorities want guarantees against majority rule. 
Consequently, minorities may prefer consociation; majorities do not.’ Second, as ethnic 
politics is a high-stakes game, there are strong inclinations to avoid risk and stay with what 
is familiar. Third, biased negotiators tend to rule in some models and rule out others. Fourth, 
the presumed visibility of interests by group leaders that ‘they can foresee the relative 
benefits and costs for their group of alternative courses of action’ even though ‘they may 
later be proved wrong about those choices’ also narrows choices (Horowitz, 2014: 9). 
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Finally, the availability of alternatives such as returning to armed conflict if negotiations 
and peace agreements prove disadvantageous for the groups involved in armed conflict.  
Even if consociational power -sharing is adopted, critics argue, it does not work in practice. 
The critics argue that making decisions is difficult or even impossible in broad power 
sharing which leads to deadlock and democratic breakdown. The failure of power-sharing 
democracy in Cyprus in 1963 and in Lebanon in 1975 is often cited by the critics of 
consociationalism. Barry (1975b: 502-503) argues that consociationalism may work in 
societies divided along ideological or religious lines but not in the ethnically divided 
societies. This is because ethnic conflicts are less amenable to control by political leaders 
and thus the conflict will be difficult to resolve, whereas religious and class groups can 
more easily be controlled by their leaders and thus it would be easier for consociationalism 
to work when ‘religious and class conflict is a conflict of organizations’ (Barry, 1975b: 
502-503). Horowitz (2014: 7) also remarks that ‘immobilism is a strong possibility’ under 
a situation in which an inclusive government is accompanied with the minority veto. Under 
such an environment, he argues, it is very difficult ‘to overcome the stasis that immobilism 
can produce.’ Minority veto can be dangerous in that it will lead to deadlock as in Belgium, 
Bosnia, etc.  
Finally, some of the critics deny the whole idea of the existence of consociations while 
some others see partial value in it but question the long-term suitability of power-sharing 
in divided societies. Stefan Wolff (2011: 1791) dubs the two groups as ‘complete 
rejectionists’ and ‘partial rejectionists’. If ‘atheism’ is the response of ‘theism’, O’Leary 
(2005: 7) observes, then the complete rejectionists, who deny that consociations exist or 
have ever existed, may be called ‘aconsociationalism’. The partial rejectionists such as 
Donald Rothchild, Philip Roeder, Donald Horowitz, and Timothy Sisk worry that power 
sharing may not be suitable for the successful conflict management in the long run (Wolff, 
2011: 1793). Sisk (2013) for example, accepts consociational forms of power-sharing as 
the best transitional arrangement but he is sceptical about its long-term capacity to bring 
about democracy and stability. Therefore, he suggests that ‘a centripetalist approach may 
be more conducive to forging a long-term peace’ (Sisk, 2013: 16). Similarly, Rothchild and 
Roeder (2005) argue that power-sharing is a useful short-term mechanism particularly in 
the immediate aftermath of civil wars, however, they have serious reservations about its 
capacity to bring about stability and sustainable peace in the long term. This is because they 
consider consociational power-sharing as a theory of conflict management not a theory of 
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conflict resolution. Thus, the criticisms against consociation since its inception have 
continued but they have also contributed in enriching the literature on consociationalism. 
This debate between consociationalists and their critics, which will probably run and run, 
is actually useful, especially for researchers who want to understand whether consociation 
can be adopted in new cases, including the Kirkuk case for that matter. Consociationalists 
have engaged with their critics in many of their works. The following section highlights 
the responses of the advocates of consociational theory against their critics.  
2.5 The Consociational Responses 
Before presenting the responses of consociationalists against their critics, I think it is 
important to clarify several issues. It is important to bear in mind that deeply divided places 
are not ideal for establishing democracy and political stability in the first place. Lijphart 
has already pointed out this reality. He (2002:38-39; 2004: 96-97) explains that most 
experts on divided societies and constitutional engineering are in broad agreement on 
several points. First, the experts agree that deep ethnic and other societal divisions pose a 
grave problem for democracy and that it is more difficult to establish and maintain 
democracy in divided than in homogeneous societies. Second, they agree that the problem 
of ethnic and other deep divisions is greater in countries that are not fully democratic yet 
or not democratic than in the well-established democracies. There is a broad but not 
universal agreement on the third point that sharing of executive power and group autonomy 
are the two key ingredients for successful democracy in divided societies. This 
acknowledgement is important to understand that some of the arguments of the critics are 
really difficult to dispute as they are valid, especially for corporate consociational 
settlements. For example, it is difficult to disagree with the critique that consociational 
power-sharing actually deepens ethnicity and empowers ethnic elites in the corporate form 
of consociationalism, particularly in the places where ethnic groups are geographically 
concentrated. 
Another point to consider is that the corporate assumption of consociational power-sharing 
has permeated many of the criticisms. As noted earlier, Lijphart as well as McGarry and 
O’Leary now make distinctions between pre-determined (corporate) and self-determined 
(liberal) consociations and favour the latter. In other words, the contemporary 
consociational power-sharing can more convincingly rebut the critiques that have originally 
been raised against classic consociation. What is missing in much of the critique of 
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consociationalism, as Allison McCulloch (2014b: 502) notes, is the recognition that ‘there 
is more than one way by which to implement consociational settlements’ which are 
corporate and liberal strategies. The works of both McGarry and O’Leary have been 
influential in developing classical consociational theory and responding to many arguments 
of the critics of consociation. Thus, the distinction between liberal and corporate forms of 
consociation have weakened the validity of those criticisms that raise the question of the 
rigidity of consociation in the consociational cases such as Bosnia.   
Lijphart himself has responded to the critics of consociational theory in various places. In 
his contribution to Andrew Reynold’s The Architecture of Democracy, 2002: 39-53, 
Lijphart offers a comprehensive and long response to the critics of his theory. He (2002:40-
45) summarizes the most important criticisms and objections against consociational theory 
in six points and he responds to them in turn. I will come back to some of his responses 
below. Both John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary have also not just contributed in 
developing consociationalism but defended it in their body of work (see, for example, 
McGarry and O’Leary 2004, 2007, 2009; McGarry 2001, O’Leary 2005 and 2013). 
Therefore, many of the criticisms against consociationalism have been answered by the 
consociationalists quite convincingly. As noted earlier, the advancements in consociational 
theory have already answered some of the problematic issues regarding the ambiguity of 
consociational definition and cases. In the following paragraphs I elaborate the systematic 
responses of consociationalists to some of the most repeated critiques against 
consociationalism.  
Consociationalists are often accused of being primordial thinkers. As noted in the previous 
chapter, Lijphart took the primordial view in his early work on consociation until the late 
1970s, but from about 1980 on, he reassessed his theory and shifted his interpretation of 
ethnic identity from primordialism to constructivism (Lijphart, 2001). Now, Lijphart 
clearly rejects holding primordial view of ethnicity (Lijphart, 2001, 2008 and 2013). This 
shift was important as it influenced his thinking on questions of institutional design for 
divided societies and in particular his thinking about ‘self-determination’. However, as 
McGarry (1998: 860) states, ethnic ties are typically durable in deeply divided societies; 
therefore, they must be ‘accommodated in political institutions’. O’Leary (2005: 8) also 
maintains that the national, ethnic, linguistic and religious identities are generally durable 
once formed. In other words, group identities, according to consociationalists, tend to be 
resilient, durable and hard and they are often mobilized in a politics of antagonism in 
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divided societies. O’Leary (2013: 19), warns the social constructionists, who suggest ethnic 
identity as malleable, fluid, soft and quickly transformable, of their unconscious 
‘assimilationists or integrationist biases’ and when divisions are durable, such biases are 
‘unjust’ and the attempts at assimilation or integration would be ‘unfeasible,’ unless ‘much 
blood is shed’. This is because assimilation or integration policy in divided societies results 
in imposing one community’s identity and interests at the expense of other community’s 
which can lead to violence or civil war as in Turkey and Iraq where the Kurds resisted 
assimilation and integrationist policies which resulted in thousands of casualties. In short, 
the consociationalists consider themselves as realists and argue that in places ‘where 
divisions are long-standing’ and ‘when there is intra-group violence’, it is more realistic to 
“accept that different groups will continue to exist than to seek the ` deconstruction' of group 
ties” (McGarry, 1998: 860). But at the same time they reject the label ‘primordialists’ 
(O’Leary 2005, 2013). This argument seems to be more convincing for Kirkuk where its 
ethnonational divisions, as noted in the previous chapter, are long standing and in every 
election since 2005, the population has mainly divided into ethnonational camps. In short, 
durability is consistent with a constructivist view of ethnicity. 
Consociationalists have also responded to the claim that consociational theory is not 
democratic. In a grand-coalition government, critics argue, elites predominate and 
oppositions are absent and thus consociationalism conflicts with the familiar notion of 
contemporary democracy (See, for example, Taylor 1992, Dixon 1997, 2005). Lijphart 
(2002: 40-41) explains that the criteria of opposition is narrowly based on majoritarian 
conception which is one conception of democracy that ‘does not exhaust the range of 
democratic possibilities.’ Moreover, although consociation favours the democratic value of 
inclusion over opposition, this does not mean that consociation has no room for opposition 
(McGarry and O’Leary, 2009: 78). In the new consociational theory, leaders can freely 
choose to sit in opposition, as, for example, the Sadr group did for a period in Iraq and 
Hezbollah did in Lebanon (again, for a period). Lijphart (2002: 41) states that when the two 
systems of consociation and majoritarian rule are compared, one cannot see a big difference 
in terms of elite domination, as significant decisions are usually made in the two systems 
‘behind close doors’ and in complete secrecy by the leaders. However, O’Leary (2005, 
2013) offers a more compelling response, based on the distinction between ‘complete’, 
‘concurrent’ and ‘weak’ consociations.  This distinction, as already mentioned, is one of 
the important modifications to consociational theory. By a complete consociational 
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executive, O’Leary (2005: 12) means ‘the leaders of all significant segments of an 
ethnically differentiated territory are represented’. This indicates that ‘complete 
consociation’ is equivalent to Lijphart’s ‘grand coalition’. However, he maintains that 
‘grand coalition’ does not demand the representation of every community in the executive, 
or that representatives within every community in the government are supported by all 
individuals of that community, or that all ethnic parties have representatives in the 
executive (O’Leary, 2013: 25). In a ‘concurrent executive’, O’Leary (2013:25) argues, 
‘representatives of the majority within each of the main partner groups is in government’.  
By ‘weak’ or ‘plural’ executive, he means that at least the plurality representatives of each 
significant segment are in government (O’Leary, 2005: 13; 2013: 25). In the case of 
‘concurrent’ and ‘weak’ consociations, ‘significant parties exist outside the government to 
criticize its policies’ which means that government can be held accountable and thus the 
accusation that ‘consociational executives lack democratic opposition is only (partially) 
accurate’ (O’Leary, 2013: 37-38). In short, as O’Leary (2005: 13) points out, what matters 
for a democratic consociation is ‘meaningful cross-community executive power-sharing in 
which each significant segment in the government with at least plurality levels of support 
within its segment.’ Therefore, grand coalition has currently a broader meaning than 
Lijphart originally suggested and thus the allegation that consociation is undemocratic loses 
much of its strength.  
Further, consociationalists argue that majoritarian democracy, the benchmark against 
which critics evaluate consociational theory, is not appropriate for divided societies. In a 
majoritarian democracy, candidates that represent society’s majority generally form the 
government, and the opposition is formed of minority groups. This involves the 
monopolization of power by a party, group, faction or even a person—the opposite of 
power sharing (O’Leary, 2013: 2). This is, frankly, a nightmare situation for the minorities 
in the divided places. As Lijphart (1999: 31-32) argues, in the divided societies, ‘majority 
rule is not only undemocratic but also dangerous,’ since minorities are repeatedly denied 
access to power and this creates a situation in which they feel excluded and discriminated 
against, which in turn might make them disloyal to the government. Instead, Lijphart (1999) 
suggests, plural societies need a democratic regime that privileges and promotes consensus 
instead of opposition, inclusion rather than exclusion, and that maximizes the size of the 
governing majority.  Or as O’Leary (2005: 10) puts it, ‘consociationalists want majorities 
– rather than the majority or the plurality.’ In short, inclusive government is more effective 
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and fairer than its opposite ‘winner takes all’ democracy in deeply divided places, because 
the possibility of simple majority rule in those places gives rise to a tyranny of the majority 
or the dominant nationality (O’Leary, 2014). Such an undesirable outcome, 
consociationalists contend, should be avoided in divided societies.   
One of the big problems of the consociational approach, according to its critics, is that it 
lacks incentives for compromise. In order to reach agreements in a consociational bargain, 
the leaders of different ethnic groups are required to compromise the demands and claims 
of their followers. Such compromises are exploited by politicians who are not part of the 
consociational bargaining process to accuse the moderate leaders of ‘selling out’ the 
legitimate interests of their people (Esman, 2004: 144-145). As Stephen John Stedman 
(1997: 5) points out, ‘the greatest source of risk comes from spoilers-leaders and parties 
who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and 
interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.’ To avoid such a situation, 
centripetalism suggests a ‘pre-electoral interethnic coalition of moderates,’ whereas 
consociationalists aim at ‘post-electoral governing coalitions’ of all significant groups in 
divided societies (Horowitz, 2014: 6). It is important to note that both centripetalism and 
consociation aims at an interethnic power-sharing arrangement in the divided societies 
(O’Leary, 2013). The difference, however, arises on whether ‘conflict regulation should be 
driven by building up moderates among the majority (centripetalism)’ or ‘by building up 
moderates among the hard-liners from all groups (consociation)’ (O’Leary, 34-35). Lijphart 
(2002) acknowledges that Horowitz is right in citing many examples of coalitions that have 
fallen apart as a result of being unable to compromise, but he argues that there are many 
other contrary examples. Moreover, Lijphart (2002: 43) points out that ‘logically, the desire 
to coalesce does imply a need to compromise.’ In other words, he notes that in divided 
societies parties not only want to enter but also to stay in the cabinet in order to reach 
compromises with their coalition partners as they have a very strong incentive to 
compromise political power. Therefore, consociationalists encourage the inclusion of 
radicals in a grand coalition government as this can make them less extreme. This is because 
their concerns are addressed through their inclusion in the first place and thus they may 
moderate their policy stances in return (Mitchel et al, 2009). 
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For consociationalists, the problem of the critics is that their alternatives can hardly produce 
better outcomes in the divided societies. Moreover, political leaders in those societies tend 
to accept power-sharing arrangements rather than its rivals such as integration or 
centripetalism. Consociational deals, as O’Leary (2013: 34) notes, are attractive for the 
political leaders, mainly because ‘they guarantee their group/party some direct share in 
power’; moreover, politicians tend to agree to proportional representation electoral systems 
rather than centripetal ones, because ‘they can win votes and seats on their own preferred 
platforms’. As Anderson (2012: 257) notes, ‘a convincing critique of power-sharing 
arrangements must posit an alternative that plausibly produces superior outcomes’ and at 
the same time ‘stands some reasonable chance of being adopted by rational, self-interested 
elites in the first place.’ Consociation has already a good historical track record while 
centripetalism has found ‘almost no support from either academic experts or constitution 
writers’ (Lijphart, 2004: 98). One reason for this is that the inclusion of radicals is often a 
precondition of getting a peace agreement off the ground.  
It is hard to expect ethnic leaders to voluntarily choose institutions that are purposefully 
designed to weaken their power. As Drake and McCulloch (2011: 381) note, if parties are 
excluded from a system, then why they would contribute to the political stability of that 
system. Moreover, excluded radicals can destabilize the institutions of power-sharing by 
returning to violence or accusing the moderates from their bloc of treachery and thus 
preventing them from making necessary compromises for successful power-sharing 
(McGarry and O’Leary, 2004: 25). Contrary to Horowitz’s assumption, including radicals 
in a grand coalition government can make them less extreme as they are given a stake in 
the system and their concerns are addressed constitutionally too (McGarry and O’Leary, 
2004: 25). In addition, contrary to Horowitz’s criticism about the difficulty of adopting 
consociationalism, Rupert Taylor lists 29 strong cases of consociationalism in his 2009 
book.26   Apart from that, Fraenkel and Grofman (2006) challenge many of Horowitz’s 
empirical claims on the effectiveness of AV in realizing moderation. In short, the track 
record of AV in divided societies is, at best, questionable. 
Another reason that makes political leaders prefer power-sharing to its alternatives is the 
mutual distrust between the groups in the post-conflict divided societies. Anderson (2013: 
                                                          
26 For familiarizing with the classic, past and contemporary consociational cases, see (Taylor, 2009: 6-7). 
Taylor notes that ‘since 1997, the number of cases has doubled and seems destined to grow yet further.’ His 
previous critical views on consociationalism appears to have been changed later. 
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258) convincingly argues that ‘trust is likely to be a commodity in short supply’ in the 
aftermath of ethnic conflict. He explains that due to having no trust between the various 
groups in the post-conflict societies, competitive democracy is not likely to function 
because such a democracy ‘requires losers to trust that winners will not use their position 
of power to oppress the losers, or even to change the basic rules of the game’ (Anderson, 
2013: 258). In the consociational arrangements, however, the significant groups are 
included in the government and thus there are no clear-cut winners or losers which means 
that ‘trust’ is not a vital requirement for working consociational power-sharing. What 
makes ‘trust’ even less relevant is the existence of veto power by the minority groups to 
defend vital interests in case other groups make threats to change policy against the 
minority interests. Hence, adopting power-sharing institutions in the aftermath of ethnic 
conflict is more likely, mainly because on one hand they can function in the absence of 
genuine trust and offer security to all groups on the other hand (Anderson, 2012: 258). Iraq 
is a case in point in this regard.  As Lijphart (2004: 99) points out, ‘power sharing has 
proven to be the only democratic model that appears to have much chance of being adopted 
in divided societies’. In short, the above points push the elites to favour consociational 
power-sharing institutions over any other arrangements in the aftermath of ethnic conflict 
in divided societies. 
With regards to the criticism that consociation cannot offer an adequate explanation under 
the majority-minority situation, O’Leary (2005: 21-22) convincingly explains that under 
three conditions, the majority group may have an incentive to voluntarily share power with 
a minority group. First, when minorities have blackmail and resources potential. Second, 
when there is a risk of altering the segmental balance of power due to expanding the growth 
rate of a minority segment, thus the majority might lose its hegemonic status in the future. 
Third, when the majority group feels responsible to treat minorities generously in 
compensation for historic maltreatment. By contrast, the possibility of adopting centripetal 
institutions is even lower in the ‘sixty/forty contexts’ where one ethnic group in a clear 
majority (Anderson, 2013: 257). Lijphart (2004: 98), as noted in the introduction of this 
research, argues that if Horowitz’s model were applied to the Iraqi Governing Council 
(IGC), it would produce a majority Shi’ite body but with the condition that most of the 
Shi’ite members of that body would be moderate and sympathetic to the interests of 
Kurdish and Sunni minorities. This is, as illustrated in the introduction of this research, 
because the Shiites constitute the majority of Iraq. Clearly, the Kurds and Sunnis were 
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unlikely to agree to a constitution that would set up such a model. Thus, centripetalism is a 
system in favor of the majority group at the expense of the minority group. Therefore, even 
if centripetalism is hailed to be a good alternative to consociational power-sharing, at least 
in the long-run, it is a weak alternative as long as it has no or little chance to be adopted in 
the first place. Or as Anderson (2013: 258) puts it, ‘the problem with power-dividing and 
centripetalism as alternatives to power-sharing does not stem from their ineffectiveness at 
the consolidation phase, it is that they will never get this far.’ In short, consociational 
power-sharing has far more chances to be adopted in the aftermath of ethnic conflict than 
its alternatives. It is probably for this reason that consociation has become the preferred 
choice of the international community for post-conflict divided societies, including for Iraq.   
As noted in the previous section, critics argue that consociationalism favours communal 
identities and entrenches them at the expense of individual identities and rights. The 
consociationalists have tackled this problem by making distinction between ‘corporate’ and 
‘liberal’ consociation. This criticism seems to be more valid if raised against corporate form 
of consociation; however, as Wolff note, this is ‘a gross misreading of liberal, as opposed 
to corporate, consociationalism theory and practice’ (Wolff, 2011: 1791). As noted, in the 
first section of this chapter, the contemporary consociational power-sharing favours the 
liberal (self-determined) form of consociation over the corporate (pre-determined) one. A 
liberal consociation tries to safeguard individuals as well as national or ethnic groups. 
McGarry and O’Leary (2009: 37), for example, now argue that ‘a liberal consociation 
should treat as equally as possible those individuals who subscribe to rival national 
identities, to no national identity, to nested national identities, or have other salient public 
identities which cross-cut national lines.’ They (2007: 675) even explain their position more 
clearly when they state that liberal consociations take care to ‘ensure that the rights of 
individuals as well as groups are protected.’ Thus, this new approach (favouring self-
determined consociation) by consociationalists fills an important gap in the traditional 
consociational literature and, at the same time, provides a good response to the claim that 
consociation favours group rights over individual rights.  
Finally, it is important to note that although there are differences among scholars about the 
most effective institutional design for divided societies, there is a broad agreement that 
consociational power-sharing is the most appropriate mechanism for the transitional period. 
Many non-consociationalists also share this view. For example, Sisk (2013: 10) notes that 
‘consociationalism has become default approach to ethnic or sectarian conflicts.’ This is 
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probably because of the fact that consociationalism may be the only strategy to bring 
violent conflict to end in deeply divided societies (McCulloch, 2014b: 502). On the other 
hand, it should be noted that the breakdown of some consociational power sharing 
arrangements, as O’Leary (2014) points out, is because of what is done at the center not 
what is done by the potential secessionists. The collapse of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia arguably occurred due mainly to the recentralization efforts by the two 
governments. Similarly, the efforts of the former Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri Al-Maliki, to 
recentralize power brought Iraq to the brink of disintegration. Therefore, in O’Leary’s 
words (2014), ‘a lot of what has occurred in the world is not the result of trouble-making 
secessionist minorities, it is the problem of recentralizing and overly majoritarian centres 
which provoke the departure of the relevant entities.’ Hence, the recentralization efforts by 
the governments not the secession desires of the minorities should generally be blamed in 
case of the breakdown of powersharing systems. In short, despite all criticisms, there is a 
broad unanimity among scholars that consociational power-sharing is the most appropriate 
solution to the transitional period in post-conflict divided societies. 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented the different strategies that governments use to deal with 
differences. At the outset, the undemocratic strategies such as genocide and coercive 
expulsion and the democratic strategies which have no potential to work in Kirkuk such as 
majoritarian democracy and centripetalism were ruled out. Consociational powersharing is, 
therefore, deemed to be the only viable option that can combine both democracy and 
political stability in Kirkuk. For this reason, the chapter particularly investigated 
consociationalism over the last forty years since its inception by Lijphart in the late 1960s. 
It argued that consociational theory challenged the dominant perception among political 
scientists in the 1950s and the 1960s that democracy is impossible in the plural societies. 
In so doing, consociationalism focuses on the role of elites and pays attention to the 
importance of political and cultural representation of the significant groups in deeply 
divided societies. However, this theory has experienced major developments and 
expansions, mostly in response to its critics. Therefore, the criticisms against 
consociationalism have generally contributed to expanding knowledge and advancing the 
theoretical and conceptual understanding of consociationalism. Consociationalists have 
responded to their critics in two main ways: rebutting and refuting some of the vehement 
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criticisms and advancing classical consociational theory into a contemporary one. Thus, it 
has remained the first preferred choice of the international bodies such as UN in the post-
conflict divided societies.  
It is noteworthy that the four elements (grand coalition, segmental autonomy, 
proportionality and mutual veto) are the defining characteristics of consociational theory. 
Therefore, studying these features is essential to either analyse specific consociational cases 
or to suggest consociation as a prescription in new cases. The central question of this 
research is to normatively evaluate whether consociation can offer an appropriate 
institutional mechanism for managing conflict and building a stable government in Kirkuk. 
In order to do this, it is crucially important to evaluate and analyse each of the above-
mentioned features separately and in depth. The following chapters investigate whether 
there are prospects to apply a consociational power-sharing framework in the context of 
Kirkuk. Each of the four elements of consociational theory will be examined in a separate 
chapter. I will use my interviews in each of the following chapters. The next chapter, 
therefore, examines the ‘grand coalition’ element with reference to the case of Kirkuk. 
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Chapter 3. Grand Coalition 
On April 9, 2003, the statue of Saddam Hussein in central Baghdad was torn down and, in 
the same day, Saddam’s Ba’athist regime fell in Kirkuk. That day was the end of the 
Ba’athist party after 35 years in power and marked the beginning of a new era for the Iraqi 
people. In the new era, a multi-party system replaced one party and one faction rule. The 
Iraqi Governing Council, the first provisional government in Iraq formed on July 13, 2003, 
reflected the diverse ethnic and religious groups of the country. In the interim constitution 
(Transitional Administrative Law in 2004) and the permanent 2005 constitution, Iraq chose 
a consociational power-sharing system to run the country. As an Iraqi governorate, Kirkuk 
replicated the same governing style of Baghdad, however, due to the legal and political 
disputed status of the governorate, the city has never adopted consociational power-sharing 
formally. This chapter examines the experience of the last 12 years of governance in the 
city and governorate to understand whether there is any prospect to formally adopt the 
grand coalition element as the most important element of a consociational framework. In 
other words, this chapter examines whether the favourable conditions for grand coalition 
exist or not in Kirkuk.  
Grand coalition is the central feature of consociationalism. As Lijphart (2004: 97) puts it, 
‘power sharing denotes the participation of representatives of all significant communal 
groups in political decision making, especially at the executive level (Lijphart, 2004, 97). 
Grand coalition entails the participation of the representatives of the major segments in the 
executive decision-making process, typically on a proportional basis (McCulloch, 2014: 
11). However, as noted in the previous chapter, grand coalition has now been redefined in 
a way that covers a range of forms of governments. O’Leary (2005) now distinguishes 
complete, concurrent, and weak democratic consociational executives from each other. As 
McGarry et al. (2008: 58) put it, ‘although Lijphart originally identified a grand coalition 
in which all communities are represented as the key indicator for consociation, what matters 
is some element of jointness in executive government across all the most significant 
communities. Consociation does not require every community to be represented in 
government.’27 But applying this latter definition would be problematic in the context of 
                                                          
27 According to Paul Dixon (2011), McGarry and O’Leary have redefined consociationalism so that it is 
compatible with Iraq’s 2005 constitution. This is, on the one hand, to describe the Iraqi constitution as 
consociational and justify the exclusion of the Sunnis as a ‘significant’ segment from power in Iraq on the 
other hand.  
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Kirkuk. That is because, if ‘consociation does not require every community to be 
represented in government’, then it would be justifiable to exclude either Arabs or Turkmen 
from the executive power in Kirkuk. Excluding any of the three significant groups of 
Kirkuk would make the political situation in the city unstable and may lead to erupting 
intercommunal violence. For this reason, I will use Lijphart’s original definition of grand 
coalition in this chapter.  
In short, the inclusion of the significant groups in the executive power is one of the crucial 
features of grand coalition government. The inclusion principle can be realized even in the 
absence of sufficient trust as discussed in the previous chapter. However, for the grand 
coalition government to function and to avoid immobilism, elite cooperation is crucially 
important. In other words, the successful establishment of a grand coalition government 
needs the inclusion of the significant groups, but for that government to function a 
minimum cooperation among elites of different groups is required. The following two 
sections will discuss these two principles, but I start with a discussion the principle of 
‘inclusion’. 
As noted above, this chapter examines whether the favourable conditions for grand 
coalition exist or not in Kirkuk. It focuses on the two important principles (mentioned in 
the previous chapter) that should exist prior to and after the establishment of any grand 
coalition government: inclusion and elite cooperation. Therefore, the chapter is organized 
around these two main themes. The first section examines the inclusion principle both 
theoretically and practically with reference to the case of Kirkuk. The second section deals 
with the importance of the principle of elite cooperation in consociational theory and 
examines it in the context of Kirkuk, by particularly focusing on elite behaviour in the post-
2003 Kirkuk. Examining these two principles help us to understand the post-invasion 
governance experience in the city, and the possibility of adopting the element of grand 
coalition in the future. 
3.1 Inclusion 
The participation of leaders from all of the significant segments in the cross-community 
executive power-sharing is the defining feature of grand coalition governments. The 
consociational approach recognizes the existence of segmental cleavages and views them 
as the basic building block of the political system in divided societies (Lijphart, 1977: 41). 
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By recognizing segmental cleavages explicitly rather than deliberately seeking to abolish 
or weaken them, the consociational approach aims to achieve political stability in the 
society. In other words, consociationalism entails ‘the representation and participation of 
all major social segments in the governing process’ (McCulloch, 2014b: 501). This means 
that the consociationalists recognize the segments in the first place and argue that political 
stability can only be achieved when these segments are included in the government. This 
section examines the inclusion principle in the post-2003 Kirkuk and the prospects of the 
formation of inclusive governments in the governorate in the future. It starts with a 
theoretical argument of the importance of inclusion in deeply divided societies. It then 
examines the inclusion principle in the post-2003 governments and legislative bodies in 
Iraq as well as Kirkuk, drawing on the views of local elites in the city. Finally, based on 
the reiteration of the political leaders on the importance of considering inclusive 
governments in any future governance arrangement, I examine the corporate-liberal debate 
and I end the section with my recommendation for what kind of inclusive government 
should be adopted in the city.  
3.1.1 Inclusion in the Post-2003 Kirkuk 
Political inclusion has been the key characteristics of the post-2003 Iraqi political 
landscape.28  By appointing the broad-based Interim Governing Council (IGC) in July 
2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) tacitly provided a basis for the 
consociation approach (McGarry and O’Leary, 2007: 674). Paul Bremer as the 
administrator of the CPA issued a regulation in which he affirmed the formation of the 
Governing Council of Iraq. In his 10th regulation in 2004, he recognized the members of 
the Iraqi Interim Government who were representing all of the significant groups of Iraq 
(CPA regulation 6: 2003; regulation 10: 2004). Thus, a practical grand coalition was formed 
at the national level in Baghdad even before approving the Iraqi permanent constitution. 
Likewise, the US forces created a 30-member council in Kirkuk in 2003 with the seats 
divided equally among the four main ethnic groups, i.e. Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Christians 
and independents (Anderson and Stansfield, 2009: 93-94). Thus, inclusion has been the 
primary feature of the post-2003 period both at the national and governorate levels.  
                                                          
28 This is true in comparison with the political situation under Saddam. Otherwise, under former Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the Sunnis were largely alienated and marginalized. 
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Since 2003, inclusion has been the prevailing feature of the legislative body of the 
provincial councils which were formed in Kirkuk. Since then, three provincial councils 
have been formed in the city which have been inclusionary. However, as noted in the 
introduction of this thesis, the executive body, which is represented in the positions of 
governorship, governorship deputy and chairmanship of KPC, has been inclusive at times 
and exclusive at other times. The first municipal council lasted nearly six months between 
June 2003 and December 2003. During this period, the U.S military appointed 30 members 
indirectly for the municipal council to govern Kirkuk (Anderson, 2009: 13). That council, 
as argued by Hanish (2010: 18), was made up of five blocks (Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, 
Christians, and independents), each consisted of 6 members. Of 6 seats for the independent 
block, the Kurds held five of them. At that stage, the executive body was also inclusive as 
follow: (Mayor: Kurd, deputy Mayor: Arab, Mayor Assistants: Kurd, Christian and 
Turkman).  
The second governorate council was expanded and continued from January 2004 until 
January 2005. That was called a governorate council which consisted of 40 members from 
all of the segments of the governorate. Again, the executive body was inclusive and senior 
executive positions were distributed among the four ethnic groups as follow: governor 
(Kurd), deputy governor (Arab), assistants (Kurd, Christian, Turkmen) and the council 
chairman (Turkmen) (Anderson and Stansfield, 2009: 215). Thus, the first two legislative 
bodies represented in the governorates council and the executive bodies represented in the 
senior positions in the governorate (formed under U.S. Military supervision) could largely 
be characterized as inclusive. The presence and influence of the US officials on the ground 
was crucial for that inclusivity, as they tried to convince the Kurds that they could not run 
the province unilaterally (ICG, 2006: 9). Although there was not and there is still not a 
consociational powersharing arrangement in place, the above-mentioned political 
arrangements between 2003 and 2005 could be seen as holding features of corporate 
consociation.29  
The third provincial council started in January 2005 in which 41 members were elected in 
a public election. No governorate election has been held since 2005.  In other words, the 
                                                          
29 Although independent people were included in both the legislative and executive bodies of the governorate, 
the seats were distributed on the basis of the ethnic backgrounds of the members and each group was given a 
specific number of seats. 
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third inclusive provincial council which has been in place since 2005 was formed on the 
basis of the provincial elections outcome. The seats were taken by the political parties on 
the basis of the proportional election results (further discussed in chapter five). Unlike the 
first two provincial councils, this time there was not a prior agreement to distribute the seats 
among Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and Christians based on a fixed formula. Thus, a new 
inclusion style that will be based on a proportional electoral system would be helpful to 
achieve liberal consociationalism, if consociational power-sharing were to be the choice 
for the governing framework.30 Thus, none of the four main communities has ever totally 
been excluded from the legislative body in the city since 2003. However, the executive 
body has sometimes been exclusive. Therefore, one can argue that the inclusion experience 
of the last twelve years (2003-2015) in the legislative body is promising in that it could be 
maintained and then expanded to the executive body. This can form the basis for adopting 
consociational power-sharing.  
The elites of different groups interviewed for this research were generally satisfied with the 
level of inclusion in the discussions held over the issue of governance in the city since 2003. 
For example, the Kurdish member of the KPC, Ibrahim Khalil (2013) contended that ‘the 
groups have participated in the majority of discussions both inside and outside Iraq.’ When 
I asked him about the circumstances under which discussions were held, he added that ‘all 
of the discussions have taken place in a spirit of mutual understanding.’ Khalil’s point was 
corroborated by the former Kurdish chairman of KPC, Rzgar Ali (2013) who stated that 
‘all of the groups have participated in the discussions that have taken place inside and 
outside the city.’ The Arabs are also satisfied with their inclusion in the discussions. Rakan 
Saeed (2013), deputy governor of Kirkuk, affirmed that ‘the discussions were inclusive.’ 
However, Saeed admits that the Arabs and Kurds reached the 2007 agreement without the 
involvement of the Turkmen. Mohammed Khalil (2013), the Arab member of the KPC, 
also explained that ‘the discussions were inclusive’ and as a result of those discussions in 
the governorate ‘we got the position of deputy governor and the Turkmen got the provincial 
council chairman.’ I asked Adward Oraha (2013), the Christian member of the KPC, 
whether the discussions that have taken place in Kirkuk were inclusive, he responded in a 
                                                          
30 What distinguishes Kirkuk from Iraq is that Iraq’s 2005 constitution contains elements of consociation 
while consociationalism has not been formally adopted in Kirkuk yet. As noted above, McGarry and O’Leary 
(2007) hail the constitution of Iraq for significant parts of it are consistent with the principles of liberal 
consociation. Critics, however, do not agree with this conclusion (for further information, see Bogaards 2015) 
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word ‘Yes’. As my interview with Oraha was not face to face, I could not ask him 
supplementary questions. However, his positive answer indicates that the Christians are 
also satisfied with the discussions held in the city.  
The views of the Turkmen were different on this issue. Hasan Turan (2013), the KPC 
chairman, was skeptical about the ability of local elites to do a genuine negotiation; 
therefore, he maintained that ‘the different groups in Iraq need a facilitator to bring all the 
parties together on the same table to do serious negotiations in order to reach a common 
vision.’ When I asked Guelen Ahmed (2013), a Turkmen member of the KPC, the question 
about the inclusivity of all groups in the discussions, she just responded ‘somewhat’. Again, 
as my interview with Guelen Ahmed was not face to face, I could not ask supplementary 
questions to further explain her response. However, she appears to have the same view by 
Najat Hasan (2013), a Turkmen member of the KPC, who argued that ‘the discussions has 
been going on since 2003, however, during certain times there was a boycott of Arab and 
Turkmen blocs.’ The Turkmen concern relates to the fact that the Kurds and Arabs signed 
an agreement at the end of 2007 in which the position of deputy governor was given to the 
Arabs, however, as Rakan Saeed, an Arab member of KPC, indicated ‘the Turkmen had 
withdrawn at the time’ but they were given the position of KPC chairman later. Once it 
comes to thinking about the future governance, the local politicians of Kirkuk believe that 
that they should run the governorate together as well. But it is important to note at the outset 
that those politicians genrally share the same view in common with regard to governing the 
city, while they hold very different views when it comes to settling the future status of the 
city. The Arabs, for example, place much emphasis on the importance of inclusive 
governments in Kirkuk. For example, Ramlah Hamid Al-Ubeidy (2013), an Arab member 
of KPC, suggested, ‘we are with shared rule.’ The reason for that is because she believed 
that ‘it is not possible that one group governs everything.’ Mohammed Khalil (2013), an 
Arab member of KPC also emphasized that ‘there should not be a dominant party’ in the 
city, rather ‘there should be a consensus government’ to solve the problems. In the same 
line of argument, Rakan Saeed (2013), an Arab deputy governor, argued that ‘after ten 
years, all the parties should be convinced that no group can dominate Kirkuk and impose 
its will by force.’ The focus on inclusion in a grand coalition government is to be expected, 
particularly in a place where there is a lack of trust between its ethnic groups. Burhan 
Mazhar Al-Ubeidy (2013), an Arab member of KPC, for example, told me ‘frankly, there 
are fears among the groups.’ As noted in the previous chapter, when mutual distrust is 
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prevailing in the post-conflict divided societies, it is very likely political leaders opt for 
power-sharing. Consociational power sharing arrangement, as Anderson (2012: 258) notes, 
prevents creating ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ as the significant groups are included in the 
governments. That is exactly what Ramlah Al-Ubeidy (2013) required when she told me 
‘to reach a solution in Kirkuk, there should not be a winner and a loser.’ Thus, the formation 
of inclusive or grand coalition governments in the city is one of the major requirements of 
the Arab community in Kirkuk. 
The Turkmen, like the Arabs, shared the same perspective for governing the city and the 
push for an inclusive government. When I asked Arshad Salhi (2013), the president of the 
Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) and member of the CoR, about the sort of governance that he 
prefers for the future of Kirkuk, he told me ‘Kirkuk should be ruled by a shared rule.’ He 
also added ‘the real solution for the situation of Kirkuk is not imposing domination by a 
particular group over others.’ He suggested that ‘consensus should become the basis.’ 
Hasan Turan (2013), the KPC chairman also pointed out that ‘what Kirkuk needs is to agree 
on a model that includes the main three groups.’ For his part, Tahseen Kahya (2013), a 
Turkman member of KPC, also claimed ‘there is no hope without the consensus of the 
groups and all of the decisions should be taken by consensus of all of the groups.’ He 
maintained that the political leaders of Kirkuk should ‘reach a shared formula to deal with 
Kirkuk.’ Thus, like the Arabs, the Turkmen also paid particular attention to the principle of 
‘inclusion’ in any government in the city. Again, they shared the same view regarding the 
issue of trust. For example, Arshad Salhi (2013), the president of ITF, noted that ‘Iraq still 
goes through the democratization processes’ and ‘there is still lack of trust among Iraqi 
groups’; therefore, ‘now, it is important to bring back the lost trust among us.’ An inclusive 
government, therefore, can be the best way for now, at least until the groups reach the point 
of ‘mutual trust’. Because, under the current situation ‘Kirkuk does not bear the majority-
minority’ model of democracy. For Tahseen Kahya (2013), a Turkman member of KPC, 
the best solution is ‘to build trust’ among political leaders of Kirkuk, because genuine trust 
‘is not existent up to now.’ The persistence of Arabs and Turkmen on the principle of 
‘inclusion’ can be deemed as attempts to bring a power-sharing model in the city and 
governorate. As O’Leary (2013: 8) notes, ‘power sharing is one of the most important 
instances of enhanced inclusion.’ Thus, inclusion and power-sharing complete each other.  
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The Kurdish elites interviewed for this research, on the other hand, believed in the 
importance of Arab and Turkmen participation in governing the city. The Kurds, who are 
the largest group in the governorate, share the same view and this is vitally important, 
because, as Horowitz claims (year?), it is usually the large ethnic groups who reject the 
adoption of power-sharing. Abdulrahman Mustafa (2013), the former Kurdish governor 
(from 2003 until 2011), stated that ‘out of my experience, I say that all of the groups should 
be included in the decision-making process.’ Awat Muhammed Ameen (2013), a Kurdish 
member of KPC, corroborated the same point as ‘Kirkuk is a diverse city and none of the 
groups are the absolute majority.’ He maintained that ‘the logic of imposition and coercion 
does not work.’ In other words, he supported an inclusive government in Kirkuk at least 
for the transitional period and this, he explains, is the view of all the Kurdish politicians in 
Kirkuk and the KRG as well. Najmaddin Karim (2013), the current governor of Kirkuk, 
also confirmed to me that ‘majoritarian democracy is not suitable for Kirkuk.’ Thus, the 
Kurds appeared to be aware of the risks of governing Kirkuk unilaterally and its negative 
consequences on the political stability in the city. One reason for that could be related to 
the point that the Kurds comprised less than 20 per cent of the Iraqi population, yet they 
made many troubles for successive Iraqi governments in the past. For example, the Kurdish 
issue was one of the main factors of Iraq’s political instability throughout the twentieth 
century. In other words, the Kurds were able to shake the political stability in the country 
while only constituting around one fifth of Iraqi population and had no friends but the 
mountains.31 
In the same logic, the exclusion of the Arabs and Turkmen might result in destabilizing the 
political situation of Kirkuk, because on the one hand, they definitely comprise more than 
20 per cent of the population of Kirkuk governorate, and on the other hand, unlike the Kurds 
in the twentieth century, they have friends. For example, Arshad Salhi (2013), the president 
of Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF), explained to me that the ‘European parliament is now 
concerned with Turkmen issues in Iraq’ and ‘holds special meetings regularly to solve the 
problems of Turkmen.’ He also told me that if they ‘are oppressed by Baghdad and the 
Kurdistan region’, they ‘will inevitably resort to two parties, either the international party 
or Turkey, as they are our only resorts.’ The Arabs also have friends in Baghdad and 
                                                          
31 The expression that the Kurds have ‘No friends but mountains’ is well known and frequently used by 
journalists and commentators on the Kurdish issue in middle east.  
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probably in the Arab neighbouring countries. The Sunni/Shia split seems to have been 
effective in this regard. In their recent report on the future of Kirkuk, for example, the 
Middle East Research Institute (MERI) (2015: 25), notes that ‘the distrust that has grown 
between Sunni Arabs and the Shia dominated government in Baghdad is also present in 
Kirkuk.’ Therefore, it is unlikely that the Kurds intend to or will be able to marginalize 
other non-Kurdish communities in the city. This empirical evidence is in line with 
O’Leary’s previously mentioned (2005) observation that under certain circumstances the 
majority group agree to adopt power-sharing, whereas it does not support Horowitz’s 
(2014) scepticism that it is difficult to adopt consociation in a majority-minority situation. 
In general, the Kurds, like Arabs and Turkmen, have been and are in favour of forming 
inclusive governments in Kirkuk. They all understand that without an inclusive 
government, it is highly unlikely that political stability will be achieved and sustained in 
the city.   
3.1.2 Corporate or Liberal Consociation? 
An important and relevant issue regarding inclusion is the distinction that consociationalists 
now make between corporate and liberal forms of consociation. The main practical 
difference between the two is whether seats are reserved in advance or not. In a 
consociational power-sharing arrangement, as McCulloch (2014b: 503) observes, inclusion 
can be achieved by ‘either predetermining which groups will share power or by allowing 
groups to determine the extent of their participation.’ In other words, inclusiveness can be 
achieved through both corporate and liberal forms of consociationalism, however, the 
former gives more guarantee of inclusion to the minority groups than the latter. In corporate 
consociation, the representation of the groups is entrenched and guaranteed constitutionally 
such as in the examples of Bosnia, Belgium and Lebanon. In Bosnia, for example, the 
position of president is rotated between the three ethnic groups of the Bosniak, Croat and 
the Serbs. The Flemish and Walloons are represented with the ratio 6:4 in the legislature 
while French and Dutch speakers are represented equally in the Cabinet of Ministers 
(McCulloch, 2014b: 503).  In Lebanon, the formula of power-sharing based on the 1943 
National Pact guaranteed the presidency to a Christian Maronite, the prime ministerial 
position to a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of the national assembly position to a Shia 
Muslim, while a ratio of six Christians to five Muslims was adopted in other public offices 
(Salamey, 2009: 83). This fixed formula of allocating the presidency, premiership, and 
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speaker of the legislature to a Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shi’a Muslim is still the same 
in Lebanon. Thus, corporate consociationalism predetermines seats and power positions 
among ethnic groups in divided societies.  
Liberal consociationalism, however, ‘avoids constitutionally entrenching group 
representation by leaving the question of who shares power in the hands of voters’ 
(McCulloch, 2014b: 503). In other words, in liberal consociationalism the voters will 
decide, through the ballot box, which party (ethnic or non-ethnic) takes which position and 
thus it leaves rooms for the emergence of new groups. Iraq’s 2005 constitution and 
Northern Ireland’s 1998 Agreement are considered by consociationalists as two documents 
that contain significant elements of liberal consociationalism (see, for example, McGarry 
and O’Leary, 2004, 2006 and 2007). In Iraq, consociation as an institutional mechanism 
for managing conflict has been in place since 2003. One can argue that the first stage of 
consociation was corporate consociation, but it gradually moved towards being a more 
liberal form later. Appointing the 25-members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) based 
on their national and religious backgrounds soon after the fall of the former regime by the 
CPA was a clear move to favour inclusion within the corporate consociational form. In 
2005, the Iraqi constitution was adopted which moved towards a form of liberal 
consociation. According to McGarry and O’Leary (2007: 687) the constitution of Iraq takes 
a liberal consociational approach as it focuses on democratic preferences rather than 
predetermined communal or ethnic categories. For example, while governorates are 
allowed to become regions which have more power and authority, they are not required to 
do so. 
As noted above, the legislative body in Kirkuk has been inclusive since 2003 and the 
political leaders agree upon the necessity of an inclusion principle in any future political 
arrangement. However, while they all want inclusion, they want it on their own terms.  The 
Kurds want a power-sharing arrangement based on the election results, i.e. they reject 
allocating the seats and positions based on a fixed formula in the governorate. The Arabs 
and Turkmen, however, can generally be seen as advocates of adopting equal power-
sharing for each of the three main ethnic groups which is basically the same as corporate 
consociation. These different perspectives among the three main ethnic groups constitute 
the core of the governance problem in the city. An example can clarify this matter. On July 
22, 2008, the Provincial Elections Law was passed by the Iraqi Council of Representatives 
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(CoR). According to article 24 of that law, a local power-sharing formula in Kirkuk was 
decided upon on the basis of 32-32-32-4 formula to distribute key positions to the Kurds, 
Arabs, Turkmen and Christians (Visser: 2008a). The Kurdish members of the CoR 
boycotted the vote and staged a walkout in protest against the inclusion of Article 24 of the 
law for the above-mentioned ‘Provincial Elections Law’. The reason for Kurdish 
opposition to that article was that it mandated equal power-sharing among the three main 
ethnic groups of the governorate (Anderson, 2013: 364). However, despite Kurdish 
legislators protest the law was approved. By contrast, the Arabs and Turkmen members of 
CoR voted in favour of the law. Khalid Shwani (2013), a Kurdish member of CoR, 
described article 24 of the Provisional Election Law as ‘departing from the constitution and 
the implementation of article 140.’ For him, passing this law meant ‘Kirkuk’s restoration 
to the pre-2003 era.’ The law, however, was vetoed the next day by the Kurdish Iraqi 
president, Jalal Talabani and his Shiite deputy, Adel Abdul Mahdi. Thus, the Kurds blocked 
that attempt to approve equal power-sharing government for Kirkuk. 
Two months later, on September 24, 2008, Article 24 was replaced by article 23 in which 
the United Nations special representative in Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, cooperated to craft 
the elections and brokered a compromise in Kirkuk governorate by setting elections for 
fourteen provinces by 31 January 2009. The new article (Article 23) was approved by the 
presidency council on 3 October 2008 (ICG, 2008: 4). According to this article, a 
committee of 7 parliamentary representatives from Kirkuk was to be established to deal 
with the local power-sharing arrangement in Kirkuk. The committee reflected the ethnic 
composition of Kirkuk and consisted of 2 Kurds, 2 Arabs, 2 Turkmen and 1 Christian. They 
should have prepared a report by 31 March 2009 and the CoR was expected to create a 
special election law for Kirkuk. It was decreed in the law that if the parliament failed to do 
so, the president, the prime minister and the speaker of the parliament were to decree, in 
cooperation with the United Nations, a suitable system for elections (Visser: 2008b). 
However, none of these relevant parties could issue such a law. One reason for this was 
that the Arabs and Turkmen insisted on a pre-determined 32-32-32-4 per cent power-
sharing formula to divide senior executive positions in the province and they were opposed 
to holding provincial elections. By contrast, the Kurds were confident that if elections were 
held, they would win, whereas if elections were delayed the current Kurdish dominated 
council would continue (ICG, 2008: 3). I will further discuss the reasons for not holding 
governorate election in Kirkuk since 2005 in chapter five. Thus, the groups basically agree 
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on the importance of considering the inclusion principle, however, they disagree over the 
sort of inclusion that should be adopted. 
 Due to the failure of the seven-member committee to prepare the draft law by its deadline 
of March 31, 2009, the committee was dissolved. After that, at the request of a Kurdish 
member of Kirkuk Provincial Council (KPC), the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court decided to 
strike down the first two paragraphs of Article 23 in August 2013. The first paragraph of 
article 23 stipulated that holding elections in Kirkuk should come after sharing power and 
that administrative, security and public sector employment positions should be shared 
equally among the groups. The Supreme Court’s main reason for abolishing this first 
paragraph was that it deemed them unconstitutional as it considered it violation of article 
16 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution which says ‘equal opportunities shall be guaranteed to all 
Iraqis, and the state shall ensure that the necessary measures to achieve this are taken.’ In 
other words, the article was abolished as it gave the opportunities only to the groups at the 
expense of citizens who may not align themselves with any ethnic group [a point made by 
O’Flynn (2003), Taylor (1992) and others in relation to Northern Ireland]. The court also 
emphasized that the same constitutional violation of the first paragraph has been repeated 
in the second paragraph when it puts ‘forming a committee that consists of two 
representatives from the main three constituents of Kirkuk governorate…’ Again, this 
committee was limited to only the main ethnic groups which denies equal opportunity to 
those who may not like to describe or identify themselves along ethnic lines. This act by 
the Iraqi Supreme Court indicates two important points. First, it is an obvious indication 
that the Iraqi constitution is not consistent with corporate form of consociationalism, rather 
it is more compatible with liberal consociationalism, a point that McGarry and O’Leary 
(2007) had already made. Second, the decision precludes or at least weakens the possibility 
of adopting corporate consociationalism for Kirkuk in the future. Thus, the court reached 
the conclusion that the article is unconstitutional and ends the possibility of any future legal 
attempt to form a grand coalition council or government based on equal power-sharing in 
Kirkuk. 
Having said that, I would argue that considering a combination of corporate and liberal 
forms of consociational power-sharing would be a suitable solution to overcome the 
problem of governance in the city, at least for the transitional period. This is because, as I 
will explain in the following section, the division of the three senior positions in the city, 
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namely the positions of governor, deputy governor and KPC’s chair among the Kurds, 
Arabs and Turkmen has proved effective in the past. These three positions were taken by 
the Kurds until 2008 when the political situation was very tense in the city. However, once 
the positions of deputy governor and KPC’s chairman were given to the Arabs and 
Turkmen in 2008 and 2011, the relations among the political leaders improved 
considerably. Moreover, after noting how Iraq has remained ‘violently unstable’, 
McCulloch (2014b: 509) suggests that ‘it would seem liberal consociational rules, by 
themselves, cannot do all the work of bringing about stability and cooperation’ and notes 
‘if we turn to the cases that combine aspects of liberal and corporate rules, they, on average, 
appear as considerably more stable,’ therefore, she recommends hybridity (a combination 
of liberal and consociational elements) as in Northern Ireland and Macedonia. This 
recommendation could be beneficial for Kirkuk’s future in two ways. First, this is basically 
the demand of some of the political leaders in the city. For example, Rakan Saeed (2013), 
the Arab deputy governor, suggested adopting a combination of corporate and liberal forms 
of consociation in the city when he said ‘the senior positions should be divided among the 
groups regardless of the elections outcome and other lower positions would be based on 
the elections results’.  This point was corroborated by Rzgar Ali (2013), the former Kurdish 
provincial chairman; ‘the senior positions such as governor, deputy governor, provincial 
council chairman, and directors of various directorates should be divided with consent of 
the groups. But the lower positions such as civil servants and workers should be divided on 
the basis of each group’s size in the elections.’ Second, adopting a combination of liberal 
and corporate consociational elements helps to avoid the deficiencies of corporate 
consociation which often ends with gridlock as in the case of Bosnia. In addition, the 
adoption of a hybridity consociational arrangement would be able to address the demands 
of the Kurds on the one hand (the lower positions will be distributed based on elections 
results) and the Arabs and Turkmen on the other hand (the three senior positions of 
governorship, deputy governorship and the KPC’s chairmanship will be distributed 
between the three main ethnic groups) and thus conflicts can be diminished. Finally, I 
would argue that this solution should be possible in the case of Kirkuk. 
Hybridity would be possible in Kirkuk by replicating the informal culture of dividing the 
senior positions among Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds in Baghdad. Habib Al-Hurmzi (2013) 
asserts the importance of this norm which he labels ‘informal culture’. He argues that this 
informal culture has proved well-founded in Iraqi politics. In other words, legislation and 
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important political decisions are issued in Iraq in accordance with the consensus principle 
among the concerned parties. Since 2003, he argues, this phenomenon has become a 
constitutional norm employed to distribute the highest political and administrative 
positions. In other words, hybridity is some sort of ‘half-way-house’ between the liberal 
and corporate models.  Distributing the highest three political positions of the country 
(prime minister, the president and the speaker of Parliament) among Shiites, Kurds and 
Sunnis has been in accordance with this formulation. The same norm can be applied in 
Kirkuk for managing the conflict in the transitional period. Alternatively, this can be 
achieved through an agreement between the groups for a limited time, i.e. ten years or so. 
Finally, from the arguments stated above one may conclude that inclusion of all the 
significant ethnic groups has been the defining feature of the post-2003 political process in 
the city. This means that there is at least a decade of experience of inclusive provincial 
councils in Kirkuk. Moreover, the elites of different groups reiterate the importance of an 
inclusive government in the city for the future. Therefore, one can view this as a promising 
basis for grand coalition in any future governance arrangement in Kirkuk. Without 
inclusion, at least at this stage in which the mutual trust between groups is relatively low, 
it is highly unlikely that Kirkuk can achieve political stability. Therefore, the principle of 
inclusion is important to be maintained and formalized in Kirkuk either within an 
agreement framework (if Kirkuk joins the Kurdistan region or remains as a governorate 
under Baghdad authority) or a constitution (if Kirkuk becomes a stand-alone autonomous 
region). Although the informal inclusive government arrangements have worked relatively 
well in Kirkuk, it should be formalized as the Kurds controlled the city after the emergence 
of ISIS. In other words, the Kurds are in a stronger position than the Arabs and Turkmen 
and there is no guarantee that the Kurdish leaders will not try to achieve their goals by 
domination and refuse cooperation with the leaders of other communities. A formal 
structure of inclusion is necessary to rule out gaining power by domination and to give a 
sense of security to other non-Kurdish groups. This is of vital importance if genuine 
political stability in the city and governorate is going to be achieved. 
However, the major dispute between the groups is not on the necessity of considering the 
principle of inclusion, rather they disagree about whether any future powersharing 
arrangement would be based on equal distribution of the positions (corporate consociation) 
or based on the outcome of elections (liberal consociation). Taking these differences into 
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consideration, I would suggest considering a combination between the two forms of 
consociational power-sharing in any future governance arrangement. Clearly, apart from 
the centrality of ‘inclusion’, elite cooperation is also another very important element for the 
functioning and success of any grand coalition government in divided societies. In the 
following section, I discuss elite cooperation with specific reference to the case of Kirkuk.  
3.2 Elite Cooperation 
Grand coalition government as the first primary characteristic of consociational democracy 
cannot function well without elites cooperating together. In the context of Kirkuk, however, 
no formal consociation has been put in place so far. Therefore, one cannot examine elite 
cooperation to assess whether consociation has been successful or not. Therefore, elite 
cooperation in the context of Kirkuk should be discussed to understand whether there is a 
prior cooperation among elites that could be conducive to the establishment of a 
consociational power-sharing arrangement. In this section, I examine elite cooperation as a 
favourable condition that is strongly conducive to establishing consociation. To do so, 
firstly I discuss in theoretical terms the factors that could contribute to the establishment or 
maintenance of cooperation among elites in a divided society. Then, to show a clear picture 
of elite relations in the past decade or so, I turn to empirically assess the behaviour of elites 
in the post-2003 period in the city. Thus, in the light of the theoretical explanation and 
empirical evidence on the ground, one may judge how elites have worked together in the 
past and whether that experience can tell us anything about the prospects of adopting grand 
coalition government in the future.  
3.2.1 Elite Cooperation: A Theoretical Discussion 
Elite cooperation is key to the functioning and durability of grand coalition in divided 
societies. The role of political leaders is central in consociational theory. This role can very 
clearly be noticed in Lijphart’s first formulation of consociationalism when he (1969: 216) 
states that ‘consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a 
democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy’. He later 
emphasized this in his ground-breaking book Democracy in Plural Societies when he 
(1977: 1) stated that ‘elite cooperation is the primary distinguishing feature of 
consociational democracy’. After studying the cases such as the Netherlands, Austria and 
Belgium, he identified that even if these societies were fragmented, they maintained a stable 
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political process mainly because the cooperative behaviour of their elites (Wolff and 
Cordell, 2011: 300). Furthermore, the cooperation between the representatives of the 
different segments can bring about both democratic legitimacy and political stability in 
divided societies (McCulloch, 2014: 11). Consociationalists suggest that this elite-level 
cooperation can overcome deep communal differences and assuage conflict in such 
societies (Sisk, 1996: 34). This could be because consociationalism ‘depends on the 
capacity of leaders to make compromises and to persuade their followers to accept such 
compromises’ (O’Leary, 2013: 38). In short, consociational theory connects the political 
stability of divided societies to the principle of inclusion and the behaviour of elites in a 
grand coalition government.  
While elite cooperation is key to the functioning and sustainability of grand coalition, the 
existence of a prior tradition of elite accommodation is a favourable factor to the 
establishment of consociationalism. Put differently, in the deeply divided places where 
grand coalition government has already been in place, elite cooperation is vitally important 
and even a prerequisite for functioning power-sharing. However, in other places where 
grand coalition has not yet been adopted such as Kirkuk, the existence of a tradition of elite 
accommodation is a favourable factor for its establishment. Thus, elite cooperation can 
serve as a favourable factor prior to the establishment of grand coalition and a prerequisite 
condition after its establishment. Therefore, prior experience of elite cooperation has been 
identified by Lijphart as one of the favourable factors that is conducive to establishing a 
consociational government. Moreover, Lijphart (1977:103) argues that this factor is more 
important than the other favourable conditions. Overall, although prior tradition of elite 
cooperation does not necessarily mean mutual understanding between elites in the future, 
it is at least a facilitating condition for establishing and maintaining consociationalism in 
the divided places. 
According to Lijphart, three factors strongly contribute in the establishment or maintenance 
of cooperation among elites in the plural or divided societies: these are the existence of an 
external threat to the divided society; a multiple balance of power among the subcultures; 
and a relatively low total load on the decision-making institutions, i.e. size factor (Lijphart, 
1969: 217-219). Firstly, I turn to the factor of the existence of external threats. In the time 
of crisis, even the elites of the countries belonging to the class of majoritarian democracies 
may opt for cooperating with each other within a grand coalition government as a 
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temporary expedient. For instance, Great Britain and Sweden, which were not 
consociational, yet resorted to grand coalition cabinets during the Second World War 
(Lijphart, 1977: 28). At the time of writing this dissertation, the predominantly Arab areas 
in western Kirkuk such as Hawija, Rashad, al-Abbasi, al-Zab, and Riyadh are under ISIS. 
In other words, Kirkuk is currently under the threat of a common enemy; therefore, the 
political leaders in the city are compelled to cooperate with each other to face ISIS. Now 
the three main ethnic groups of Kirkuk fight against ISIS under Kurdish Peshmerga, the 
Popular Mobilization Forces and the Sunni Tribal Fighters. Thus, the ISIS threat has 
compelled the elites of Kirkuk to cooperate with each other. However, notwithstanding 
these recent developments, political leaders in Kirkuk have generally cooperated with each 
other since 2003, partly because their city has borders with the highly violent governorates 
of Mosul, Salahadin and Diyala and they have been obliged to cooperate with each other at 
times to prevent violence and chaos in Kirkuk. Thus, outside threats have been a factor to 
get the elites of Kirkuk to work together at various points since 2003.  
A second favourable factor that encourages the elites to opt for cooperation is the multiple 
balance of power among the segments. Lijphart (1969: 217) argues that if one segment is 
in the majority ‘its leaders may attempt to dominate rather than cooperate with the rival 
minority.’ For Lijphart (1977: 56), the notion of a multiple balance of power includes two 
separate elements: a balance among the segments, and the presence of at least three 
different segments. In other words, in the presence of a multiple balance of power no 
segment has a clear majority. At first sight, a multiple balance of power appears to be absent 
in Kirkuk. On closer inspection, however, one can reach a different conclusion. In an 
interview that I conducted with the Arab author Abdul Satar Al-Ka’bi (2013), he told me 
that ‘there is no balance of power in Kirkuk’ as the Kurds are ‘in majority in terms of 
demography and they have also controlled the main positions’ which made them more 
influential than other groups in the course of events in the city. However, as noted earlier, 
the Kurds seem to only constitute the plurality in the city. Despite what Al-Ka’bi claimed, 
there is no census to prove that they are more than 50 per cent. Even if it turns out that the 
Kurds are more than 50%, there are other reasons that may counterbalance that Kurdish 
majority. 
Kirkuk is not only a local problem but also a national, regional and an international one; 
therefore, when considering the balance of power, the influence of Erbil, Baghdad and other 
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regional and international actors such Turkey and UN should not be overlooked. In 
addition, the existence of the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and Christians is already fulfilling 
Lijphart’s condition for a multiple balance of power, i.e. the condition of the existence of a 
minimum three groups condition is already met in Kirkuk. In addition, as I discuss later, 
the post-2003 experience also proves that the Kurdish elites have cooperated with other 
non-Kurdish groups relatively well in the city. Thus, in spite of their current political and 
military domination in the city, the Kurdish elites cannot ignore other groups once it comes 
to governing the city.  
The size element is the third important factor that can lead to the establishment and 
maintenance of cooperation among elites in divided societies. Lijphart (1969: 219) notes 
that ‘the political burdens that large states have to shoulder tend to be disproportionately 
heavier than those of small countries.’ This is because small places can be managed better, 
or more easily, than bigger ones.  Lijphart (1977: 65) argues that small size has both direct 
and indirect impacts on the possibility that consociation ‘will be established and will be 
successful’. It directly consolidates the spirit of accommodation and cooperativeness, and 
it indirectly renders the issue of governance easier. The direct internal influence of 
smallness is based on the assumption that it is more likely that the elites know each other 
personally and meet frequently. This can make them choose a cooperative rather than an 
adversarial style of decision-making. In Kirkuk, the members of the provincial council from 
different groups know each other personally and meet every Tuesday to talk about the 
issues related to public service and so on. Moreover, as their offices are in the same 
building, they see each other almost every day and, during my frequent interviews for 
nearly two months in the Kirkuk governorate building, I noticed that some of the members 
were frequently visiting the offices of other members of different groups and 
communicating together. In addition, the offices of the governor, his deputy and the 
provincial council chairman are in the same building and they see each other on a daily 
basis to talk about the administrative issues. Rakan Saeed (2013), the deputy governor, for 
example, told me that he ‘meets the KPC chairman on a daily basis,’ and continued, 
‘personally, my coordination with the council chairman and the governor is high.’ 
Similarly, Najmadeen Karim, the governor, told me that he meets the KPC chairman ‘more 
than once a week’ and also said that there are no disputes between him as a governor and 
the governor deputy ‘on the daily and administrative issues.’ Moreover, the directors of the 
governorates directorates also know each other. Thus, the small size of Kirkuk has been a 
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facilitating factor for elite cooperation on the administrative and governance issues to date. 
The presence of this elite cooperation and the lack of division at the mass level together (as 
I will discuss in the following chapter) could be a very promising basis for the adoption of 
a grand coalition and consequently consociation in Kirkuk.  
3.2.2 Elite Cooperation in Kirkuk: Post-2003 Experience 
Having presented the theoretical discussion on elite cooperation above, it is important to 
turn to the behaviour of Kirkuk elites on the ground in the post-2003 period. As noted 
earlier, prior elite accommodation experience is a favourable factor to the establishment 
and success of consociational power-sharing. Based on the interviews that I have 
conducted, I can argue that relations among elites in Kirkuk have passed three stages since 
2003. The relations have generally improved since then. The three phases can be classified 
as follow: The first phase (2003 – end of 2007); the second phase (2008-2011) and the final 
one (2011 until the present). I will explain each of these stages in further detail below. 
The political situation can be defined as ‘tense’ in the city between the years 2003-2007. 
David Gray (2006) who was commander of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was 
assigned to the multinational division north in Iraq, describes the complex struggle for 
power among the ethnic groups of Kirkuk as ‘an amalgamation of a knife fight, a gunfight 
and three-dimensional chess’ in the aftermath of Saddam’s fall in 2003. In this stage, the 
communities were suspicious towards each other. As Awat Mohammed Ameen (2013), a 
Kurdish member of KPC, notes, the participation of the Kurds in overthrowing the 
Ba’athists rule with the American forces made the Kurds ‘a de facto dominant group.’ For 
the Arabs and Turkmen, he argues, ‘dealing with this new de facto was difficult.’ The 
Turkmen viewed Kurdish rule in the city with concern and accused the Kurds of starting 
‘coercive procedures to change the demography of Kirkuk’ under the process of the so-
called ‘Kurdification’ of the city (Arshad Salhi interview, 2013). The Arabs thought that 
the overall regime change targeted them in Kirkuk. As Ramlah Al-Ubeidy (2013), an Arab 
member of KPC, explained to me, in the early years after the fall of the former regime ‘the 
Kurds and Turkmen were viewing each Arab individual as representatives of the former 
regime.’ She added, ‘even saying “hello” and “good morning” was very difficult.’ Thus, 
after 2003, the Arabs (Sunni Arabs in particular) were feeling alienated due to the American 
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occupation, on the one hand, and the process of de-Ba’thification on the other.32 As a result 
of de-Ba’thification process, close to one thousand former Ba’thists at the rank of team 
leader or higher were removed from their positions in the early months after the fall of 
Ba’th party in 2003 which added further to Sunni Arab alienation (Anderson and Stansfield, 
2009: 108). Moreover, Mohammed Khursheed (2013), a senior member of the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP), described the situation to me and said that the four ethnic groups 
‘were trying to achieve the most for themselves’ in that early stage. Rebwar Sayd Gul 
(2013), a senior member of the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), clarified that in 2003 ‘there 
was a contention among the communities and within communities over who will rule and 
govern Kirkuk.’ The struggle for power in the multiethnic society of Kirkuk was 
understandable at the early stages of post-2003 era. Therefore, it is not difficult to 
understand that cooperation among elites under such a turbulent and tense situation would 
not be easy to achieve. 
As noted in the first chapter, the roots of ethnic conflict in Kirkuk date back to the beginning 
of the twentieth century. However, it was only after 2003 that the Arabs for the first time 
felt deprivation, discrimination and grievances. One of the common reasons for ethnic 
conflict is political injustice or political inequality. As Milton Esman (2004: 74-78) points 
out, political injustice is one of the common and key reasons for most of the world conflicts 
which manifests itself in many forms, such as the problem over the status of territory, 
political inequality and exclusion, and the persecution of minorities.  Cederman et al (2011: 
479) also argue that political inequality plays a central role in conflict and even civil war. 
However, the theory of ‘relative deprivation’ might be the most important explanation for 
the early years following the fall Saddam’s regime as this theory connects grievance with 
conflict.33 For William Zartman (1995: 5), ethnic conflicts begin ‘with the inability or 
unwillingness of the government to handle grievances to the satisfaction of the aggrieved.’ 
That is what happened in Kirkuk both before and after 2003. The successive Iraqi 
                                                          
32 Shortly after the US invasion of Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 
introduced de-Ba’thification process on May 16, 2003. This was to remove members of the Ba'ath Party from 
their positions of authority and to ban them from future employment in the public sector. For further 
information on de-Ba’thification process in Iraq, see: Bremer, P. L. and McConnell, M. (2006) My year in 
Iraq: the struggle to build a future of hope; David, R. (2006) 'From Prague to Baghdad: lustration systems 
and their political effects', Government and Opposition, 41(3), pp 347–372; Stover, E., Megally, H. and Mufti, 
H. (2005) ‘Bremer’s “Gordian knot”: transitional justice and the US occupation of Iraq’, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 27(3), pp. 229–254. 
33 According to Esman (1994: 29), the concept of relative deprivation refers to ‘the gap between a group’s 
current status and prospects and what appear to be reasonable and legitimate expectations.’  
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governments were unwilling to address the grievances of the Kurds and Turkmen before 
2003, whereas the Arabs and Turkmen believe that the Kurds have overlooked their 
concerns in the post-2003 period. To resolve their problems, the Arabs and Turkmen 
resorted to boycotting the KPC’s proceedings. They frequently boycotted the sessions of 
the provincial council during 2006-2007. In Awat Mohammed Ameen’s words (2013) ‘the 
Arabs and Turkmen was like one bloc at the time, each time one of them was boycotting 
the provincial council.’ Thus, the groups’ feelings of suffering discrimination and their 
grievances have played significant roles in Kirkuk conflict.  
However, that tense situation which marks the beginning of the second phase was eased by 
2008. The Kurdish Brotherhood List (KBL) and Arab Iraqi republican Assembly (IRA) 
signed a power-sharing agreement at the end of 2007. According to the terms of the 
agreement, the deputy governor position was given to the Arabs and they agreed on 
allocating power equally on the basis of 32-32-32-4 for the three main ethnic groups and 
the Christians (Anderson and Stansfield, 2009: 161). This agreement was reached based on 
two workshops held at the Dead Sea in Jordan in 2008 and in Berlin in 2009 which were 
facilitated by Iraqi and non-Iraqi bodies and organizations. In the first case, the Friedrich 
Nauman Foundation organized a conference entitled ‘Facilitation of Governing 
Arrangements for Kirkuk’ for 23 political decision makers of the Kirkuk governorate at the 
Dead Sea in Jordan from 1 December to 5 December 2008. The conference was intended 
to elaborate recommendations foreseen in Article 23 of the Provincial Elections Law and 
to search for a peaceful co-existence in the governorate and a fair and feasible power-
sharing arrangement.34 In a remarkable move of cooperation, the participants signed a joint 
declaration, the so-called ‘Dead Sea Declaration’, in which in the first point they all agreed 
on implementing the principle of power-sharing (Collins and Wolff, 2009). They also 
agreed on working to realize some other key issues such as implementing economic and 
administrative reforms, supporting the seven-member Article 23 committee, and 
accelerating the process of solving the property disputes in Kirkuk. 
A subsequent workshop was held by the same Foundation in Berlin entitled ‘Implementing 
the Dead Sea Declaration:  Just and Durable Solutions to the Challenges of Governance in 
Kirkuk’ from 28 to 30 April 2009. This was later known as the Berlin Accord. The 
                                                          
34 According to Article 23 of the Provincial Election Law, the political and administrative positions of Kirkuk 
was supposed to be distributed between the three main groups on an equal basis. This article will be discussed 
in detail in chapter five. 
 
 
110 
participants agreed on several points and affirmed their commitment to the principles and 
provisions of the Dead Sea Declaration. They also emphasized the importance of 
implementing the power-sharing arrangements already agreed upon in the Kurdish-Arab 
agreement of 02 December 2007 and the content of Article 23. They agreed on equal power-
sharing of 32-32-32-4 for public sector employment and for distributing the senior positions 
as well (Berlin Accord, 2009). As Awat Mohammed Ameen (2013) notes, ‘this was the 
beginning of working with the basics of power-sharing.’ The 2007 agreement with the 
Arabs was activated in 2008 which resulted in stopping boycotts by the Arabs. Thus, the 
Turkmen remained alone. But at the same time, this deal was a successful ‘divide and 
conquer’ strategy by the Kurds that fractured the Arab-Turkmen alliance that had continued 
since November 2006 (Anderson and Stansfield, 2009: 161). This was the beginning of 
cooperation between the elites of the Kurds and the Arabs in the city. According to Rakan 
Saeed (2013), the deputy governor, ‘the former chair of the provincial council played a 
role’ in reaching that deal.35 He continues that they ‘were also assisted by the international 
organizations’ to hold dialogues, meetings and reaching the agreements. Thus, the Kurdish 
and Arab local political leaders took important steps towards improving their relations and 
cooperation with each other at this stage. The Kurdish-Arab agreement paved the way for 
the later Kurdish-Turkmen deal. 
The third phase of understanding started in 2011 when the Kurds gave up the position of 
provincial council chairmanship to the Turkmen. Awat Mohammed Ameen (2013) 
described this stage as ‘a very important change in Kurdish politics towards Kurdish-
Turkmen rapprochement.’ In Rebwar Talabany’s view (2013), deputy chairman of KPC, 
‘the situation has been eased since 2011.’ Tahseen Kahya, a Turkman member of KPC, 
viewed the cooperation among the elites of Kirkuk positively and described this new 
circumstance as based ‘on the necessity of creating peaceful coexistence and not allowing 
others to fish in the murky water to undermine the relations among the groups.’ Mohammed 
Salih, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) branch in Kirkuk and a member of 
KPC, concluded that ‘the Kurdish-Turkmen relations head in a very positive direction.’ 
Since 2011, the representatives of the groups in the KPC cooperate with each other on 
improving public service in their city. As Sdeeq Kaka Rash (2013), a Kurdish member of 
the KPC, clarified to me ‘all of the group leaders are cooperating with each other on 
                                                          
35 Rzgar Ali from the Kurdish Brotherhood List was the KPC’s chairman at the time. 
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offering local and strategic projects for Kirkuk province.’ In other words, according to Kaka 
Rash, now ‘there are no disputes on offering services such as electricity, water, health and 
education to the citizens.’ In terms of political cooperation on the future status of the city, 
however, there is little evidence that the political leaders have cooperated with each other. 
Ramlah Al-Ubeidy, the Arab member of KPC stated that all the members of KPC are now 
‘discussing and participating in the issue of service.’ She added that ‘things have changed 
and the situation is not like 2003. Now is much better than before.’ Ramlah’s optimistic 
statement mainly focuses on the issue of governance, but when it comes to the future status 
of Kirkuk, she believes that ‘the article 140 has expired constitutionally’. This shows that 
the local elites of different groups share the same view about the gradual cooperation 
improvements among political leaders on the governance issue. However, they hold very 
different views when it comes to the future status of the city. 
It seems to me that the time dimension has played an important role in the improvement of 
relations among local elites of Kirkuk since 2003. The Kurdish-Arab deal at the end of 
2007, as noted earlier by Anderson and Stansfield (2009: 161), was ‘a straightforward 
“divide and conquer” strategy by the Kurds that left the Turkmen bloc outside the council.’ 
However, one can also argue that this deal was reached as a result of what Zartman (2008) 
calls Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) in which the situation would be ripe for starting 
negotiation between conflicting parties. The concept of ripeness, as Zartman (2001: 8) 
notes, ‘is based on the notion that when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict 
from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them 
(although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), they seek an alternative 
policy or Way Out.’ In the context of Kirkuk, as Anderson and Stansfield (2009: 161) point 
out, ‘with the article 140 process at a virtual standstill, a welcome and unexpected 
breakthrough in Kirkuk politics occurred’ when ‘a new power-sharing deal between the 
KBL and the (IRA)’ was announced. This is a clear indication that the deal occurred when 
the time was ripe and neither Kurds nor Arabs could gain what they wanted unilaterally. 
The same thing could be true for the Kurdish-Turkmen deal in 2011. The MHS, as Zartman 
(2008: 232) observes, ‘provides the push to begin negotiations; the Way Out provides the 
pull into a negotiated solution.’ In other words, both the Kurds and Turkmen reached the 
conclusion that negotiation is the best way to reach a solution for governing the city. The 
element of ‘time’ was perceived as important by some of my interviewees. For example, 
Rebwar Talabany (2013), argued that the discussion in Kirkuk has ‘experienced a kind of 
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severity and tension but with the passage of time this was improved.’ Similarly, Ramlah 
Al-Ubeidy (2013) observed that ‘with the passage of time cooperation and coordination 
started.’ Thus, after initial frequent deadlocks in governing the city, the elites gradually 
became accustomed to work and cooperate with each other in the provincial council. This 
move resulted in turning the initial tense situation into a relatively good accommodation in 
the city. 
However, this does not mean that the elites have reached solutions on all of the problems 
in the city. Awat Mohammed Ameen (2013), a Kurdish member of the KPC, explains that 
‘there is still not a comprehensive agreement among all the three main groups on a common 
agenda.’ As mentioned earlier, settling the future status of the city is one of the most 
intractable problems and is still a fundamental point of dispute among the political leaders. 
Each group, as noted in the first chapter, has its own story for claiming the ownership of 
the city. However, ‘no group has been able to convince other groups about the projects they 
believe in’ (Hasan Turan interview, 2013). Due to the different views on the history and 
future of Kirkuk, as Tahseen Kahya (2013), a Turkman member of KPC, stated ‘the 
cooperation flowed and ebbed.’ Sdeeq Kaka Rash (2013) drew a distinction between two 
types of cooperation: 1- cooperation on projects in the governorate and 2- cooperation on 
settling the fate of Kirkuk. He told me ‘regarding the second point, we do not see any 
political cooperation among the leaders of different groups.’ In short, the future status of 
Kirkuk still remains the most difficult issues to be negotiated over by the political leaders 
of Kirkuk.  
Thus, the rapprochement between the groups’ elites and reaching a mutual understanding 
marked a milestone in improving intergroup relations. Moreover, it can be argued that the 
relative elite cooperation has been influential in the relative stability in the city. Tahseen 
Kahya (2003) contended that the sort of cooperation among the elites in the city ‘has 
prevented a resurgence of violence.’ He explained that ‘Kirkuk was often considered as a 
time-bomb or a flash-point, but this cooperation did not allow that to happen.’ Mohammed 
Khalil (2013), an Arab member of the KPC, indicated that there is cooperation and mutual 
understanding among the groups and states ‘through discussions we reached this stage.’ 
For Burhan Mazhar (2013) ‘there is now better understanding than in 2003, 2004 and 
2005.’ One reason for this, according to Rebwar Talabany (2013), deputy chairman of KPC, 
is that ‘the political and cultural awareness has been changed’ in the city. In other words, 
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the experience of more than a decade of political engagement has proved to be effective in 
getting the views of Kirkuk’s elites together and removing the initial tense situation among 
them. Therefore, it is possible to be optimistic about the prospects for grand coalition as 
the key element of consociationalism in Kirkuk.  
Finally, this section investigated elite cooperation as a favourable condition that is 
conducive to establishing consociational government and also explained the behaviour of 
elites in Kirkuk since the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003. The above discussions showed 
that relations between elites of different groups were very tense at the beginning but with 
the passage of time they become less radical, particularly on the issues of governing the 
city together and cooperating on serving the city in terms of public service, etc. This 
conclusion counters Horowitz’s concern about the inclusion of radicals, while it affirms 
Lijphart’s assumption that when radicals are included in the formation of government they 
will gradually become less radical.  
Conclusion 
This chapter highlighted the two most prominent features of any grand coalition 
government: namely inclusion and elite cooperation. Taking the theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence together, it is fair to conclude that there is a reasonable prospect of the 
formal adoption grand coalition in the future. This is partly because the inclusion of the 
four main ethnic and religious groups in the three provincial councils and, to a lesser degree, 
governments of Kirkuk have been the defining feature of the post-2003 period. This means 
that there is already experience of at least a decade of inclusive governments, though, again, 
they have not been formal consociational ones. What makes the prospect for a successful 
grand coalition government in the future, if adopted, is the emphasis of all the groups of 
the necessity of adopting an inclusive power-sharing government. However, as the Kurds 
press for considering a sort of liberal power-sharing and the Arabs and Turkmen demand a 
more corporate one, I suggest considering a combination of both. Adopting a hybridity of 
both corporate and liberal consociations would have more potential to work in the future 
because in this way the demands of all groups can be addressed and a zero-sum game 
(winners and losers) can be avoided.  
Furthermore, this chapter demonstrated that the relations among elites have slowly but 
steadily improved in the governorate. This has been mainly due to the elites working 
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together in the governorate. While the elites had a psychological barrier to even 
communicate together in the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam’s Ba’ath party, they 
now work together and vote unanimously in the KPC to approve projects related to public 
service and the everyday needs of people. That is a considerable achievement for a deeply 
divided city like Kirkuk. Moreover, this advancement in terms of relations among elites 
confirm consociationalists’ argument that inclusion of the radicals in a government will 
make them moderate their radical tone and thus become less extreme and more open to 
compromise. Of course, little has been achieved with regards to reaching a mutual 
understanding and compromise over the future status of the city. However, it is worth 
remembering that my focus in this dissertation is on solving the unresolved governance 
problem in the city not the city’s future administrative status. In short, based on discussions 
and analyses presented in this chapter, one may conclude that adopting grand coalition 
government would not be overly difficult in the future (though of course a lot can change 
in politics). However, in order to answer the main question of this research (whether 
consociation can offer an appropriate institutional mechanism for managing conflict and 
building a stable government in Kirkuk), one must also study the other three elements of 
consociation (segmental autonomy, proportionality and mutual veto) before arriving at an 
overall, determinate conclusion. In the following chapter, therefore, I focus on the 
segmental autonomy element in Lijphart’s consociational model.  
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Chapter 4. Segmental Autonomy 
Consociationalism and civil society approaches are two common models for conflict 
resolution in divided societies. Consociationalism as an elite-oriented and top-down form 
of power-sharing starts from a commitment to bridging interethnic conflict at the 
governmental level whereas the civil society approach, by contrast, is a bottom-up model 
which starts from a commitment to bridging interethnic contact at the mass level. As far as 
segmental autonomy is concerned, consociationalism opts for segregated ethnic autonomy 
for groups in areas like language, religion and education. In other words, consociationalism 
prefers accommodation in the sense that the cultural rights of every ethnic group would be 
constitutionally protected within their own discrete spheres, whereas civil society approach 
favours integration of the different groups by urging groups to have one common integrated 
outlook in the public sphere. In this chapter, I argue that these two approaches need not be 
viewed as mutually exclusive.  On the contrary, as I contend, segmental autonomy can play 
a greater role in engendering political stability if it is enhanced with a civil society 
perspective such as that provided by social capital theory.  
More specifically, the analysis of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I 
provide an overview of segmental autonomy, its definition and its two main forms (i.e. 
territorial autonomy and non-territorial or cultural autonomy) and will also discuss a 
number of relevant cases. The second section examines how the Iraqi constitution and laws 
deal with the ‘segmental autonomy’ issue. The situation of religious and ethnic minorities 
in the post-2003 period is also discussed in this section. The concluding section deals with 
social capital theory and focuses mainly on the importance of existing and creating 
‘bridging’ (as opposed to ‘bonding’) social capital at the grassroots level in Kirkuk. This is 
significant as the city underwent a massive identity change at the hands of successive Iraqi 
regimes in the past, particularly by Saddam’s regime, which has had a negative impact on 
peaceful coexistence among its communities. Briefly, I will argue that social capital theory 
is necessary to be considered in Kirkuk as it can help supplement and deepen consociational 
theory. In this way, the argument presented in this dissertation seeks to go beyond the 
traditional consociational approach to conflict management.  
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4.1 An Overview on Segmental Autonomy 
Segmental autonomy has a relatively long history. The Ottomans originally used this type 
of autonomy in the millet system to manage religious diversity and allow non-Muslim 
communities to exercise a considerable degree of autonomy (Coakley 1994:299). The term 
‘autonomy’ derives from two Greek words: auto (self), and nomos (law or rule) (Lapidoth, 
1997: 29).  From the fifteenth century the Greek Orthodox, Armenian Catholic and 
theJewish community were recognized as millets and were allowed to administer their own 
internal affairs in the domains of religion, education and family law (McGarry and O’Leary, 
2011: 255). The millet system was broad and highly effective for co-opting the Christian 
population under Ottoman rule into a form of consociation (Braude, 2013: 180). It has 
contributed to the current legal systems in Lebanon, India and Israel where autonomy over 
family law has been given to different religious communities (McGarry and Moore, 2005: 
69). The old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth also introduced ‘Kahal’ which was an 
equivalent of the Ottoman’s millet that allowed the Jewish community considerable 
autonomy over its internal affairs (Coakley, 1994:299). Non-territorial autonomy, thus, has 
a historical track record which is still used to this day.  
A more systematic study of segmental autonomy in the form of national-cultural autonomy 
was developed by Otto Bauer and Karl Renner at the start of the twentieth century. Their 
model was based on the ‘personality principle’ which is the idea that ‘communities may be 
autonomous within a multinational state, regardless of whether they have, or identify with, 
a particular territory’ (Prina, 2013: 1). This means that the right-bearers are individual 
communities not geographical territories (Chouinard, 2014: 143). The aim of Bauer and 
Renner, according to Ephraim Nimni (2007: 346), was to find a solution to the problem of 
secessionist threats from national and ethnic minorities by accommodating these ethno-
national differences and offering those minorities constitutionally guaranteed rights, broad 
cultural autonomy and non-territorial self-determination. In other words, national self-
determination, within carefully circumscribed limits, was considered as inappropriate for 
the demographic reality of the Austro-Hungarian empire as it constituted intermingled 
populations of Germans, Magyars, Slovaks, Czechs, Serbo-Croats, Poles, Ruthenians, 
Jews, and others (McGarry and Moore, 2005: 64). This model was widely implemented in 
the period between the First and Second World Wars and has been revived again in Central 
and Eastern Europe since 1991 (Wolff, 2011: 1784). Coakley (1994: 297) argues that 
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elements of this approach have been present in the contemporary world in efforts ‘to resolve 
the problems of indigenous minorities.’ Thus, Bauer and Renner played important roles in 
advancing the concept of non-territorial autonomy in the modern era.  
Consociational theory has also paid a special attention to the segmental or group autonomy. 
Lijphart (1977: 41) defines segmental autonomy as ‘rule by the minority over itself in the 
area of the minority’s exclusive concern,’ especially in the areas of education and culture. 
In other words, according to consociational theory, each ethnic community should enjoy 
‘some distinct measure of autonomy, particularly self-government in matters of cultural 
concern’ (McGarry and O’Leary, 2004: 2). The main purpose of the principle of segmental 
autonomy is that ‘decision making authority is delegated to the separate segments as much 
as possible,’ however, ‘on all issues of common interest, the decisions are made jointly by 
the segments’ leaders’ (Lijphart, 1979: 500). The idea of granting autonomy to minority 
groups is that ‘conflict arises only when they [subcultures or ethnic groups] are in contact 
with each other’ (Lijphart, 1969: 219). Or as O’Leary (2005: 11) puts ‘good fences make 
good neighbours.’  
Segmental autonomy can play a vital role in bringing about political stability in divided 
societies.This is because it can help groups to maintain their distinct ethnic identity and 
through delegating a certain level of power to the political leaders of those groups, it 
encourages them to support the political system in general and thus helps to maintain 
political stability (O’Flynn, 2010: 581; Lijphart, 2004: 97). In other words, due to the 
retention of decision-making power over their own internal affairs along with concurrent 
participation in the broader decision-making process, the different groups are offered ‘a 
vested interest in the stable process of the political system and in sustaining interethnic 
peace’ (McCulloch, 2014: 16). As the ethnic groups in the post-conflict societies will most 
likely view each other with great suspicion and distrust, it is wise to take the interests of 
groups into consideration and leave ‘as many decisions as possible to the groups 
themselves’ (Binningsbø, 2004: 59). Segmental autonomy, in that case, can play an 
important role in managing ethnic conflicts in such societies. 
Territorial autonomy is another kind of autonomy. Weller and Wolff (2005, 12-13) make 
clear distinctions between the cultural and territorial forms of autonomy. They argue that 
in territorial autonomy the autonomous entity is defined in territorial terms and thus ‘a 
population living in a certain territory is granted an autonomous status regardless of 
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whether the individuals living on this territory belong to one or another ethnic group.’ By 
contrast, in non-territorial autonomy the autonomous entity is defined in ‘personal’ terms 
which means ‘a particular (ethnic) group is granted autonomy rights and all its members 
can enjoy these rights, regardless of where they live on the territory of their host-state’ 
(Weller and Wolff, 2005: 13). It is worth mentioning that consociational theory has a 
tendency to prefer cultural over territorial autonomy. This is because cultural autonomy has 
some advantages over the territorial form. For example, as McGarry and O’Leary (2011: 
257) note, membership is voluntary in cases with cultural autonomy in the sense that 
cultural autonomy applies only to individuals who deem themselves as members of the 
group for which the autonomy is established. Territorial autonomy, on the other hand, may 
apply to all inhabitants of a certain region including people who are not members of the 
group for whose benefit the institution was established (Lapidoth, 1997: 39). This, for 
example, is applied to the minorities like Turkmen, Christians and Arabs who live in the 
Kurdistan region. As Wolff (2012: 26-27) remarks, non-territorial or cultural autonomy is 
usually advocated by claimant groups that are territorially not sufficiently concentrated. 
Moreover, non-territorial autonomy is generally more favoured by the governments and 
policy makers than territorial autonomy as the latter may eventually push minorities to 
secede at least in the eyes of governments.   
It is important to note that cultural autonomy for linguistic and religious groups, according 
to Lijphart (2008: 46), has taken three main forms in consociational democracies: 
(1) federal arrangements in which state and linguistic boundaries largely coincide, thus  
providing  a  high degree  of  linguistic  autonomy,  as  in  Switzerland,  Belgium, and 
Czecho-Slovakia; (2)  the right  of religious and linguistic  minorities  to  establish  and  
administer  their own  autonomous  schools,  fully  supported  by  public funds,  as  in  
Belgium  and  the  Netherlands;  and  (3) separate  ‘personal  laws’-  concerning  marriage,  
divorce,  custody  and  adoption  of  children,  and  inheritance for  religious  minorities,  
as  in  Lebanon  and Cyprus.  
In Iraq, as I shall explain later, the above forms of cultural autonomy have been in existence 
since 2003.  
Non-territorial autonomy arrangements have been adopted in a number of contexts, 
including Estonia, Hungary, Canada, Cyprus and Belgium. Estonia was one of the first 
countries that recognized and protected the rights of its national minorities in the post-
World War I period. It adopted the Law of Cultural Autonomy in 1925 which was based 
on the Bauer-Renner proposals (Lijphart, 1979: 507). That law stipulated that each ethnic 
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minority with at least 3,000 registered members had the right to establish its own cultural 
council elected by the ethnic group itself (McCulloch, 2014: 16). These councils would 
have jurisdiction over schools and other cultural institutions such as libraries, museums and 
theatres. They were provided with state subsidies to ensure that minority schools are funded 
at the same level as for ethnically Estonian schools (Lijphart, 2008: 71). The second phase 
of Estonia’s cultural autonomy, which is a continuation of Estonia’s previous experiences 
and also based on the original Renner and Bauer premise, started with the enactment of the 
Act on Cultural Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities on 28 November 1993 (Villiers, 2012: 
174). According to the first point of section one in that act, the cultural autonomy of a 
national minority ‘shall mean the right of persons belonging to a national minority to 
establish cultural autonomy bodies in order to perform culture-related rights granted to 
them by the Constitution’ (legaltext.ee, 1993). The law also provides cultural autonomy to 
‘the German, Russian, Swedish and Jewish national minority, and persons of national 
minorities with a population of over 3000 may establish cultural autonomy bodies’. The 
main purpose of this legislation was to acknowledge the right of national minorities and 
protect their cultural rights.  
It is worth noting that a combination of both territorial and non-territorial forms of 
autonomy is possible within the same country. Canada and Belgium can be viewed as 
examples of such a combination. According to Will Kymlicka (2007: 385) Canada is a case 
where territorial self-government is combined with non-territorial forms of cultural 
autonomy. He points out that along with territorial autonomy in the French-majority 
province of Quebec, the Francophones who live outside Quebec can enjoy linguistic and 
cultural rights. The number of French-speakers living in provinces and territories outside 
Quebec is estimated to be close to one million (LE´GER, 2014: 418). For Chouinard (2014: 
142) the purpose of adopting a federal system in the country, historically, was partly to 
‘recognize and give certain powers to the French-speaking minority’ concentrated in 
Quebec. Apart from the federal arrangement, the francophone communities can gain public 
funds to set up French language schools and varying degrees of public assistance are given 
to religious groups for their own schools (McCulloch, 2014: 17).  Thus, the sizeable French-
speakers’ minority in Canada enjoy a combination of territorial and non-territorial 
autonomy at the same time. The federal government of Belgium and parliament also 
address issues of concern for all Belgians, whereas the regional government and 
parliaments of the Walloon, Flemish and Brussels have authority over certain matters in 
 
 
120 
their defined territories (Hanauer and Miller, 2012: 17). According to the Belgian 
constitution, three linguistic communities have been acknowledged (the Flemish, the 
French, and the German) and each community has councils (articles 115 and 116). Both of 
articles 127 and 130 grant powers to these communities over linguistic and educational 
issues. 
Such a combination has also been instituted in Iraq in which the Kurds enjoy their territorial 
region while other ethnic and religious minorities such as Turkmen, Christians and Yezidis 
have been granted the rights of cultural autonomy. In other words, territorial autonomy 
necessarily encompasses the non-territorial autonomy. For example, in the Kurdistan 
region, the territorial autonomy automatically translates into enjoying cultural rights for the 
Kurds living inside the Kurdistan region. There are some other interesting cases where 
territorial autonomy of a minority is combined with non-territorial forms of cultural 
autonomy for individual citizens of the minority who live outside the self-governing region. 
For example, the Swedes in Finland enjoy both territorial autonomy in the Åland Islands, 
where they constitute a local majority and non-territorial cultural and linguistic rights 
elsewhere in the country. In the following section, I will discuss the right of segmental 
autonomy in Kirkuk in the light of Iraqi legal documents and their practical implementation 
on the ground. 
4.2 Segmental Autonomy in Iraq and Kirkuk 
In this section, I shall discuss how Iraqi legal documents such as the Iraqi constitution and 
various laws and policies by the Council of Representatives (CoR) have dealt with the issue 
of segmental autonomy for various communities in Iraq. From the outset, it is important to 
stress that segmental autonomy is already present in Kirkuk which makes the adoption of 
consociational power-sharing more likely in the future. It is worth noting, however, that the 
rights of segmental autonomy for different communities in Kirkuk is directly affected by 
the Iraqi constitution and laws. This is obviously because Kirkuk is one of the governorates 
of Iraq. The presence of segmental autonomy in the constitution of Iraq is so obvious that 
even the critics of consociationalism agree that segmental autonomy is the only 
consociational feature that is clearly present in the Iraqi constitution. Bogaards (2015: 9), 
for example, who is skeptical of the extent to which Iraq is indeed consociational, regards 
segmental autonomy as ‘the exclusive consociational feature of the 2005 Iraq 
consociation.’ Briefly, the section attempts to show how the groups have been given the 
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rights to govern their internal affairs in Iraq. In order to do so, it looks at the Iraqi 
constitution and other laws by Iraqi parliament with a placing emphasis on the aspects of 
groups’ rights in the areas of governing their religious, linguistic and educational affairs.  
The supreme law in Iraq is the constitution. Therefore, to understand how segmental 
autonomy has been instituted in the country, one should start looking at the constitution 
first. The right of self-government for the groups to run their own internal affairs is reflected 
in various places of the constitution. For example, article 2 recognizes the rights of religious 
minorities such as ‘Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean Sabeans’, while article 3 defines Iraq 
as a country of multiple nationalities, religions, and sects. Article 4 asserts that ‘the Arabic 
language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis 
to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turkmen, Syriac, and Armenian 
shall be guaranteed in government educational institutions in accordance with educational 
guidelines, or in any other language in private educational institutions.’ Article 4 also states 
that ‘the Turkomen language and the Syriac language are two other official languages in 
the administrative units in which they constitute density of population’ and that ‘each 
region or governorate may adopt any other local language as an additional official 
language.’ Article 125 guarantees ‘the administrative, political, cultural, and educational 
rights of the various nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and all other 
constituents…’ Article 43 states that the followers of all religions and sects are free in the 
‘practice of religious rites’ and ‘management of religious endowments (Awqaf), their 
affairs, and their religious institutions.’ Thus, the above articles indicate that segmental 
autonomy has been officially entrenched in the constitution of Iraq and national and 
religious groups can govern themselves in areas of their exclusive domain such as 
education, language and religion.  
Furthermore, the Iraqi constitution also supports the promotion of territorial autonomy in 
Iraq. As noted in the previous section, territorial autonomy is also one of the forms of 
segmental autonomy. Article 117, for instance, recognizes Kurdistan as a federal region 
and allows for the establishment of new regions in the future.36 According to article 119, 
                                                          
36 The Kurdistan region as a federal region compromises three governorates of Erbil, Sulaimani and Duhok 
with the population of 5.2 million. For further information on the Kurdistan region, see: 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/page.aspx?l=12&s=050000&r=300&p=210 
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new regions could be formed by a request from one-third of the council members from the 
relevant governorate or by one-tenth of the voters in the relevant governorate, and the 
request should be voted on in a general referendum. The new-formed regions will adopt 
their own constitutions (Article 120), that will have the right to ‘exercise executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers’ (Article 121). Of course, apart from article 117, other 
articles (119, 120 and 121) have not been implemented in practice so far. However, the 
point here is not about the implementation, though it is vitally important, rather it is to 
illustrate that Iraq’s permanent constitution has adopted a combination of both territorial 
and non-territorial autonomy such as the cases of Canada and Belgium. Article 119 will be 
relevant to Kirkuk only after the implementation of article 140 which indicates that the 
people of Kirkuk will decide upon the future of their city in a public referendum. Without 
settling its future status in accordance with article 140 which is special to Kirkuk and other 
disputed territories in Iraq, article 119 cannot be implemented in Kirkuk. Moreover, as 
Kirkuk is a mixed city, what matters for Kirkuk most is the right of segmental autonomy, 
not federalism, for its four main communities. 
One of the indications of segmental autonomy consolidation in the post-2003 Iraq was the 
establishment of several religious institutions for various religious groups to run their 
religious affairs. Even before writing the constitution, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) 
decided to dissolve the Ministry of Awqaf (charitable endowment) and Religious Affairs in 
2003 and replaced it with administrative offices for the Awqaf of all religions and sects 
(Talmon, 2012: 292). The main reason behind that decision was reportedly the 
disagreement among the IGC members over who would become the relevant minister and 
from which religion. Whatever the reason, that decision turned out to benefit religious 
groups in the control of their internal religious matters. After that decision, three religious 
Diwans (chief administrative office) were created which replaced the dissolved ministry, 
one for Shi’a, one for Sunnis and the other for Christians and other religious communities 
(sunniaffairs.gov, 2015). As noted above, the religious groups have been given the right to 
practise and manage their religious affairs in the 2005 Iraqi constitution.  
As for the religious rights of the Christians and other religious communities, the name of 
the ‘Office of Awqaf of Christians and other Religious Communities’ which was adopted 
in 2003, was later changed into ‘Office of Awqaf of the Christians, Yezidis, Sabean-
Mandaean Religions’ and the CoR issued a specific law for this new Office (Diwan) in 
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2012 (Law 58, 2012). According to this law, the new Office is directly connected to the 
Council of Ministers (CoM) that aims to take care of the affairs of worship and worship 
sites, clergy and religious institutions. The above three religious minority groups are 
represented in the Office and each manages its own internal religious affairs. The law states 
that the charitable endowments belonging to these religious groups will be exempt from 
taxes by government. Moreover, the employees of the Office who are holders of diploma, 
bachelor and postgraduate certificates will enjoy the same right as the employees who serve 
in the ministry of education or ministry of higher education. In addition, the CoM issued 
an ‘Order’ on 15 April 2014 to form the Offices for each religious group and specify its 
tasks in accordance with the above-mentioned law (Order 297, 2014). The tasks of each 
religious group Office, according to the CoM’s Order is to take care of the places of 
worship; to provide for the needs of the clergy and religious institutions and follow up how 
this order is implemented in the governorates and districts; to contribute to the 
establishment of schools, orphanages and hospitals; to endorse marriage certificates; to 
monitor the distribution of subsidies and social grants; to supervise the printing of religious 
books and magazines; to organize training programmes for its employees both inside and 
outside Iraq; to prepare research that is pertinent to the Office purposes; to make facility 
for holding seminars and conferences in Baghdad and other governorates; and to organize 
religious and national parties. Thus, these Offices have been granted broad rights over the 
internal affairs of their religious groups in all Iraqi governorates, including Kirkuk. 
Moreover, provincial authorities funded the construction of the first official Christian 
cultural centre in Iraq in 2013 which is located in Kirkuk (International Religious Freedom, 
2013: 13). This is a significant step for securing segmental autonomy of the religious 
minorities in Iraq as a whole. The above laws that regulate the rights of the religious groups 
to practise and manage their religious affairs could be seen as a practical implementation 
of the above-mentioned article 43 of the constitution. Thus, both the above law and Order 
by the CoM which are grounded in constitution can be viewed as guaranteeing the 
segmental autonomy of religious minorities. 
Furthermore, the ethnic groups have also been granted autonomy over their linguistic and 
educational matters in Iraq. For example, the CoR issued a law to regulate both official 
languages of Iraq and local official languages at governorate level in 2014. The law is called 
‘the law of official languages’ which aims to ensure respect for the constitution and its 
enforcement, achieving the spirit of pride in the mother tongue and supporting the 
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development of both Arabic and Kurdish languages and other Iraqi languages such as 
Turkmani, Syriac, Armenian and Sabean- Mandaean (Law 7, 2014). According to this law, 
Arabic and Kurdish languages are the two official languages in Iraq, while Turkmani and 
Syriac languages are official languages in the administrative units where the Turkmen and 
Syriacs communities constitute the demographic density. The Law allows Turkmen, 
Assyrian and Armenian citizens to study in their own languages in all educational stages. 
Moreover, the law states that each region and governorate has the right to recognize any 
local language as an additional official language if the majority of its population vote for 
that in a public referendum. Every Iraqi citizen has been given the right to educate their 
children in their mother tongue. In addition, each community has been granted the right to 
establish colleges, institutes, cultural centers and scientific academy to serve and develop 
their languages, culture and heritage. What is important is that the law confirms article 3 of 
the constitution indirectly, namely that it considers Iraq as a country of many nationalities, 
religions and sects. Thus, the groups have also been given a considerable autonomy over 
their linguistic and educational affairs.  
The above law is of great importance for Kirkuk. Now, four languages are used in the 
institutions of Kirkuk. As Hasan Turan (2013), the chairman of the KPC, told me in an 
interview ‘we have four main official languages in Kirkuk,’ this is because ‘the constitution 
has given this right to everybody to keep its national and ethnic particularities.’ Therefore, 
as Rebwar Talabany (2013), the deputy chairman of KPC, asserted during the course of 
another interview that ‘all of the groups are free to use their language in anything that is 
readable, audible or visual.’ The former governor of Kirkuk, Abdulrahman Mustafa (2013), 
pointed out that ‘the four groups are now studying in their languages from primary school 
until university.’ He also told me that when he was governor of Kirkuk from 28 May 2003 
to 3 April 2011, ‘I was usually delivering my speeches in three languages’, i.e. Kurdish, 
Arabic and Turkmani. As he explained to me, he does not know Syriac language, otherwise 
he would also have used it.  Moreover, ‘in Kirkuk, the signs of the directorates are written 
in four languages (Tahseen Kahya interview, 2013). Thus, none of my interviewees raised 
concerns regarding managing their own religious or linguistics affairs. The main reason for 
that is because the cultural rights of ethnic, national and religious groups are protected by 
law and the groups enjoy those rights in practice. Ibrahim Khalil (2013), a Kurdish member 
of the provincial council, explained to me in an interview that I conducted with him that 
Kirkuk’s provincial council ‘has no problem in this regard [segmental autonomy]’ and 
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Rebwar Talabany (2013), the deputy chairman of the KPC, emphasized that ‘the issue of 
cultural rights has been solved practically.’ In short, the communities of Kirkuk govern 
their internal affairs and practise their religion, language and education and have few 
concerns in this regard.  
However, as I will argue below, the communities of Kirkuk enjoy their cultural rights due 
to the Iraqi constitution. In the case of Kirkuk, it is important to also adopt segmental 
autonomy within the governorate. In the case of adopting consociational power-sharing the 
areas that the communities should have distinctive control upon must be addressed clearly. 
The local communities should agree upon the policy areas that each community can control, 
if consociation is to be the favoured system of governance. The communities of Kirkuk 
should have a distinctive measure of autonomy over their cultural issues such as language, 
religion and education. Although the 2005 Iraqi constitution has secured the cultural rights 
of various ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, it is important that those rights would be 
entrenched constitutionally or in any future agreement over Kirkuk’s unresolved 
governance problem. Kirkuk is often considered as a small picture of Iraq in terms of its 
diversity. Therefore, it is vital that this diversity is kept in a formal agreement or enshrined 
within a constitution if Kirkuk would become an autonomous region in the future.   
Further, the people in Kirkuk, regardless of nationality or ethnicity, have the right to study 
in their own native language and this right is enjoyed in practice. For example, by 2014, 
there were 437 Kurdish schools in which 79,000 students were studying in the Kurdish 
language as well as 23 Kurdish kindergartens in the Kirkuk governorate (Al-Amri, 2014). 
Moreover, the KPC provided one billion and 500 million Iraqi Dinars from the petro-dollar 
project for reviving Kurdish study in the governorate in 2014 (Al-Amri, 2014). Meanwhile, 
there are 175 Turkmen-language schools in the governorate (Mohammed, 2010). In 
addition, according to Law 22 in 2011, which is pertinent to the ministry of education, there 
are official Kurdish, Turkmani and Syriac directorates within the structure of the ministry 
of education in Iraq (Law 22 in 2011). This is to ensure that groups can have direct control 
over their linguistic and educational affairs. There are currently Arabic, Kurdish, Turkmani 
and Syriac Study Departments within the general directorate of education in Kirkuk. 
Moreover, to preserve the Syriac language, the Iraqi Ministry of Education decided to 
include Syriac and Christian religious education in the curricula of 152 public schools in 
the provinces of Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk (Fides, 2014). These practical examples on 
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the ground, therefore, can illustrate that the groups in both Iraq and Kirkuk enjoy rights to 
cultural, religious and educational autonomy to a considerable extent.  
From the above arguments in this section, we can reach the conclusion that the legal 
documents of Iraq such as the constitution and the laws by the CoR have secured segmental 
autonomy rights for different religious, national and ethnic groups in Iraq which 
automatically apply to Kirkuk. The constitution articles have been regulated in various laws 
and thus the rights guaranteed by the constitution is enjoyed in practice. Thus, segmental 
autonomy can be seen as a defining feature of Iraq’s consociationalism. In other words, 
there is segmental autonomy at the provincial level in Iraq. However, in the case of Kirkuk, 
it is important to also adopt segmental autonomy within the governorate. The local 
communities should agree upon the policy areas that each community can control, if 
consociation is to be the favoured system of governance. In Stefan Wolff’s words (2010: 
1378) ‘this involves issues of local administrative capacity (which can be developed) and 
issues of whether specific competences are exercised jointly by all communities.’ This is 
important, because the existing arrangement, as already noted, springs from the political 
system that is currently in place in Baghdad. Therefore, if consociational democracy is to 
be adopted, Kirkuk local elites should agree upon issues that are specific to the city and its 
ethnic groups. 
Yet, this is still part of the story. Due to the particular nature of Kirkuk and the peaceful 
coexistence between its communities, it is important to also consider bridging interethnic 
contact in the city. It is all very well having segmental autonomy, but there is always the 
risk that segmental autonomy may result in polarization rather than greater stability. So, 
what we need is the right form of segmental autonomy—one that allows groups 
considerable freedom, but that, at one and same time, encourages bridges to be built. I shall 
discuss this extension of consociational theory in the following section.  
4.3 The Necessity of Social Capital Theory in Kirkuk 
This section is interested in the interface between segmental autonomy as an important 
element of consociational theory and social capital (especially the bridging form of social 
capital which I shall return to shortly) as a manifestation of a civil society approach. It 
argues that political stability in Kirkuk requires a hybrid between the two. In other words, 
it is important to consider social capital in Kirkuk to avoid some of the problems that might 
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attach to segmental autonomy such as the problems of balkanisation or polarisation. 
Segmental autonomy may result in isolating groups and may make them think that they are 
living in different worlds; to counteract that, we need not just bonding social capital, but 
also bridging social capital. This is exactly what Najat Hasan (2013), a Turkmen member 
of the KPC, was concerned about when he told me that granting segmental autonomy 
should not lead to the ‘creation of a wall between the sects and nationalities’. In short, the 
argument of this section is that segmental autonomy will play a greater role in the 
stabilization of Kirkuk if it is enhanced with a civil society perspective such as that offered 
by social capital theory.   
Researchers from various disciplines have paid attention to social capital and its effects. 
The modern scholarly interest in social capital is often attributed to the works of Bourdieu, 
Coleman and Putnam (Agnitsch et al, 2006: 37). My focus here is on the definition put 
forward by Putnam (2000) as a political scientist. According to Putnam (2000: 19) ‘whereas 
physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to properties of 
individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and 
the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’. In other words, social 
capital is a product of shared norms, networks and trust that allow co-operation between 
individuals and groups and shape social interaction (Muir, 2011: 959). Accordingly, the 
positive consequences of social capital can be trust, mutual support, cooperation and 
institutional effectiveness (Putnam, 2000: 22). The idea here is that intra-ethnic hostility 
can be avoided if it is replaced by inter-ethnic social networks. Interethnic cooperation and 
collaboration can be established among members of different groups by generating 
interpersonal trust and reinforcing community ties. This is crucial in reducing inter-ethnic 
prejudice and maintaining political stability, particularly in divided societies.  
‘Bridging’ and ‘bonding’ are the two most important forms of social capital identified by 
Putnam. The key difference between the two is whether the social connections are 
homogeneous or heterogeneous (Agnitsch et al, 2006: 39). Bonding social capital is 
‘inward looking and tends to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups’ 
(Putnam, 2000: 22). Bonding usually occurs when people socialize with people who are 
like them in ethnicity, religion, race, etc. That is to say, bonding social capital is exclusive 
and occurs among homogeneous populations (Leonard, 2004: 929). Bridging, on the other 
hand, is ‘outward looking networks and includes people across diverse social cleavage’ 
 
 
128 
(Putnam, 2000: 22). Bridging connects people who are different from each other in terms 
of their ethnicity, religion, race, etc. That is to say, it is inclusive and occurs among (or 
between) heterogeneous societies. In short, bonding is dense networks within homogeneous 
groups, while bridging networks is generally weaker which occurs within heterogeneous 
groups. Some scholars, for example, Patulny and Svendsen, touch on the third kind of social 
capital which is called ‘linking capital’. This means the links formed by communities with 
political, economic and social institutions (Patulny and Svendsen, 2007: 33). However, 
Patulny and Svendsen state that treating linking as equal to bonding and bridging seems 
contentious, since ‘linking’ is not a part of everyday social interaction. They also point out 
that linking overlaps with other concepts like trust in government and democratic 
performance. However, since bridging and bonding only relate to what goes on in civil 
society, some sort of linking device seems to be important to connect the masses in the 
‘bottom’ to the elites at the ‘top’ and vice versa (i.e., representativeness and accountability, 
which are two key principles in democracy). Since segmental autonomy pays attention to 
only what goes on within the groups, and not what goes on between the groups and the 
government, these forms of social capital are important to fill that gap. Accordingly, my 
main focus here is on forming bridging social capital through civil society organization or 
in the workspaces, markets, neighbourhoods, etc.  
Clearly, consociational democracy does not seek to abolish segmental cleavages in divided 
societies, rather it recognizes them to make plural societies more thoroughly plural 
(Lijphart, 1977: 42). According to Lijphart (1969: 220), ‘a distinction has to be made 
between essentially homogenous political cultures, where increased contacts are likely to 
lead to an increase in mutual understanding and further homogenization and essentially 
heterogeneous cultures, where close contacts are likely to lead to strain and hostility.’ As 
noted earlier, the idea of segmental autonomy is that ‘good fences make good neighbours’ 
(O’Leary, 2005: 11). Thus, consociationalists think that the less contact among groups can 
result in reducing conflict. The logic behind this view is that 'clear boundaries between the 
segments of a plural society have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and 
consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into 
actual hostility' (Lijphart, 1977: 88). This perspective contrasts sharply with the so-called 
‘contact hypothesis’ which argues that, under conducive conditions, inter-group interaction 
and social ties between the individuals of different ethnic groups, leads to the reduction of 
prejudice among groups and while, on the other hand, inter-ethnic contact can lead to 
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positive inter-group attitudes (Allport, 1954). In short, as Taylor (1992: 5) points out, under 
consociationalism, ‘ethnic polarization into communal blocs is encouraged, institutionally 
entrenched and legitimated.’  
Of course, critics have questioned the implications of consociational assumptions about the 
issues of contact and conflict and doubt that consociation and social capital can be 
combined into a single approach. In other words, critics argue that a civil society 
perspective, such as social capital theory, is not compatible with consociational theory. 
They maintain that consociationalism favours the institutionalized separation of the groups, 
whereas the civil society approach encourages contacts to foster cross-communal 
reconciliation (Dixon, 1997, 2012 and Tracol, 2015). Noussaibah Younis (2011: 12) 
criticizes consociation in the context of Iraq and considers it as a ‘short sighted theory’ 
given its clear tendency to entrench ethnic divisions and its failure to promote cross-
communal reconciliation. However, criticisms of this sort miss the liberal/corporate 
distinction (a point already made in chapter two). Consociationalists, on the other hand, are 
also concerned about the actual role of civil society organizations on the grounds that it is 
unrealistic to put much faith in the ability of civil society organizations to counterbalance 
elite ethnocentrism in the divided societies because these organizations are themselves 
likely to be ethnically based and appeal to ethnocentrism (McGarry et al. 2008, 74).  
However, as O’Flynn (2009: 264) notes, ‘a good consociation should create space not just 
for things that distinguish people from one another (accommodation), but also the things 
that bring them closer together (integration).’37 That is to say, the existence of both bonding 
and bridging social capital can enhance consociational arrangements in divided societies.  
Bonding social capital is good for mobilizing solidarity and social support, but at the same 
time it reinforces our narrower selves, whereas bridging social capital can create broader 
identities (Putnam, 2000: 22-23). For Putnam (2000), by generating strong in-group 
loyalty, bonding social capital may create strong out-group antagonism. Therefore, a 
negative external impact of this form of social capital is more likely. A society made up of 
                                                          
37 In their response to O’Flynn’s argument, McGarry and O’Leary (2009b: 378) argue that “consociation 
may also be considered ‘integrationist’”. Moreover, they assert that integrationists ‘should not be allowed to 
monopolize a concept with positive connotations.’ This is an indication that consociationalists accept some 
elements of integration. In fact, McGarry and O’Leary now explicitly argue that consociation can embrace 
some elements of integration (see, for example, O’Leary 2013). Therefore, my argument to embrace the 
elements of both consociation and civil society approach in Kirkuk does not necessarily contradict 
consociationalism, or at least its most recent manifestation. 
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distinct groups with each characterised by bonding social capital will look like Belfast or 
Bosnia at their worst, that is, where the groups in question are segregated into mutually 
hostile camps (Putnam and Feldstein, 2003: 2-3). Too much bonding and not enough 
bridging in the divided societies can result in many of the negative outcomes hypothesised 
by social capital (Agnitsch et al, 2006: 39). The problem is that it is harder to create bridging 
social capital than bonding social capital. Under such a situation, this proverb is applicable 
‘birds of a feather flock together’ (Putnam and Feldstein, 2003: 23). In short, if democracy 
in divided societies is to survive in the long-run, a combination of consociation ‘top-down’ 
and civil society approach ‘bottom-up’ should be sought. I argue for this hybrid 
arrangement in the case of Kirkuk. This is important as segmental isolation in the city may 
deepen mutual suspicions among the four ethnic groups and lead each to stereotype the 
other. 
A combination of both bonding and bridging is important for maintaining peace and 
stability in divided societies. Quoting Briggs, Putnam (2000: 23) argues that bonding social 
capital is good for ‘getting by,’ while the bridging form is essential for ‘getting ahead’. As 
Norris (2002: 3) points out, Putnam’s distinction between bonding and bridging should be 
seen as a continuum rather than dichotomy, as many groups serve both bonding and 
bridging functions in practice. Networks, she argues, can be classified to be closer to one 
end of the spectrum or the other. This means that bonding and bridging can be combined 
together. In addition, in a quantitative study to examine the effects of different forms of 
social capital (bonding and bridging) on community action, Agnitsch et al (2006) concluded 
that each of bonding and bridging predict community action separately; however, they are 
more effective when they are combined. Patulny and Svendsen (2007: 36) warn that if 
researchers and policy makers assume that the bonding/bridging distinction is strictly 
mutually exclusive, then the strength of that distinction can change into its weaknesses. In 
other words, neither bridging nor bonding should be placed over the other. Briefly, the 
policy makers should consider weaving these two forms of social capital together, 
especially in divided societies. Therefore, it is crucially important to consider social capital 
theory along with segmental autonomy in any future consociational arrangements for 
Kirkuk. As I will explain later, social capital is already existent in Kirkuk, but needs 
revitalization and enhancement.  
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It has to be said that the research on whether contact and inter-group interaction encourages 
tolerance and reduces ethnic violence is mixed. For example, Ashutosh Varshney (2001) 
argues that interethnic civic and non-governmental associations are essential to preventing 
ethnic violence. This is partly because ‘the more the associational networks cut across 
ethnic boundaries, the harder it is for politicians to polarize communities’ (Varshney, 2001: 
363). Based on data from six Indian cities, Varshney found where interethnic ties and 
networks existed, tensions and conflict between Hindus and Muslims had been regulated 
and thus violence had been avoided. However, the cities where such networks and 
associations were missing witnessed the most violent communal conflicts. But this 
conclusion cannot be generalizable to all ethnic conflicts. Esman (2004: 18-19) for 
example, points to the case of Sarajevo which was hailed for peaceful ethnic coexistence 
among Muslims, Serbs, Croats and other communities; however, the people of Sarajevo 
were unable to resist the pressure of war erupting in Bosnia and they also broke apart into 
separate and hostile camps. I examine below what these claims and arguments would mean 
in the case of Kirkuk.  
4.4 Interethnic Relations in Kirkuk 
Most of the literature on the problem of Kirkuk focuses on the elite or top-down 
institutional solution while giving much less emphasis to the bottom-up mechanisms and 
arrangements. This dominant and unilateral focus can be found in the works of Anderson 
and Stansfield (2009), Natali (2008), Rafaat (2008), Romano (2009), Wolff (2010) and 
Anderson (2013). A small number of other studies on Kirkuk focus only on the bottom-up 
solution such as the works of Rydgren and Sofi (2011) and Rydgren et al. (2013). This 
seems to be the case in most other deeply divided places. As Cochrane (2000: 1) notes, the 
academic literature on political conflicts in Northern Ireland, South Africa and 
Israel/Palestine ‘has concentrated on the elite level, Track One diplomacy and the struggle 
between the parties, with little attention being given to the equally important community-
based Track Two initiatives, that are essential to building and sustaining peace processes.’ 
Cochrane (2000: 2) states that ‘politics generally, and conflict resolution in particular, is 
too often analysed at the elite level, with little emphasis being given to the communities 
from whom the elite political actors derive their authority.’ Therefore, simultaneously 
considering both bottom-up (micro-level) and top-down (macro-level) solutions seems to 
be indispensable in most of the deeply divided societies. In the case of Kirkuk, this is 
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precisely what Dlawer Ala'Aldeen (2015), the president of the Middle East Research 
Institute (MERI), asserted during my interview with him: ‘Kirkuk has to be approached 
with both top-down and bottom-up processes.’ This is crucially important to bring long-
term political stability and a lasting peace to the city and the governorate. 
As argued in chapter one, the ethnic groups of Kirkuk have lived together peacefully for 
centuries. This reinforces the argument that diversity per se is not the reason for ethnic 
conflict. Contrary to the impression that academic literature and journalists often give, 
peaceful and even cooperative relations between ethnic groups are more common than 
large-scale violence (for a formal game-theoretic analysis of this type of cooperative 
behaviour, see Fearon and Laitin, 1996). This has been the case in Kirkuk for a long time. 
Despite strong in-group (‘bonding’) connections, interethnic (‘bridging’) networks have 
been one of the defining features in Kirkuk. Such networks have been created through 
intermarriage and contact in the interaction spaces like the neighbourhoods, workplaces, 
market, mosques, etc. In other words, both bonding and bridging social capital have been 
in place for a long time and are likely to have that played an important role in keeping peace 
and stability in the city. 
However, the Arabization process negatively influenced interethnic relations in Kirkuk. To 
dilute the percentage of Kurds and other non-Arab groups in Kirkuk, successive Iraqi 
governments brought a large number of Arabs to the city. Names of schools and streets 
were changed into Arabic (Nouri Talabany, 1999: 18-19). Moreover, Saddam’s regime 
distributed ‘ethnic identity correction’ forms within Kirkuk city and governorate to Kurds, 
Turkmens and Assyrians that required them to register themselves as Arabs (Human Rights 
Watch, 2004: 15). Over the period 1991 and 2003, between 120,000 and 200,000 non-
Arabs were displaced from Kirkuk and its environs (Human Rights Watch, 2003). As 
Anderson and Stansfield (2009: 40-41) argue, the Arabization process did not have an 
effect on changing the demographic balance of the city alone, but also on how communities 
view each other. Although communal identities had been hardening since the 1950s in the 
city, the Kirkukis’ perception about each other is still affected by the actions taken in the 
1970s and 1980s by the regime. In short, the Arabization policy led to a hardening of group 
identities and deepening ethnic divisions among the communities which resulted in 
strengthening bonding social capital and weakening interethnic relations in general, i.e. 
bridging social capital. 
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Tensions between ethnic groups have also grown at a grassroots level in the post-2003 
period in Kirkuk. After 2003, one of the main difficulties in the city was to deal with the 
issue of returning displaced people. Some 100,000 IDPs (internally displaced persons) 
returned to Kirkuk city and governorate alone by 2005 (Romano, 2007: 267). When they 
returned, many found their homes occupied by Arab settlers. Around 46,000 shops, lands 
and properties of both Kurds and Turkmen were confiscated by Arab settlers in Saddam’s 
era (Daquqi, 2011). This situation has fuelled conflict between expelled Kurds and 
Turkmen and Arab settlers that has repercussions on social peace among communities. 
Moreover, over a ten year period (2004-2014), more than 2500 people have been killed and 
10,369 persons injured in various terrorist actions in Kirkuk (Faraj, 2014). Although not all 
of these violent actions were ethnically driven, the people concerned often interpret it as 
interethnic hostility (Rydgren and Sofi, 2011). 
In addition, the civil society organizations could be funded to play a more effective role 
than now. External funding agencies can, for example, support civil society organization to 
foster dialogue at grassroots level. This is an important consideration in Kirkuk as it could 
prevent segmental autonomy deepening ethnic divisions, as critics of consociational theory 
argue. O’Flynn and Russell (2011: 228) note that creating civil society associations may 
not be possible in places where there are no such associations; however, weak civil society 
associations might be strengthened through intervention. This is what Hanauer and Miller 
(2012: 57) observe in Kirkuk, when they state that although civil society is weak in Kirkuk, 
it can be fostered. According to Hanauer and Miller (2012:57) ‘grassroots-level confidence-
building measures and initiatives promoting intercommunal dialogue in Kirkuk have had 
some success.’ They argue that the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is suited to 
support confidence-building measures at grassroots level and to develop intercommunal 
dialogue in Kirkuk. This is possible, mainly because UNAMI has undertaken many 
confidence-building measures and initiatives at the local level through its agencies that 
focus on children, women’s rights, labour issues, etc. They (2012: xv) also suggest that the 
State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) could place 
higher priority on civil society initiatives in Kirkuk. However, the role of outside actors 
such as UNAMI should be limited, because ‘wherever the United Nations have intervened, 
they complicated the problem’ (Latif Mistafa interview, 2013).  
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As mentioned earlier, apart from civil society organizations, interaction spaces can play 
important roles in getting people of different ethnic backgrounds close together. In such 
places, casual contacts have a potential to develop into true contacts and thus into 
interethnic social capital (Rydgren and Sofi: 2011). Moreover, apart from the existence of 
heterogeneous interaction spaces, intermarriage and multilingualism can be two other 
important factors in decreasing intergroup hostility and increasing tolerance. The situation 
of Kirkuk in this regard is promising. Kirkuk is a multilingual city where each ethnic group 
has its own language, i.e. four languages are used in the city. Language was not a barrier 
until the 1970s when the Arabization process intensified and, as argued earlier, a large 
number of Arabs who only spoke Arabic were brought to Kirkuk. The new generation of 
returning Kurds since 2003 can also speak only Kurdish. This may give a pessimistic 
impression at first sight. However, as Mohammed Shwani (2006: 191) points out, by 
looking at the daily treatment of people from different ethnic groups with each other, one 
can hardly find even an illiterate person who does not speak two languages or even three 
languages in Kirkuk. Moreover, intermarriage is still common in Kirkuk. Marriage has 
become a key element in the unification between the different factions of Kirkuk (Al-
Shamari, 2011). Intermarriage between the communities can be one of the main reasons for 
the peaceful coexistence in Kirkuk, because the members of different groups ‘have become 
relatives’ (Abdulrahman Mustafa interview, 2013). Moreover, exogamy has been 
influential in reducing interethnic tensions and hostilities as it has resulted in many people 
having no strong ethnic sentiment in favour or against any ethnic group (Mohammed 
Shwani, 2006: 66). In short, multilingualism and intermarriage can be two key factors to 
bridge the communities of Kirkuk and reduce the risk of segregation that segmental 
autonomy may create in the absence of robust civil associations and interethnic contact.  
It is worth noting that interethnic relations at the grassroots level seem to have prevented 
elites’ attempts to mobilize their own ethnic group against outgroups. In a study on two 
north Iraqi cities, Erbil and Kirkuk, which sought to find an association between interethnic 
friendship and trust and tolerance, Rydgren et al. (2013) found the positive association 
between interethnic friendship in specific interaction spaces such as neighbourhoods, 
workplaces, political parties and civil society organizations and interethnic trust and 
tolerance toward outgroups in these two cities. In another previous work, Rydgren and Sofi 
(2011) assume that the increase in interethnic contact will reduce the possibility of ethnic 
conflict. They argue that due to having considerable room for social meeting across ethnic 
 
 
135 
boundaries, the interethnic relationships and mutual trust situations are not hopeless in 
Kirkuk. They argue that the micro-level cooperation can be an effective factor 
counterbalancing the prejudices and the attempts by political elites to demonize outgroups. 
As the ethnic groups of Kirkuk have many historical and cultural points in common, it is 
not easy for the local elites to mobilize the members of their ethnic groups against 
outgroups. In chapter three, I argued that elites have managed to cooperate quite well in 
Kirkuk. One explanation for that, however, is that they may know that the historic peaceful 
coexistence among the groups prevents them from mobilizing members of their ethnic 
groups against members of other ethnic groups. Because, interethnic interaction, as 
Varshney (2001: 378) notes, can create a circumstance in which ‘polarizing politicians 
either do not succeed or eventually give up trying to provoke and engineer communal 
violence.’ 
My interview materials also demonstrate the good relations among the various ethnic 
groups at the grassroots level. For example, Rakan Saeed (2013), the Arab deputy governor, 
thought that ‘the psychological situation among people of Kirkuk is good. In other words, 
there is no rivalry among people, but there is a political rivalry among the political leaders’. 
This indicates that the divisions and disagreements in Kirkuk are mainly associated with 
the political elites, rather than grassroots of Kirkuks’ communities. So, as I asserted several 
times in different ways earlier, confidence-building measures at grassroots level as a 
bottom-up approach should be supported to develop intercommunal dialogue as a 
counterbalance to elite’s political rivalry and to thereby ensure that segmental autonomy 
facilitates rather than inhibits what goes on at the political level. When members of different 
ethnic groups have contacts together, they increase first-hand information about the 
members of ethnic outgroups and this can reduce and falsify xenophobia and prejudices 
(Rydgren and et al., 2013: 1656-7). In line with Rakan Saeed’s view, the former governor 
of Kirkuk, Abulrahman Mustafa (2013) stated, ‘I always differentiate between political and 
social groups. Socially, no problems have existed among ethnic and religious groups. They 
have lived peacefully in the neighbourhoods, markets and governmental institutions such 
as the schools and so on. They speak each other’s language and there is intermarriage 
among them.’ In this way, the good social relation at the grassroots level has been 
influential in mitigating the political tensions at the elites level in the city. 
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Nevertheless, as Rebwar Talabany, the deputy chairman of the KPC, noted ‘the former 
regime destroyed this city for 35 years, just imagine how many hours, days and years are 
needed to build the bridge of trust among the people of Kirkuk?’ It is for this reason that 
Jalal Jawhar (2013), a senior official of the Gorran movement (Movement for Change)38, 
argued that ‘along with normalization in demography and administration aspects, 
psychological normalization is necessary.’ Despite these concerns, Ibrahim Khalil (2013), 
a Kurdish member of the KPC, stated that ‘the identity of being Kirkuki is very dominant, 
otherwise that strong social relations could not remain like now.’ In other words, 
‘overarching loyalty’ which is identified by Lijphart (1997) as one of the favourable 
conditions that is conducive to consociational democracy is already existent in Kirkuk. 
According to Khalil ‘it is this identity [overarching loyalty] that joins a Christian and a 
Muslim as neighbours and makes them participate in each other’s feasts and ceremonies’. 
Despite of Khalil’s optimism, one may observe that the historical injustices conducted by 
the successive Iraqi governments in Kirkuk has undermined the possibility of the creation 
of a single public identity in the city to a considerable extent. Khalil’s argument, however, 
indicates that on the one hand, people of Kirkuk think of themselves in terms of belonging 
to a particular ethnic group ‘multiple identities’, but the notion of being ‘Kirkuki’ as a 
‘single’ public identity also combines them. In other words, there is a prospect for working 
accommodation and integration together. This supports the argument that ‘integration and 
accommodation are not mutually exclusive principles’ (O’Flynn, 2009: 264). Thus, a 
combination of segmental autonomy which publicly recognizes distinct identities of groups 
and the construction of a single public identity is both possible and desirable in Kirkuk.  
Furthermore, in contrast to the mixed cities of Baghdad and Mosul, for example, intergroup 
relations have been better in Kirkuk since 2003. In Kirkuk, a large number of Kurds speak 
Turkmani, and a large number of Turkmen speak the Kurdish language (Shwani, 2006: 
191). Many Kurds also speak Arabic, but few Arabs speak Kurdish or Turkmani. One 
explanation for this is that Arabic has been the official language of Iraq, so the Arabs might 
not find other languages necessary to learn. In addition, many Kurdish families are now 
sending their children to the mixed schools, whereas this was rare ten years ago. One reason 
behind this new move by Kurdish families in Kirkuk is their concern that if their children 
                                                          
38 The Movement for Change is a  Kurdish political party under the leadership of Nawshirwan Mustafa, 
founded in 2009 as an opposition to the two powerful ruling parties of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The Movement for Change is popular mainly in Sulaimaniyah and came second 
in the last election of the Kurdistan region in 2013.  
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study in Kurdish schools, then they will not learn Arabic properly and this undermines their 
chances of getting a good job in the future (Jwan Hussen interview, 2015). However, on 
the other hand, this is an indication that the Kurds are now less concerned about security of 
their children and thus there are prospects for improving interethnic interaction. In short, 
the combination of both segmental autonomy and bridging social capital will be more 
effective in the stabilization of Kirkuk than concentrating on the segmental autonomy 
alone. Civil society organization can play a positive role in this process. 
Finally, several broad conclusions can be drawn from the above discussions. First, the 
communities of Kirkuk have lived together peacefully for centuries. However, the 
Arabization policy in the twentieth century negatively influenced interethnic relations in 
Kirkuk. As Hanauer and Miller (2012: 7-8) state, ‘the conflict between Arabs, Kurds, and 
Turkomen in Kirkuk does not stem from “ancient hatreds” but is rather a manifestation of 
competition for political control, resources, and territory over the past 100 years.’ Second, 
civil society organizations are largely affiliated with the political parties in Kirkuk and they 
are mainly structured along ethnic lines. Third, despite that, the situation is far from being 
hopeless. For example, many of the workplaces are ethnically heterogeneous which can 
counterbalance the elite attempts to mobilize their own ethnic groups by demonizing 
outgroups and creating prejudices and stereotypes against them. As Cochrane (2005) notes, 
the influence of civil society organizations for building healthy and peaceful democracies 
in divided societies is dependent upon the nature of those societies. In the context of Kirkuk, 
the weak civil society associations might be strengthened through the support of the 
international actors such as UNAMI or USAID. Further, intergroup relations seem to have 
been better in Kirkuk than other mixed cities in Iraq in the post-2003 period. Thus, there 
are reasons to argue that the opportunity to achieve political stability in Kirkuk will be 
greater if a hybridity of elements of accommodation and integration are considered.  
4.5 Civil Society Organizations in Kirkuk 
The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was not only a milestone for political changes in 
Iraq but also a crucial turning point for Iraqi civil society. After the collapse of the 
Ba’ath regime, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) showed its active support 
for civil society organizations (CSOs). Therefore, numerous CSOs were created. This 
section outlines what is meant by civil society organizations and how they have 
evolved since 2003 with the focus on Kirkuk governorate. In addition, it examines the 
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capacity of the CSOs in delivering the sort of bridging social capital which is already 
outlined in this chapter along with the capacity gap that needs to be addressed.  
 
According to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) (2011: 1), civil society 
organizations are ‘networks, associations, and organizations composed of members 
that advocate their common interests through collective action. CSOs include volunteer 
and charity groups, sports clubs, arts and culture groups, faith-based groups, trade 
unions, community-based and non-governmental organizations, and issues-based 
activist groups.’39 It is important to note that both of the terms civil society 
organization (CSO) and non-governmental organization (NGO) are usually used 
interchangeably. In this research, they are treated to refer to organizations which work 
in the following areas: Iraqi organizations engaged in human rights and civil liberties; 
essential social services; citizen participation in decision-making; improvements in 
public policies; anticorruption and transparency. 
Since their foundations, the CSOs went through three stages. In the first phase, an 
office entitled ‘NGO assistance office’ was established as part of Ministry of Planning 
in 2004. According to the Order (45) by CPA in 2003, this office was the authorized 
entity to oversee the registration of NGOs. In the second stage, this office was 
transferred from the Ministry of Planning into the Ministry of State for Civil Society 
Affairs in 2005. This situation continued until 2008. Then, the name ‘NGO assistance 
office’ was changed into ‘NGO Directorate’ which includes several branches, units, 
departments, coordinating centers and coordinators from all Iraqi provinces. Currently, 
the NGO law which is in place in Iraq is (Law no. 12 of 2010). According to the United 
States Agency International Aid (USAID) report (2012: 11), the new Iraqi Law is 
regarded as ‘one of the best in the Middle East by international legal organizations.’ 
The report adds that this law was a result of the Iraqi CSOs attempts with international 
NGOs to adopt ‘a new NGO law that would be more consistent with international law 
and best practices’ (USAID, 2012: 9). 
                                                          
39 According to Order (45) by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003, however, Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) means ‘any organization and foundation that is organized to undertake 
one or more of the following as its principal activities: humanitarian assistance and relief projects; human 
rights advocacy and awareness; community rehabilitation and resettlement; charitable works; educational; 
health, and cultural activities; conservation; environmental protection; economic reconstruction and 
development; promotion of democratic practices; development of civil society; promotion of gender equality; 
or any other non-profit activity that serves the public interest. 
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The emergence of civil society organizations is relatively new in Iraq. As Hayder Saeed 
(2013) points out, unlike other countries in the region, there is not ‘a heritage of analytical 
research on the experience of civil society in Iraq’, because ‘Iraq did not have a real civil 
society experience’. This situation could be understandable as the country went through an 
authoritarian regime during the rule of Ba’ath Party (1968 -2003). However, due to the 
post-2003 freedom, many civil society organizations were established which were 
concerned with social, human, cultural and health issues. For example, in the first years of 
Saddam’s fall, the number of the registered civil society organizations reached (997) and 
nearly ten thousand unregistered CSOs (Saraj, 2010). Within the years following the 
invasion, that number increased dramatically. Now the number of CSOs in Iraq is estimated 
to be somewhere between 8,000 and 12,000 (NCCI, 2011: 15). In Kirkuk, no accurate data 
is available on the number of CSOs.  
The NGOs of Kirkuk are similar to those in other Iraqi governorates in terms of their degree 
of independence and professionalism. There are few impartial, non-ethnic and non-political 
NGOs in Iraq. In other words, most of them are proxies to political parties. Kirkuk is not 
an exception. In other words, nonpartisan organizations are few in the city. As Rydgren and 
Sofi (2011: 38) point out, in Kirkuk ‘civil society is almost synonymous with party politics 
since most voluntary organizations are extensions of or at least affiliated with the political 
parties.’ This circumstance is predictable in a place like Kirkuk where’ party politics are 
highly ethnicised’ (Rydgren and Sofi, 2011: 38). Appendix F is a list of some of CSOs in 
Kirkuk. However, the problem is that this list does not include all the existing civil society 
organizations.  
However, despite the concerns about their impartiality, heterogonous CSOs are still 
common in the city. As Rydgren and Sofi (2011: 27) note, a closer look at workplaces and 
voluntary organizations suggests reasons for optimism as many organizations are 
surprisingly heterogeneous. Jwan Hussen (2015), confirmed in an interview that I 
conducted with her, the heterogeneity of many of the civil society organizations in Kirkuk 
and explained that part of the reason behind this is because ‘the international organizations 
were mainly supporting the heterogeneous civil society organization after 2003.' It is the 
case that the role of civil society in engaging people in dialogue and deliberation is limited 
in Kirkuk. As Jwan Hussen (2015) argues, it is because of ‘the dominance of politicians 
and the negative role of media which has been controlled by political parties’ that 
sometimes create a tense situation among members of ethnic groups. But the fact remains 
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that many workplaces are ethnically heterogeneous which may counterbalance any 
exploitative attempts by politicians as they can be places where ordinary people can 
deliberate and exchange their views together and thus create bridging social capital. 
In addition, the civil society organizations could be funded to play a more effective role 
than now. External funding agencies can, for example, support civil society organization to 
foster dialogue at the grassroots level. This is an important consideration in Kirkuk as it 
could prevent segmental autonomy deepening ethnic divisions, as critics of the 
consociational theory argue. O’Flynn and Russell (2011: 228) note that creating civil 
society associations may not be possible in places where there are no such associations; 
however, weak civil society associations might be strengthened through intervention. This 
is what Hanauer and Miller (2012: 57) observe in Kirkuk when they state that although 
civil society is weak in Kirkuk, it can be fostered. According to Hanauer and Miller (2012: 
57), ‘grassroots-level confidence-building measures and initiatives promoting 
intercommunal dialogue in Kirkuk have had some success.’ They argue that the UN 
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is suited to support confidence-building measures at 
the grassroots level and to develop intercommunal dialogue in Kirkuk. Such a support by 
UNAMI is possible, mainly because it has already undertaken many confidence-building 
measures and initiatives at the local level through its agencies that focus on children, 
women’s rights, labour issues, etc. They (2012: xv) also suggest that the State Department 
and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) could place a higher priority on 
civil society initiatives in Kirkuk. However, the role of outside actors such as UNAMI 
should be limited, because ‘wherever the United Nations have intervened, they complicated 
the problem’ (Latif Mistafa interview, 2013). 
There is a risk that such actors will not make funding available unless organizations follow 
an agenda that changes civil associations into quasi-regulatory agencies (O’Flynn and 
Russell, 2011: 231). Unfortunately, this has occurred in Kirkuk. Jwan Hussen (2015), a 
Kurdish member of the KPC and the head of human rights and children and women 
committee, asserted to me that these international actors do not support all civil society 
organizations, rather they ‘fund those who follow their strategies.' Moreover, she 
highlighted another phenomenon which has to do with the corruption of some employees 
who work for those international funding bodies. For example, she stated that ‘sometimes, 
getting funds from international organizations depends on whether the Iraqi civil society 
organizations know a person from the staff of those international organizations or not’ 
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which means ‘favouritism exists even within those international organizations.’ In some 
other cases, external funding agencies create nothing ‘more than a thin layer of 
professionals adept at writing grant proposals to western foundations’ (Fukuyama, 2002: 
35). Therefore, these risks should be considered when it comes to resorting to international 
community funding of civil associations to foster dialogue among ordinary people in 
Kirkuk. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that two factors have been a hindrance to the CSOs’ capacityto 
deliver the bridging social capital in Kirkuk. First, apart from the fact that neutral CSOs are 
few in Iraq and Kirkuk, they have not been successful in building trust with people. One 
explanation for this, according to a report by USAID (2012: 8), is that ‘many Iraqis perceive 
civil society’s return following the fall of Hussein in 2003 to have been Western-funded.’ 
This perception has created a credibility gap between those organizations and people. 
Moreover, according to a report by National Democratic Institute (NDI), NGOs are ‘hesitant to 
criticize certain public officials or the government’s policy on certain issues.’ The report states that 
while the NGOs are generally ambitious, they are ‘pessimistic regarding their ability to affect the 
actions or behavior of government or political parties’ (NDI, 2011: 11). Second, civil society 
organizations are largely affiliated with the political parties in Kirkuk, and they are mainly 
structured along ethnic lines. To solve this problem, external funding agencies could fund 
civil society organizations in Kirkuk to rescue them from impartiality and following 
political party instructions. However, the risk that external actors would provide funds on 
the condition of following a certain agenda should be considered. In addition, it is important 
that the CSOs in Kirkuk would give much emphasis on fostering dialogue at the grassroots 
level to deliver the sort of bridging social capital that already discussed in this chapter. 
Conclusion 
There are generally two forms of segmental autonomy, territorial and non-territorial or 
cultural (functional) autonomies. The groups of Kirkuk have freedom over areas of their 
concern such as language and religion. In other words, the right of segmental autonomy has 
been guaranteed by law and ethnic groups enjoy their educational, linguistic and religious 
rights in the city. However, to avoid segregation (as opposed to autonomy) and the 
downside of segmental autonomy, it is important to consider bridging social capital. 
Although the city has been well known for peaceful coexistence among the members of 
different ethnic groups, the Arabization policy by the successive Iraqi regimes weakened 
 
 
142 
that coexistence, i.e. it undermined bridging social capital among the communities while, 
on the other hand, it enhanced bonding social capital among members of the same ethnic 
group. 
However, the situation is still not hopeless. There are still interaction spaces in Kirkuk 
which can lead to creating bridging social capital and strengthening the existing ones. 
Moreover, intermarriage is still common and many people speak more than one or two 
languages. The civil society organizations can play a significant role in this regard by 
bringing people from different ethnic groups close to each other, but those organizations 
should be funded and depoliticized as well. The external actors, if they stay neutral in 
dealing with civil society organizations, can play a considerable role in cultivating such 
deepening interactions among member of diverse ethnic groups in Kirkuk. In short, both 
segmental autonomy and social capital theory are necessary for managing conflict and 
maintaining political stability in Kirkuk. This is possible, but it needs local and international 
support. In the following chapter, I discuss another consociational element, i.e. 
proportionality. 
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Chapter 5. Proportionality 
On 21 April 2014, following the retirement of the previous Kurdish President of Kirkuk 
University, the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education appointed a Shiite Turkmen for the 
position. However, this appointment brought wide Kurdish anger and condemnation in its 
wake as Kurds believed the post to be exclusively theirs. After two weeks, on 4 May 2015, 
the new Turkmen president was forced to sign a letter of resignation when a number of 
armed students attacked his office and threatened him to step down. While the official 
sources claimed that the resignation was voluntary, the Turkmen say that the resignation 
was coerced and interpret it as part of the marginalisation and discrimination against the 
Turkmen in the governorate. This event indicates the sensitivity of taking positions by 
different ethnic groups but also illustrates the importance of setting clear criteria for 
distributing the senior and lower positions in the city. Giving the element of proportionality 
a clear basis (e.g. elections outcome) could be a reasonable solution to the problem that all 
the groups in Kirkuk have complained about being marginalized or underrepresented in at 
least one of the public sector institutions in the governorate. 
This chapter assesses whether there is any prospect for the adoption of a proportionality 
element in Kirkuk, if consociation is going to be the future governance arrangement. To do 
so, the chapter examines two important issues, namely: the electoral systems that have been 
used in the post-2003 Kirkuk elections and the distribution of the political, administrative 
and public sector positions. Therefore, this chapter is organized over three sections. The 
first section presents a general overview of proportionality as one of the four elements of 
consociational theory. The second section examines the electoral systems that have been 
used in different elections in Iraq and Kirkuk. The electoral system choice is crucially 
important in post-conflict divided societies because different electoral systems have 
different consequences for the inclusion and representation of different ethnic groups and 
eventually for the political stability in those societies. The last section deals with the 
representation of the ethnic groups of Kirkuk in the public sector. In this section, I examine 
whether the positions and resources have been distributed on the basis of proportionality or 
not. Then, I present my suggestion for how the political, administrative and security 
positions, resources and public sector employees should be distributed if consociational 
power-sharing is adopted in Kirkuk. 
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5.1 Proportionality: An Overview 
Proportionality is another important feature of consociational theory governing, for 
example, the allocation of financial resources, civil service appointments and political 
representation in political institutions. Thus, the rationale behind proportional 
representation is to facilitate a fair representation of the groups at all levels of government, 
i.e. central, regional and local levels. This can be achieved through electoral systems. 
Therefore, one of the most significant institutional decisions for any democracy is the 
choice of electoral system (Reilly, 2001:14). This is mainly because different electoral 
systems have different consequences, either aggravating or managing conflicts in societies. 
Benjamin Reilly (2002: 156) states that scholars and practitioners alike agree that ‘electoral 
systems can play a powerful role in promoting both democracy and successful conflict 
management.’ Lijphart (1995, 412) already asserted this view and reflected the scholarly 
consensus when he highlighted that `if one wants to change the nature of a particular 
democracy, the electoral system is likely to be the most suitable and effective instrument 
for doing so.’ One explanation for the profound and effective roles of a particular electoral 
system on the future political process of a country, according to Reilly (2001: 14), is that 
once electoral systems are chosen, they tend to ‘remain unchanged for long periods as 
political interests quickly congeal around and respond to the incentives presented by the 
system’. 
To ensure parliamentary proportionality and the inclusion of members of both majority and 
minority groups in the legislature, Lijphart suggests proportional representation (PR) 
electoral system in divided societies. According to Lijphart (2004: 100), PR is the best 
choice in plural societies because ‘in addition to producing proportionality and minority 
representation, it  treats all  groups  –  ethnic, racial,  religious,  or  even  non-communal  
groups  –  in  a  completely  equal  and even handed fashion.’ In other words, as Steiner 
(1971: 63) notes, the model of proportionality is one in which ‘all groups influence a 
decision in proportion to their numerical strength.’ This is because ‘parties are awarded 
seats in parliament in direct proportion to votes garnered in an election’ (Sisk, 1996: 37). 
The main thing about PR is that it reduces the disparity between votes cast and seats won, 
so that, for example, if a party wins 25% of the vote in a general election, it should get 
roughly 25% of seats in parliament.   
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In a majoritarian democracy, for example, candidates that represent society’s majority 
generally form the government, and the opposition is formed of minority groups. This 
involves the monopolization of power by a party, group, faction or even a person—the 
opposite of power-sharing (O’Leary, 2013: 2). In the deeply divided societies, Lijphart 
(1999: 31-32) argues, ‘majority rule is not only undemocratic but also dangerous,’ since 
minorities are repeatedly denied access to power and this creates a situation in which they 
feel excluded and discriminated against, which in turn might make them disloyal to the 
government. Thus, as Lijphart (2008: 78) notes, ‘there is a scholarly consensus against 
majoritarian systems in divided societies.’ Therefore, he argues that plural societies need a 
democratic regime that asserts consensus instead of opposition, inclusion rather than 
exclusion, and that maximizes the size of the governing majority.  Or as O’Leary (2005: 
10) puts it, ‘consociationalists want majorities – rather than the majority or the plurality’ 
(emphasis in original).  
It is worth noting that there are two major types of PR electoral system: namely, Single 
Transferable Vote (STV) and Party-List Proportional Representation (PLPR). STV is based 
around multimember districts which retains the basic logic of PR but adds the preferential 
dimension in that voters can rank the candidates (as opposed to parties) in order of their 
preference (McCulloch, 2014: 14). In STV, the count begins by determining a specific 
‘quota’ of votes required to elect a single candidate and any candidate who surpasses the 
specified quota is immediately elected (Reilly, 2002: 158). In successive counts, votes are 
redistributed from both votes surplus from successful candidates and votes from candidates 
with the lowest number of first preferences who are eliminated until all seats for the 
electoral district are filled (Reynolds et al, 2005: 76).  The STV is used in Ireland, Malta, 
and the Australian Senate (Taagepera, 2007: 35).  
Under a party-list PR system, however, voters vote for their preferred party and parties 
receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote in the electoral district, with the 
winning candidates taken from the lists in order of their position on the lists. (Reynolds et 
al. 2005: 60). The party lists can be either closed or open. In ‘closed list’ systems, 
candidates are elected in the order in which they appear on the list which is determined by 
the party leaders, i.e. voters select a party only, whereas in ‘open list’ systems, voters can 
express their preferences for specific candidates and influence the ranking of candidates 
(Taagepera, 2007: 18). In the open list, things like reputation and clientelist links with 
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voters, agenda and access to media would facilitate the election of candidates. While open-
list PR gives voters greater freedom over the choice of candidate, due to competition of the 
candidates with each other from within the same party for votes, it can lead to internal party 
conflict and fragmentation. Therefore, Lijphart (2002: 53) favours closed lists over open 
lists, because this strengthens the hand of party leaders, and so makes elite cooperation 
easier. Moreover, Lijphart argues that closed-list PR encourages ‘the formation and 
maintenance of strong and cohesive political parties (Lijphart, 2008: 79). However, closed-
list PR has some disadvantages. For example, as Reynolds et al. (2005: 71) explain, voters 
have no choice to determine the identity of the candidate who will represent them, nor can 
they reject winning candidates in case of poor performance. Moreover, closed-list systems 
entrench excessive power in the hands of senior party leaderships. But this is precisely why 
Lijphart commends PR, as consociationalism is basically an elite-oriented theory. Hence, 
Lijphart recommends PR for the same reason that its critics oppose it as strong political 
parties and elites are clearly preferable in consociational theory.  
There are also different types of majoritarian electoral systems. First Past the Post (FPTP), 
for example, is the simplest form of plurality/majority electoral system. Any candidate who 
gains more votes than others is the winner, even if this is not an absolute majority (50 per 
cent plus one) of valid votes. FPTP uses single-member districts in which the voters vote 
for candidates rather than political parties (Reynolds et al. 2005: 35). Alternative Vote (AV) 
is also a majoritarian approach. In Reilly’s words (2002: 158): 
AV is a majoritarian system used in single-member electoral districts that requires the 
winning candidate to gain not just a plurality but an absolute majority of votes. If no 
candidate has an absolute majority of first preferences, the candidate with the lowest 
number of first-preference votes is eliminated and his or her ballots are redistributed to the 
remaining candidates according to the lower preferences marked. This process of sequential 
elimination and transfer of votes continues until a majority winner emerges. 
The difference between AV and FPTP as two majoritarian systems, however, is that AV 
gives voters more options than FPTP and allows them to mark their preferences on the 
ballot paper. In other words, unlike FPTP which allows voters to express only a single 
preference, under AV voters can rank order their preferences between candidates and, for 
this reason, it is often known as ‘preferential voting’ in the countries which use it (Reynolds 
et al. 2005: 47). As noted in chapter two, the purpose of AV is to promote vote pooling by 
candidates across ethnic lines.  
 
 
147 
Consociationalists, however, challenge this view. From a consociational perspective, 
Horowitz's (2002) vote-pooling recommendations are not very different from majority-rule 
democracy. This is because ’the logic and the practical effect of the alternative vote are 
clearly majoritarian’ and thus they doubt the value of AV for the management of ethnic 
conflict (Lijphart, 2002: 47-48). For example, Lijphart (2004: 98) argues that if Horowitz’s 
model were applied to the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in 2003, it would produce a 
majority Shi’ite body but with the condition that most of the Shi’ite members of that body 
would be moderate and sympathetic to the interests of Kurdish and Sunni minorities. This 
is because the Shiites are the majority in Iraq.40 Lijphart rightly argues that such moderate 
representation would not be acceptable to the Kurds and Sunnis in the long run as groups 
prefer to be represented by the members of their own communities rather than moderate 
members from other groups. Lijphart’s argument could be applicable to the case of Kirkuk. 
If Horowitz’s model were to be adopted in Kirkuk, then a majority of Kurdish moderate 
representatives would be elected for the Kirkuk provincial council.41 It is hard to imagine 
that, in the long run, the Arabs and Turkmen would be satisfied with such moderate Kurdish 
representation, instead of being represented by the members of their own communities. It 
is equally hard to imagine that they would ever agree to a constitution that seeks to set up 
such a system in the future. On the contrary, as O’Leary (2013: 34) points out, ‘politicians 
are more likely to agree to PR than centripetal electoral systems because they can win votes 
and seats on their own preferred platforms.’ 
In short, the rationale behind proportionality is the representation of all groups at all levels 
of government, i.e. in executive, judiciary, legislature, security forces and in the civil 
service on a proportional basis. For Lijphart, the party-list PR is well suited to realize that 
aim. In the following two sections, I try to assess both the electoral system used in Kirkuk 
elections so far and the way that groups are represented in different sectors in the 
governorate. This is important as it would help us in understanding whether there is any 
prospect for adopting the principle of proportionality in the governorate or not for the 
future. 
                                                          
40The number of Shiites in Iraq is estimated to be (60%-65%). For further information, see: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html 
41 Although there is no reliable census in Kirkuk, the election results show that the Kurds constitute either 
majority or plurality in the governorate. For example, Kirkuk has currently 13 representatives in Iraqi 
parliament. Out of which, 8 of them are Kurds, two Arabs, two Turkmen and 1 Christian as a quota. Moreover, 
the Brotherhood List which is primarily Kurds constitute the majority of KPC, taking 26 seats out of 41. 
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5.2 Electoral Systems in Iraq and Kirkuk 
The electoral systems and elections of Kirkuk can only be understood through the lens of 
the country’s electoral system. This is because, as a governorate, Kirkuk has been subject 
to the same electoral systems that have been used in other parts of Iraq. In this section, I 
discuss the electoral systems that have been used in different elections in Iraq. It should be 
noted from the outset that a PR electoral system has been used in the elections of Iraq and 
Kirkuk as well. However, the electoral system in Kirkuk can change by changing the 
current unresolved status of the city. The possibility of adopting a majoritarian electoral 
system cannot be entirely discounted, for example, if Kirkuk were to join the Kurdistan 
region in the future. Therefore, the crucial point here is that the existing PR electoral system 
should be maintained in Kirkuk, if consociation is going to be the system of governance. 
To choose an electoral system and run elections in Iraq, international advice and assistance 
was necessary. One of the important tasks of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
was that it commissioned experts from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
(IFES) and elsewhere to gain advice on how elections might be administered in Iraq 
(Dawisha and Diamond, 2006: 89). In the autumn of 2003, the IFES sent a team to Iraq to 
conduct a pre-election assessment. This team was led by Jeff Fischer, who had previously 
directed election efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor (Soudriette, 2005: 23). With 
regard to electoral systems, as Adeed Dawisha and Larry Diamond (2006: 90) explain, all 
options were on the table for Iraq such as the first-past-the-post system (FPTP); 
proportional representation (PR); mixed systems; the alternative vote (AV) and the single 
transferable vote (STV).42However, due to their impracticality or unsuitability to Iraq’s 
political circumstances, most of the electoral system options were quickly discounted. 
As noted earlier, there is a scholarly consensus against majoritarian systems in divided 
societies. Therefore, as a majoritarian system, FPTP was inappropriate for a deeply divided 
society such as Iraq which needed a system that guarantees the representations of all major 
groups and minorities. As Arthur Lewis (1965: 71) clearly points out that ‘the surest way 
to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American electoral 
system of first-past-the-post.’ Eliminating FPTP as an electoral system, therefore, was not 
a surprise. Although AV was appealing in theory it soon became apparent that it would not 
                                                          
42 In the early months of 2004, Diamond served as a senior adviser on governance to CPA in Baghdad 
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be practical, for the simple reason that a new Iraqi electoral administration, regardless of 
the advice and assistance by the international community, was not going to have ‘the time, 
the resources, the reliable census data, or the political credibility to draw the boundaries of 
some 275 individual districts’43 (Dawisha and Diamond, 2006: 90). STV which is a form 
of PR was also considered impractical. This was likely because of the fact that STV 
demands a degree of literacy and numeracy and due to its intricacies (for example, it was 
abandoned in Estonia on such grounds) (Reynolds et al, 2005: 76). In short, a simple ballot 
and voting process was intended to be adopted in Iraq. Therefore, party-list PR was a 
compelling choice for Iraq.  
Thus, the party-list PR electoral system was chosen by Carina Perelli, the chief of the 
United Nations Electoral Assistance Division, which was then adopted by the Iraqi 
Governing Council (IGC). The reasons for choosing the party-list PR system, apart from 
its simplicity to administer the elections, was that it would ensure the inclusion and the 
representation of all ethnic and religious groups in parliament. Based on the belief that the 
proportionality principle in Iraq is both necessary and important, the CPA had already 
attempted to appoint Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis to the IGC on a proportional basis.44 As 
noted in chapter three, by appointing the broad-based Interim Governing Council (IGC) in 
July 2003, the CPA tacitly provided a basis for the consociation approach. In other words, 
as Dawisha and Diamond (2006: 91) argue, one reason for choosing PR was because of its 
‘fit with the power-sharing or “consociational” logic of institutional design that Iraq was 
moving to embrace’. Moreover, they (2006: 91) note that ‘the leaders of the principal 
Shi’ite and Kurdish political parties were attracted to party-list PR because it promised to 
reinforce their weight in the political system.’ This confirms the argument of the 
consociational advocates who claim that the politicians are more likely to agree to PR than 
other electoral alternatives in post-conflict divided societies.  
However, several other issues were yet to be settled. Among those issues were the 
minimum threshold for entry into parliament and whether Iraq would become one-single 
                                                          
43 According to article 49 of the constitution ‘The Council of Representatives shall consist of a number of 
members, at a ratio of one seat per 100,000 Iraqi persons representing the entire Iraqi people.’ Thus, the CoR 
consisted of number of seats at a ratio of one seat for every hundred thousand people based on the latest 
census submitted by the Ministry of Trade. 
44 Iraqi Governing Council—whose 25 members represented a delicate balance among Shi’ites, Sunnis, and 
Kurds in numbers approximating their shares of the population (it also included one member each from the 
Turkoman and Assyrian Christian minorities) 
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district or made up of multiple-districts for holding elections. The first electoral system was 
codified in the 2004 Electoral Law. The law was issued under the order ‘number 96’ by the 
CPA which laid the basis for Iraq’s first post-invasion national elections. The law 
established Iraq a single electoral constituency with a closed-list proportional 
representation. Moreover, due to the fear of excluding small religious minorities and 
secular liberal forces, the desire to have an inclusive parliament and making sure that 
radical movements like Muqtada al-Sadr can clear any electoral threshold, no formal 
threshold was put in the law (Dawisha and Diamond, 2006). Making Iraq a single electoral 
district offered significant advantages. 
Firstly, in the absence of reliable census data, it was the easiest way to hold elections and 
avoid the problems of drawing electoral districts. The last census conducted in Iraq was in 
1997 in which the three governorates of the Kurdistan did not participate. Therefore, one 
of the important early recommendations by the IFES team was to use the food ration-card 
database as the basis of the voter registration system because this database was ‘the most 
comprehensive in the country and contained the names of virtually every Iraqi’ (Soudriette, 
2005: 23). Secondly, a single national district simplified the logistics of voting and vote 
counting as it avoided the problem of assigning displaced people and voters outside Iraq to 
electoral districts because ‘they would all be voting as part of a single, nationwide district’ 
(Bjornlund et al, 2007: 74). Finally, a single nationwide constituency enabled dispersed 
communities and groups to ‘aggregate their scattered votes’ and elect one or more members 
of parliament ‘even if they lacked the electoral weight to do so from any one province’ 
(Dawisha and Diamond, 2006: 93). However, despite these advantages, the nationwide 
system led most Sunni political parties to boycott the elections. The Sunni parties rejected 
the 2004 Electoral Law as they were concerned that ‘because the Sunni Arab vote is 
concentrated in a few districts – their electoral power would be significantly diluted in a 
system using a single national district’ (Younis: 2011: 14). After settling the electoral law, 
the country was ready for the first post-Saddam elections.  
On 30 January 2005, two elections were held in Iraq, the elections for choosing the 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and the governorate councils. The TNA which had 
275 members, was charged with responsibility to write a permanent Iraqi constitution and 
prepare the country for general elections in 2005. The provincial elections, on the other 
hand, were to elect 41 members to each of Iraq’s 18 provincial councils (except for Baghdad 
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which had been designated 51 members). The governorate councils, according to the CPA 
Order number (96) of 2004, would have some defined powers such as the powers to elect 
and remove the governor and his or her two deputies, to approve nominations for senior 
positions and remove senior managers of the provincial administration, to monitor and 
recommend improvements in the delivery of public services, and to independently generate 
and collect revenues by imposing taxes and fees. Because the turnout of Sunni voters was 
extremely low, the national assembly election results were skewed in favour of the Shiites 
and Kurds and left the Sunnis underrepresented. Thus, the Shiite and Kurd parties won well 
over two-thirds of the seats in the Assembly while the Sunnis held only 17 seats (about 6% 
of the total seats).In provincial elections, the Kurds won 26 out of 41 seats in the Kirkuk 
province (about 60% of the seats), Arabs won 6 and Turkmen won 9. The low turnout of 
the Sunni Arabs left the Arabs underrepresented in Kirkuk as well. However, using a party-
list PR electoral system was still effective at least in the sense that it meant that all of 
significant groups in Kirkuk were represented in Kirkuk’s provincial council.45  
Table 5.1 Provincial elections results in Kirkuk, January 200546 
Entities Votes Seats 
List of Kurdistan Brotherhood 237,303 26 
Iraqi Turkmen Front  737,91 8 
Iraqi Republican Group 
(Sunni Arab) 
43,635 5 
The Islamic Turkoman 
Coalition 
12,678 1 
National Iraq Union (Sunni 
Arab) 
12,329 1 
In preparation for Iraq’s second national elections and to elect the members for the Council 
of Representatives (CoR) for the next four years (which was held on 15 December 2005), 
the TNA made a few amendments to the 2004 Electoral Law. The new law [elections law 
number (16) of 2005] retained the general system of PR without any threshold for 
                                                          
45 The Kurds participated in 2005 provincial elections under the name ‘Kirkuk Brotherhood List’ (KBL). The 
26 members of KBL’s provincial council have been distributed as follow: twenty seats for Kurds, three for 
Arabs, two for Turkmen and one for Christians. Although KBL is a predominantly Kurdish list, it contains 6 
candidates from the Arabs, Turkmen and Christians. However, the individual Arabs in the KBL list are 
considered to be ‘discredited Arabs’ among the Arab community, while the Turkmen individuals in the KBL 
are viewed by the Turkmen as ‘Kurds speaking Turkmen’ (See, Natali, 2008: 438). The other 15 seats held 
by the Turkmen and Arabs are as follow: Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) won eight seats, Iraqi Republic Gathering 
(Arab) won five seats, Iraqi National Gathering (Arab) won one seat, and Turkmen Islamic coalition won one 
seat (Hanish, 2010: 18).  
46 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/newsletterImages/PF81Annexes.pdf 
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representation, but it changed the single constituency in the January elections to 
governorate-level constituencies. This time the country was divided into eighteen electoral 
districts corresponding to the pre-existing eighteen provinces. Moreover, Article (15) of 
this law specified that ‘the House of Representatives shall be composed of 275 members, 
230 seats shall be distributed to the electoral districts and 45 of them shall be distributed as 
compensatory seats.’ According to article (17) of the same law, compensatory seats are 
allocated to lists that do not win any seat in the election districts but have obtained at least 
the national average of votes. The national average of votes was calculated by dividing the 
total number of valid votes by 275. Adding ‘compensatory seats’ in the new amendment 
was to achieve overall proportionality nationally. Therefore, based on this change in the 
electoral system ‘regardless of how many people actually went to the polls in their 
provinces, the Sunnis were effectively guaranteed a certain bloc of seats in the new 
Assembly’ (Dawisha and Diamond, 2006: 95). This shift in the electoral system pushed the 
Sunnis to actively participate in the December 2005 elections and thus they gained a fairer 
representation. According to some scholars (Dawisha and Diamond, 2006; Dawisha, 2010; 
Younis, 2011), in the 15th December 2005 election, voters turned to their primordial 
loyalties by choosing lists representing their sects, regions, etc.  
In preparation for the third national elections (which was held in March 2010), the CoR 
also made a few amendments to the Elections Law number (16) of the year 2005. In the 
new law ‘Election Law number (16) of 2009’, open-list replaced closed-list and ballots 
carried the names of individual candidates together with their party. Moreover the number 
of members of the CoR increased from 275 into 325 and the religious minorities were 
granted a quota of eight seats.47 According to the new amendment the vacant seats were 
given to the largest winning lists which obtained a number of seats based on the percentage 
of votes they obtained. On the other hand, in preparation to conduct the second provincial 
elections in 2009, the CoR already passed a new law (Law No. 38) in 2008 which was 
called the ‘Elections Law of the Provincial, Districts, and Sub-Districts Councils’. Both 
and this new law and the ‘Election Law number (16) of 2009’ were in favour of open-list. 
                                                          
47 The CoR included the compensatory seats at the rate of (5%) and the eight seats were distributed as follow: 
the Christians, five seats distributed to the provinces of Baghdad, Nineveh, Kirkuk, Dohuk, and Erbil; the 
Yazidis, one seat in the Nineveh Province; the Sabi’/Manda’ian, one seat in Baghdad Province; the Shabak’s, 
one seat in Nineveh Province. 
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However, as noted in chapter three, according to Article 23 of the Provincial Elections Law 
of 2008, Kirkuk was excluded from participating in the 2009 provincial elections.  
Table 5.2 Elections and electoral systems in Iraq and Kirkuk48 
Elections Electoral Systems Specifications 
January 2005 Iraqi parliamentary 
elections 
PLPR One-single district, closed list 
December 2005 Iraqi 
parliamentary elections 
PLPR Multi-district, closed list 
2009 provincial elections PLPR Multi district, open list 
March 2010 Iraqi parliamentary 
elections 
PLPR Multi district, open list 
2013 provincial elections PLPR Multi district, open list, Sainte-lague 
2014 Iraqi parliamentary  PLPR Multi district, open list, Sainte-lague 
 
The CoR once again amended its electoral law for the next provincial and national elections 
which took place in 2013 and 2014. In 2012, the CoR ratified an amendment on the 
provincial elections law number (36) of 2008 in which it adopted the Sainte-Laguë 
method.49 Before the amendment, the 2008 law (36) mandated that only parties that had 
already won seats would be eligible to win the leftover seats which was a body blow to 
small parties. However, the changes to the seat distribution formula and the adoption of 
Sainte-Laguë method was crucial for small parties to vie for the leftover seats, because 
under the former arrangement, as Reidar Visser (2012) points out, ‘only parties that had 
already won seats had the chance to win the “leftover” seats following the initial 
distribution.’ Changing the counting system from the largest remainder method to the 
modified Sainte-Laguë method was due to a ruling by the Supreme Court of Iraq which 
considered the previous method discriminated against smaller parties and thus was 
unconstitutional. Again, due to the obstacle of article 23, provincial elections did not take 
                                                          
48 Compiled by author from various sources. 
49 The Sainte-Laguë method is named after the French mathematician André Sainte-Laguë. It is a highest 
quotient method for allocating seats in party-list PR. 
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place in Kirkuk for the second time in 2013. On the national level, according to Yezinumber 
(45) of 2013, the CoR also adopted the Sainte-Laguë method for the national elections held 
in 2014. Adopting the Sainte-Laguë method was to ensure wider representations both in 
the governorate councils and in the CoR as well. The open-list, however, remained the same 
in both of the elections.  
After the Supreme Court annulled article 23, the CoR tried to design a specific law in order 
to hold provincial elections in Kirkuk. For this reason, it discussed a proposal draft law in 
November 2013 entitled ‘election law for Kirkuk governorate council.’ The draft suggests 
that elections will be held based on the modified provincial elections law number (36) of 
2008, but it demands that the senior positions will be distributed based on each election’s 
outcome rather than being pre-determined. In other words, it suggests a solution which is 
more compatible with liberal consociation rather than a corporate one. However, the draft 
has not yet been ratified. The reason for this, according to Mahmood Othman (2015), an 
independent Kurdish member of the CoR, is because ‘the Turkmen were against it,’ as they 
believe that ‘the demography of Kirkuk has been changed after 2003’ which will affect the 
elections outcome in favour of the Kurds. But another reason is that the Turkmen know 
that, due to the low turnout of the Arabs, they are overrepresented in the KPC and they fear 
that they will lose their current status in future elections. For example, when I raised the 
question of Turkmens’ overrepresentation in the KPC at the expense of the Arabs with 
Arashad Salhi (2013), the president of Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF), he did not deny this and 
said that ‘if they [Arabs] had participated [in the 2005 provincial elections] it would likely 
have changed the current equation.’ In any case, as Mahmood Othman (2015) notes, ‘in 
order to ratify this law, the components of Kirkuk should not be against it’; however, 
because the components did not already agree upon the law, ‘it did not pass and it has not 
become a law yet.’ 
From the above arguments, we may reach several conclusions. First, a PR electoral system 
has been used in every Iraqi election, including those held in Kirkuk, since 2005. The many 
changes that the electoral systems have witnessed in different elections in the country have 
been about which type of PR should be adopted (specifically, closed list or open-list), rather 
than adopting alternatives to PR. To ensure that all ethnic and religious groups of Kirkuk 
are represented in legislation and executive bodies, especially if Kirkuk would become an 
autonomous region, it is vitally important to formally adopt PR electoral system. It is 
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important to remember that according to article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, the future 
status of Kirkuk should be settled in a public referendum. If the voters would choose an 
autonomous region for their governorate, then the region would enjoy its own constitution. 
In that case, it is essential to adopt PR electoral system to ensure the representation of all 
communities of Kirkuk.  
Second, the CoR and the governorate councils have been largely inclusive and this is 
because of the usage of a PR electoral system.50 Third, while other governorates in Iraq 
have held three elections by now, Kirkuk governorate is the only governorate that has 
experienced only one election since 2005 and thus the Kirkuk Provincial Council (KPC) is 
now the longest-serving provincial council in Iraq. Mohammed Kamal (2013), a Kurdish 
member of KPC, told me that ‘the provincial council is a tired council. I am one of the 
members of the council and say “we are tired”, let a new council come with new 
members.’51 For Saman Saeed (2013), a senior member of KIG, ‘the term of the current 
provincial council is over.’ Fourth, without the consent of the main three groups of Kirkuk, 
it is highly unlikely to hold provincial elections in the governorate. Finally, the principle of 
party-list PR should be maintained in any future elections in the city so that the ethnic 
groups of Kirkuk will be represented in the KPC (or the parliament should Kirkuk becomes 
an autonomous region).  
5.3 Ethnic Representation in Kirkuk’s Public Sector 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, proportionality is not restricted to electoral 
systems alone, rather it also means the representation of all groups in all levels of 
government on a proportional basis, including executive, legislature, judiciary, security 
forces and in the civil service. It can also cover things like oil revenues, taxation, fiscal 
transfers, housing etc. Considering the proportionality criteria in distributing governmental 
jobs is vitally important in Kirkuk, because the ethnic groups are so intermingled that 
discrimination and discrepancies in service delivery and appointing employees could 
catalyze an intercommunal conflict and destabilize the governorate. Clearly, one of the 
                                                          
50 The Sunnis were underrepresented as a result of January 2005 elections, but this is due to their boycott not 
the electoral system. The small parties were largely marginalized in the 2009 provincial elections and the 
2010 national elections, because of using the formula of the largest remainder for distributing the seats. 
However, this formula was later changed into Sainte-Laguë method which is in favour of small parties.  
51 I also observed that some of the members of KPC were coming to their offices only on Tuesday just for 
attending the weekly meeting of KPC.  
 
 
156 
main reasons for ethnic conflict is the struggle between contending parties over access to 
economic resources. Therefore, economic inequalities in the form of employment 
discrimination and unfair imbalances in the allocation of public services such as health 
facilities, roads, electric power and water supply can lead to political violence. As Esman 
(2004: 78) remarks, ‘those whose grievances are expressed in political language are really 
protesting their disadvantageous economic situation.’ Hence, applying the proportionality 
principle when distributing governmental jobs and appointing employees can be crucial in 
avoiding discrimination. The question remains, however, as to whether there prospects for 
the allocation of financial resources and civil service appointments on a proportional basis 
in Kirkuk. The following section answers this question. 
To answer the above question, it is important to illustrate the share of each of the three main 
ethnic groups in different sectors in the governorate. But before discussing that, two 
important points should be explained. First, as noted in the first chapter, the only reliable 
and least-politicized census available is the 1957 census which cannot reflect the current 
reality on the ground as more than half a century has now passed since that census. The 
number of each ethnic group may, therefore, only be estimated from the elections results. 
However, this is also problematic because different elections resulted in different outcomes. 
For example, the Kurds have taken two thirds of the KPC members and out of the current 
13 CoR members representing Kirkuk in Baghdad, 8 of them are Kurds, 2 are Arabs, 2 are 
Turkmen and one is a Christian. Nevertheless, in the 2010 national elections, the Kurds had 
6 seats and the Arabs and Turkmen together also had 6 seats. Thus, although all the post-
2003 elections indicate that the Kurds either constitute the majority or at least the plurality 
in the governorate, there is no accurate data to indicate the exact number of each ethnic 
group. Under such a circumstance of uncertainty, it is not surprising that each group 
complains that its share in the governorate does not reflect its actual population size. 
Second, Kirkuk has institutional linkages to both Baghdad and the KRG and depend on 
both of them financially to pay its public servants and to reconstruct the city. Since 2006, 
Baghdad has used the mechanism of the Accelerated Reconstruction and Development 
Program (ARDP) in order to transfer money from the federal budget to the provinces. The 
purpose of the ARDP has been to facilitate short-term projects along with the longer-term 
budget initiatives conducted by the ministries. Kirkuk Provincial Council (KPC), for 
example, reserved 25 percent of Kirkuk’s ARDP funding to maximize per capita allocation 
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for the damaged areas in the governorate (Knights and Ali: 2010, 20-23). The KRG, on the 
other hand, has actively been involved in the province and acted as a strong external donor 
through providing financial support to develop various projects. For example, according to 
one report, of a total of about 1,390 schools across Kirkuk province, 460 of them were 
funded by KRG in which their curriculums and teaching are entirely Kurdish (Ryan: 2010). 
This means that both Baghdad and KRG rather than KPC are more influential once it comes 
to appointing public employees. At the time of writing this chapter, Kirkuk has faced a 
financial crisis due to a suspension of the ARDP fund by the central government since 
August 2014. This is because the country has been badly affected due falling oil prices on 
one hand, and rising Iraqi military expenditure because of fighting with ISIS, on the other.52 
The central government in Baghdad has stopped sending petrodollars to Kirkuk for nearly 
two years now, and as a result the salaries of approximately 7,000 contract workers in 
Kirkuk have been cut for several months (iraqenergy.org, 2015)53 In short, to meet its 
financial needs, the KPC depends on Baghdad and the RG. I shall return to this point later.  
Having said that, it is vital to point out at the outset that each ethnic group is represented in 
different sectors in the governorate. However, the groups often complain and criticize each 
other as they think jobs are not distributed proportionally. The common objections of the 
Arabs and the Turkmen is that the Kurds have monopolized most of the significant political 
and security positions in the governorate.54 In addition, Arabs view themselves 
underrepresented in the KPC. For example, the KPC estimates that 19 percent of public 
sector managers are Arab, 26 percent are Turkmen, and 54 percent are Kurdish (Knights 
and Ahmed, 2010: 25).  Unlike their confirmation views with regard to the inclusion of all 
groups in governing the city and the gradual relationship improvements among the groups 
since 2003 as shown in chapter three, the respondents for this research had different and 
often contradictory views regarding the representation of their groups in the key institutions 
and public sector employment in the governorate. When I asked the Arab members of the 
                                                          
52More than 90 percent of Iraq’s federal revenue will come from oil exports in 2015. For more information, 
see:  http://iraqieconomists.net/en/2015/01/04/analysis-5-key-takeaways-from-iraqs-2015-draft-budget-by-
patrick-osgood-ben-van-heuvel/ 
53 The petrodollar is a budget specific to provinces that produce oil such as Basra and Kirkuk. The oil-
producing provinces are given $1 for each barrel they produce. According to the amended law number (21) 
of 2008 which is also called ‘Law of governorates not incorporated into a region’, revenues for the 
governorates includes 5 petrodollars per barrel of oil or 150 cubic metres of natural gas. However, due to the 
crisis of dropping oil price, the 2015 Iraqi budget has allocated an amount of $2 for each barrel of crude oil 
produced or refined in the oil-producing governorates and $2 for each 150 cubic meters of natural gas.  
54 The Turkmen, as noted in the previous section, have been overrepresented in the KPC because of the Sunni 
Arab low turnout in the provincial elections in 2005.  
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KPC about whether they think that their community has been represented fairly in the 
political, economic and security sectors in the governorate, their answers were negative. 
For example, Mohammed Khalil (2013) told me that ‘the number of Arabs in the provincial 
council does not represent the number of Arab population.’ Burhan Mazhar (2013) also 
expressed his concern in this regard when he said ‘we are six [members] in the provincial 
council that does not reflect the number of Arabs.’ Similarly, Ramlah Al-Ubeidy (2013) 
was unhappy about their share ‘our representation is very low which does not reflect our 
population and our wide areas.’ She added ‘if we take all of the directors of Kirkuk, our 
rate may not exceed 15 percent [while] our Kurdish brothers have got 50 or 49 percent [of 
the positions] and in some aspects the Turkmen have got nearly 38 percent.’ Briefly, as 
Rakan Saeed (2013), the Arab deputy governor, noted ‘the ratio of the Arabs in 
administrations, provincial council, and security matters are not compared to the Arab 
population size in Kirkuk.’ In other words, the Arabs feel marginalized and believe that 
their actual size is far proportionally bigger than their share in the governorate. 
Consociation, if adopted, could be a suitable solution to fix this problem.  
The Turkmen politicians also believe that they are underrepresented in different sectors in 
the city. They believe that that the Turkmen community has not been represented fairly in 
the political, economic and security sectors in the governorate. For example, Arshad Salhi 
(2013), the president of ITF, told me that ‘although we have eligibility for economic and 
security sectors, we are away from them in Kirkuk as they are dominated by the Kurds 
only.’ According to Hasan Turan (2013), the KPC chairman, the evidence for Turkmen 
underrepresentation in Kirkuk is that ‘the numbers of Turkmen in the security leadership 
of Kirkuk police consist of eight percent only.’ For Tahseen Kahya (2013), the Turkmen 
have faced ‘unfairness’, ‘marginalization’ and sometimes ‘exclusion’ in the administration 
and directorates of the city. Najat Hasan (2013) argues that the Kurds and Turkmen were 
marginalized by the Ba’ath regime, however, after the fall of the regime ‘the Kurdish 
brothers were compensated, while we, as Turkmen, did not get a chance to get 
compensation.’55 Thus, like the Arabs, the Turkmen have got their own stories and 
complaints. 
                                                          
55 Many of the Arab and Turkmen politicians use the expression ‘Kurdish brothers’ when they refer to their 
Kurdish counterparts. However, this has often nothing to do with their friendly stance towards the Kurdish 
demands. Even the most stubborn Arab and Turkmen politicians use this expression! 
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The Kurds, however, have their own concerns in this regard. The Kurdish view can be 
summarized in several points. First, they argue that they were largely marginalized and 
even excluded under the Ba’ath regime; therefore, what happens now is nothing but a case 
of rectifying past injustices and creating a balance by giving jobs to the Kurds who already 
suffered a lot and were deprived of jobs by the Ba’ath party due to their Kurdish identity. 
The former governor of Kirkuk argues that when he was the governor, the number of 
Kurdish employees was very low. He indicates that the North Oil Company (NOC) had 
only 18 Kurdish employees, so he increased the Kurdish employees to 1000 (UNPO: 2011). 
Second, the Kurds acknowledge that there is injustice in the allocation of civil service 
positions, but they argue that the Kurds are also underrepresented in other sectors. For 
example, the current Kurdish governor, Najamddin Karim (2013), told me that ‘the Arabs 
may have complaints, but most of the employees of Kirkuk are Arabs followed by the 
Turkmen.’ He also added that ‘the Kurds have the least number of employees in Kirkuk,’ 
therefore, he maintained that the Arabs and Turkmen ‘should not focus only on their 
problems and forget others’.’ Third, the Kurds argue that the employees are appointed by 
Baghdad and all of the governmental directorates are under Baghdad authority; therefore, 
as Jalal Jawhar (2013), a senior politician of the Change Movement, claimed ‘it is totally 
untrue and baseless that the Kurds have dominated everything’ in the city. Fourth, some of 
the Kurdish politicians think that the Kurds are still underrepresented. For example, Sdeeq 
Kaka Rash (2013), a Kurdish member of the KPC, told me that ‘the Arab group has 
dominated the oil sector’, i.e. North Oil Company. Moreover, ‘most of the engineers, 
officials and the retired people are Arabs.’ In the meantime, ‘the Turkmen have dominated 
the education and court sectors in Kirkuk,’ therefore, ‘this indicates that justice has not 
been regarded.’ Similarly, for Khalid Shwani, a Kurdish member of the CoR (2013), ‘the 
Kurds are the most aggrieved and affected group’ in the city. Here are some of Shwani’s 
views regarding Kurdish underrepresentation in some sectors and places: 
There are 63,000 civil servants in Kirkuk, nearly 32,600 of them are Arabs which is about 
60 percent of the number of civil servants, while they consist of only 25 percent of the city. 
On the security level, I think there are 943 officers in Kirkuk. More than 475 of them are 
Arabs which is more than 50 per cent. In Hawija with all its sub-districts, there is not even 
one Kurdish officer. However, within the city in which the Arabs are a minority, there are 
many Arab officials.  
Furthermore, the Kurds argue that they constitute two thirds of the KPC and thus it is their 
right to hold more positions than Arabs and Turkmen. As Anderson and Stansfield (2009: 
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220) note, ‘the allocation of 48 percent of the governorates administrative posts to the 
Kurds is fair and reasonably proportional if one accepts that the Kurds comprise 53 percent 
of the governorate’s population.’ Likewise, they argue, ‘28 percent of Kirkuk’s 
administrative posts is a generous allocation for the Turkmens if one accepts that they 
comprise almost certainly fewer than 20 percent of the governorate’s population.’ 
Anderson and Stansfield’s argument depends on the election results of January and 
December 2005 in which the Kurds came out as the first winner in the governorates. 
However, the problem is that the Arabs and Turkmen do not accept the use of the post-
2003 elections as benchmark numbers to assess the proportionality of their administrative 
and political representation. The Turkmen, as noted earlier, accuse the Kurds of the 
Kurdification process and the Arabs argue that in the 2005 provincial elections, the turnout 
of the Arab voters was very low which resulted in the underrepresentation of the Arabs. In 
Mohammed Khalil’s words (2013): 
The Arabs were not ready for the elections in 2005. There was instability and there was a 
threat to the voters on the day of elections and there was pressure from the security forces 
of the dominant group [Kurds] so that the Arabs cannot reach the station polls. This election 
resulted in unreal and an unnatural situation in this province. This is unfair per se. 
Scholars and researchers on Iraq and Kirkuk have different views about whether the groups 
are proportionally represented in the governorate or not. For example, Reidar Visser 
(2008c), argues that the Kurds have monopolized power in Kirkuk and they scotched the 
provincial elections law in 2008 by using the presidential veto to maintain the power they 
gained in the controversial January 2005 elections which resulted in their controlling the 
provincial council. Instead of accepting a power-sharing formula for Kirkuk, he argues, the 
Kurds want to keep the status quo. However, contrary to Visser’s argument and the claims 
of the Arab and Turkmen leaders, Liam Anderson (2009: 13) illustrates that despite a clear 
victory in the 2005 governorate election, the Kurds have not monopolized power and have 
not excluded other groups. For example, the KBL could, theoretically, govern and elect a 
governor without the support of other parties. Yet, the legitimacy of Kurdish rule originates 
from reaching some sort of mutually acceptable power-sharing arrangement with other 
ethnic groups (Anderson and Stansfield, 2009: 128). Thus, there is no clear-cut evidence to 
prove the domination of one group and the exclusion of others.   
Based on the above arguments, several conclusions can be drawn. First, as long as the 
governance situation of Kirkuk remains unresolved, the complaints and criticisms of the 
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groups along with their propensities to depict themselves as marginalized and 
underrepresented will continue. Having no reliable data and the disputed election outcomes 
make the situation even more complicated. Second, the groups are represented in different 
sectors in the governorate but there is imbalance in distributing the positions. In other 
words, the employment rates which are based on ethnicity in public institutions and 
government, changes from one place to another. For example, the Kurds have dominated 
the senior positions, whereas the Arabs have taken the majority in the lower positions such 
as ordinary civil servants and so on. The Turkmen proportion, on the other hand, in the 
public sector might roughly reflect their actual size on the ground. In sum, then, if a group 
is underrepresented in one sector, it is overrepresented in another one. Third, Baghdad is 
mainly responsible for this imbalance, as it has the authority to appoint employees and there 
is no balance in the employment orders they send to the governorate. For example, due to 
the position of the general-director of education directorate in Kirkuk, problems arose 
between Arabs and Turkmen, as the latter thought it is their right to take that position while 
the former has currently taken this position with the support of the Iraqi minister of 
education. (Bawabatthiqar website, 2014). Similarly, tensions between the Kurds and 
Turkmen arose recently when the ministry of higher education decided to replace the retired 
Kurdish president of Kirkuk University with a Turkmen. Eventually, the new Turkmen 
president of Kirkuk University was obliged to resign (Al-Yasri, 2015). Fourth, the KRG 
support for the KPC and mainly the Kurdish areas would clearly increase the proportional 
number of the Kurdish employees in the governorate which worries the Arabs and 
Turkmen. Finally, to come out from this conundrum, it is crucially important to hold the 
second provincial elections in the city as the legitimacy of the current KPC is questionable. 
Moreover, it is important that the positions should be distributed based on the elections 
outcome not the equal sharing of the positions (32-32-32-4) among the groups of Kirkuk 
as the Turkmen and the Arabs demand. However, consociation can be the most appropriate 
mechanism to address this problem through its element of proportionality.    
Conclusion 
From what has been argued in this chapter, one can reach the conclusion that a sort of an 
informal, if in certain respects imperfect or problematic, proportionality has been in place 
for the past decade in Kirkuk, especially with regards to electoral systems. This is because 
the Iraqi constitution has already adopted the proportional electoral system and as an Iraqi 
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governorate, Kirkuk has been subject to the PR electoral system as well. In terms of 
representations, the ethnic groups of Kirkuk have been represented in the executive, 
legislative and judicial areas proportionally. Nevertheless, due to a lack of reliable census 
data in the city and as the disputed outcome of the January 2005, the groups (especially the 
Arabs and, to a lesser extent, Turkmen) often raise concerns and complaints against 
marginalization as they think that their actual size is proportionally bigger than their share 
in the administrative and political representations. Although these concerns spark tensions 
every now and then, they have not led to inter-communal violence—which is to say that 
the principle of proportionality needs to be seen in relation to the other principles that we 
are addressing in this research as well as the broader socio-historical context in which they 
are located. One more specific explanation for the absence of violence is the fact that none 
of the groups has dominated the whole public sector. More specifically, a group’s 
deprivation in one sector is counterbalanced by its domination in another. The concerns are 
more related to the perception of injustice and sometimes discrimination perception, rather 
than raising serious complaints against exclusion. 
Taking this into consideration, the possibility of durable peace could arguably be greater in 
Kirkuk if proportional representation was to be considered formally based on a clear criteria 
(I would suggest elections results). As there is no reliable census, the elections can be an 
alternative way of assessing the relative number of the different groups since ordinary 
voters tend to vote along ethnic lines in Iraq and Kirkuk as well (see Garry 2009 on the 
case of Northern Ireland and its voting patterns).  Briefly, the PR electoral system is already 
in place and, despite the imbalance in the distribution of jobs and resources, there is a kind 
of proportionality in general. This research suggests maintaining the pre-existing PR 
electoral system and agreeing upon clear criteria to distribute the positions and resources 
as part of a consociational framework. Moreover, proportionality is crucial and should not 
be treated as a secondary consociational element, as Lijphart now suggests, in any future 
consociational arrangement. By this point, three elements of consociational theory (grand 
coalition, segmental autonomy and proportionality) has been discussed in this research. 
Now, I turn to analyse the last element (mutual veto). 
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Chapter 6. Mutual Veto 
Mutual veto is another important element of consociational theory. It is deemed necessary, 
along with the other three elements of consociational theory for managing conflict among 
different ethnic groups. More precisely, consociational theory considers mutual veto as an 
additional shelter or protection for minorities, as grand coalition alone might not be 
sufficient to provide a complete protection for minorities (Lijphart, 1977: 36). The main 
idea of mutual veto is to protect minority segments in a grand coalition government. 
Although groups are represented in a grand coalition, they may be outvoted once it comes 
to making decisions in the coalition government by majority vote. Therefore, as Allison 
McCulloch (2014: 15) states, ‘without the veto, the principle of majority rule can be easily 
enacted within the power-sharing executive or legislature, thereby defeating the very 
purpose of the coalition’, and, one might add, of inclusion and proportionality more 
generally. Thus, the veto along with participation in a grand coalition government ensure 
that the minority groups would enjoy a genuine, effective participation in the process of 
decision making.  
This chapter assesses the prospects for adopting the element of mutual veto in Kirkuk. As 
part of that, it considers various different types of veto. To this end, I divide the chapter 
into three sections. In the first section, I provide an overview of mutual veto, its types and 
forms, their advantages, drawbacks, and the formal or informal status of veto rights in 
different places. The second section examines a number of empirical cases with mutual 
veto. I deal especially with cases that appear to have useful lessons for Kirkuk such as 
Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Belgium and Brussels. In the last section, I discuss the feasibility 
of mutual veto institutions in Kirkuk in the future. In this last section, I present a brief 
overview on how veto rights have been dealt with in the post-Saddam Iraq. Based on that 
and the learnt lessons from other cases, I examine whether mutual veto would be feasible 
in Kirkuk. 
6.1 An Overview on Mutual Veto 
Consociationalists believe that minority or mutual veto provides protection to minorities.56 
By participating in a grand coalition, minorities may gain important political protection but 
                                                          
56 Or to majorities too, especially if they are only slightly bigger than the other side (hence, in Northern Ireland 
they tend to be called mutual vetoes rather than minority vetoes).   
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grand coalition alone does not provide a complete protection for minorities (Lijphart, 1977: 
36). The reason for this is that the minority’s presence in the coalition cannot prevent it 
from simply being overruled, particularly on issues of vital importance to them, since many 
decisions are reached by majority vote. In other words, a minority may have the formal 
chance to present its case to its coalition partners, but its arguments and demands may 
simply be outvoted by the majority. Therefore, in my interview with Najat Hasan (2013), a 
Turkmen member of the KPC, he asserted that ‘through strong guarantees, powersharing 
agreement will be enhanced.’ Therefore, for a complete guarantee of political protection 
for each segment, mutual veto has been defended by consociationalists. The existence of a 
veto option is an important deviation from the majority rule principle in the power-sharing 
executive. For this reason, Lijphart (1990: 495) has described veto rights as ‘the ultimate 
weapon that minorities need to protect their vital interests.’ The importance of mutual veto 
is that it does not only focus on the initial coalition-building stage and getting the 
representatives of different groups together in a grand coalition, but also deals with how 
these representatives behave once together (McCulloch, 2014: 14). Thus, mutual veto is 
important in consociational theory for, along with the grand coalition element, it provides 
an additional political shelter for minority protection. 
If misused by minorities, however, veto rights can have dangerous consequences. Lijphart 
(1977: 37) recognizes that a minority veto may lead to minority tyranny, which may limit 
the cooperation among elites in a grand coalition government as much as the persistent 
outvoting of minorities. This danger is to be expected. For example, a minority group may 
be able to veto any decision under the pretext of minority group protection and by arguing 
that its fundamental interests are threatened, whether or not this is actually the case. That 
was the concern of some of my interviewees. For example, Najmadeen Karim, the current 
Kirkuk governor, whom I interviewed with in his office in Kirkuk in 2013, had a negative 
view on veto. This was clear in his tone when he told me ‘No veto. Veto leads to deadlock, 
it is impossible.’ However, once he came to talk about governing the city, he asserted the 
importance of the inclusion of Arabs and Turkmen in any future powersharing arrangement, 
‘we have to prove our good intention by offering services to the Arab and Turkmen areas. 
They should be inclusive now and in the future in running the governorate.’ But, as noted 
earlier, the problem is that if minorities are not given veto rights, they might be outvoted 
by the majority group in grand coalition governments. Nevertheless, the governor’s 
concerns about veto is shared by Yasin Al-Ubaidi, Iraq’s MP from Hawija whom I 
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interviewed with on 22 January 2015 by phone, when he argued that ‘veto has negatively 
affected the government performance and legislation, and led the political process to 
deadlock.’ Thus, a major challenge for powersharing systems is to strike a balance between 
protecting minority groups and preventing unproductive stalemate and interethnic tension 
among the governing parties (McEvoy, 2013: 254). While Lijphart (1977: 37) 
acknowledges the negative side of veto powers, he suggests that the situation is not as 
serious as it appears for three reasons. First, the veto is a mutual veto, so its frequent use is 
unlikely as it can be turned against a minority too. Second, the fact that the veto is a 
potential weapon for the minority which gives them a feeling of security, makes the actual 
use of veto improbable. Finally, groups will not resort to using the veto because they will 
recognize the danger of deadlock and immobilism. Bieber (2005: 100), however, criticizes 
Lijphart for dismissing the dangers of veto too lightly. Bieber argues that Lijphart’s 
assumption is invalid, particularly in post-conflict societies with a political system that is 
contentious in itself. Lijphart’s argument is based on the rationality of the political parties 
and their interest in helping rather than hindering the process of decision making.57 
However, placing too much emphasis on the rationality of elites and political parties in 
divided societies is problematic.  
One reason for this is that in some situations mutual veto might not be able to achieve the 
purposes that its designers want and expect. For example, Kelleher (2005: 4-6) notes three 
problems relating to the principle of mutual veto in power-sharing systems. The first 
problem is related to the identity of the veto holder. A veto may fail to function as a minority 
protection in places where a number of different ethnic minorities acting as a single veto 
bloc is granted a veto right. In Macedonia, for example, a number of ethnic minorities have 
been bundled into a single bloc and given the right of veto. However, only the ethnic 
Albanians who are larger than others can enjoy this right properly, ‘the smaller ethnic 
minorities can never veto legislation without the support of ethnic Albanians, so their vital 
interests are only protected to the extent that they overlap with those of the predominately 
Muslim ethnic Albanian group’ (Kelleher, 2005: 4). Second, he (2005) refers to problems 
associated with the definition of ‘vital interests’ of the minority. He argues that if the ‘vital 
interests’ of a minority are defined too widely, veto rights may be open to abuse; however, 
if they are defined too narrowly, veto rights may fail to function as a tool to protect the 
                                                          
57 Rationality is not the same as goodwill. ‘Rational’ suggests that they avoid deadlocking because they think 
it will damage their own interests, not because they are interested in the processes of decision making per se. 
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fundamental interests of a minority such as the cases of Bosnia and Macedonia. Third, he 
identifies the common critique against mutual veto which is the emergence of crises and 
political deadlock after the exercise of the veto that is damaging to ethnic relations. 
Moreover, there is no clear positive correlation between adopting mutual veto and reducing 
conflict. Despite the existence of veto rights in places such as Iraq, Serbia and Montenegro, 
there is no reduction in violence, whereas mutual veto has been significant in reducing or 
preventing conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Burundi and Belgium (Ram and 
Strøm, 2014: 348-9). In short, the problems and impacts of mutual veto vary from case to 
case.  
However, despite the above criticisms and some others that I discuss in this paragraph, 
mutual veto is still seen to have potential for encouraging cooperation among elites. 
Schneckener (2002: 205) asserts the importance of veto rights as an institutional device in 
the consociational power-sharing model and writes that ‘the aim is to foster consensus-
building and the search for compromises.’ However, McEvoy (2013: 257) argues that 
‘there is a surprising lack of empirical research on whether this is the case in the real world 
of power sharing.’ Critics of consociationalism usually raise the problem of deadlock and 
democratic breakdown that can result from mutual veto.  For instance, Horowitz (2014: 7) 
argues that immobilism is a strong possibility where robust guarantees like minority vetoes 
are adopted in a consociational system, and ‘it may be very difficult to overcome the stasis 
that immobilism can produce.’ This is because a veto right allows each participating group 
in a government to block the demands of other groups. Therefore, under the environments 
of stalemate and immobilism, it might be unlikely for the elites to show cooperative 
behaviour. That is what Mohammed Khursheed (2013), a senior KDP politician whom I 
interviewed in his office in Kirkuk, warned about when he told me, ‘in my opinion, the 
veto right will be a means in the hands of politicians to use it for their interests and the 
interests of their political parties.’ However, Schneckener (2002: 221) states that veto rights 
develop a preventive effect. When I asked Hasan Turan (2013), the Turkmen head of the 
KPC, about whether they support veto, he replied ‘Of course, this model is applied in many 
countries.’ Kurshid’s negative opinion and Turan’s supportive view with regard to the 
necessity of adopting veto in Kirkuk reflects the fact that the Kurds as a numerically major 
group believe that the existence of veto will diminish their political influence in future 
while the Turkmen  fear that in the absence of veto rights, their interests would be violated. 
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In Schneckener’s view, the threat of a veto pushes the participant parties to find a 
compromise in the initial stages of decision making to make any veto unnecessary. For 
example, he refers to the preventive nature of veto right in both South Tyrol and Belgium. 
In both cases, veto rights such as the 'budget guarantee' or the 'alarm bell procedure', 
respectively, are de facto scarcely used, but the fact that they exist seems important for 
finding compromises. This explanation is compatible with Lijphart’s above response to the 
critics of mutual veto. However, it sounds that both consociationalists and their critics are 
right to a certain extent and this might have more to do with what forms of ‘veto right’ is 
in place in certain cases. It may lead to stalemate within the grand coalition government 
and risk the collapse of the political system if misused. By contrast, it may help foster 
cooperation among the participant parties in the government if used properly. 
The mutual veto can take various forms. It may be informal and unwritten or 
constitutionally enshrined or entrenched. Under its original consociational arrangement, 
Belgium had both informal and formal veto arrangements (McCulloch, 2014: 15). The 
linguistic groups of Belgium received constitutional recognition and guaranteed veto 
powers on cultural and educational issues, while mutual veto existed informally in the 
relations among the Socialist, Catholic and familles spirituelles (Lijphart, 1977: 38). Bosnia 
is another example where veto rights are constitutionally enshrined under the Dayton Peace 
Accord. For example, the presidency is formed by three members of each group and any of 
its members can effectively block any decision that is deemed to be in violation of a group’s 
vital interest (Dayton Peace Accord, Annex 4, Article v). In the case of Macedonia the veto 
provisions are embodied in their interim or preliminary constitutional documents, whereas 
more commonly veto provisions are included in the permanent constitution of the sate (Ram 
and Strøm, 2014: 346). Iraq can also serve as another example in which veto power has 
been tacitly embedded in its constitution. I will examine Iraq’s veto in a further detail in 
the final section of this chapter. The use of the popular referendum in Switzerland is another 
example of informal veto in which a certain minimum number of registered voters can force 
a public vote by signing a petition to suggest repealing existing legislation, constitutional 
amendment, etc. In short, mutual veto can take a variety of forms—it can be different from 
one country to another in terms of its formality and informality. 
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Table 6.1 The formal and informal regulation of veto rights in some cases 
Country Formal Veto Informal Veto 
Belgium     
Bosnia    
Macedonia    
Northern Ireland    
Iraq    
Whether the right of veto is formally or informally introduced, it can be implemented in 
different ways in practice. Schneckener (2002: 221), for instance, distinguishes between 
three types of vetoes: 1- delaying veto, 2- indirect veto, and 3- direct veto. The first option 
aims at delaying decisions by reconsidering a matter via parliamentary mediation or referral 
to the constitutional court. The second option leads to an indirect veto and requires specific 
conditions to be met to pass legislation in parliament such as a concurrent majority in the 
assembly (McEvoy, 2013: 258). The third option allows groups to declare an issue related 
to their ‘vital interests’ and, therefore, block the decision (e.g., Northern Ireland/petition of 
concern). He prefers the first two types of veto rights and, based on the Cypriot experience 
of mutual blockage, he suggests that ‘veto rights should be more restricted in order to 
prevent their misuse.’ He (2002: 222) also argues that ‘the less veto rights are used, the 
better,’ as ‘their frequent use can actually be seen as a sign of severe crisis.’ In terms of its 
extent, McCulloch (2014: 15) also makes distinctions between two main types of veto 
which are restrictive and permissive vetoes. She argues that ‘restrictive veto rights limit 
veto use to decisions that affect “the vital interests” of groups, whereas a more permissive 
approach allows their use on all proposed legislation.’ The problem with permissive vetoes 
is that they ‘open the door to misuse’ as they could be used for a political agenda ‘unrelated 
to community concerns’ (Bieber, 2005: 97). Therefore, academics generally favour 
restricted veto rather than permissive veto rights (McEvoy, 2013: 258). However, the 
choice between one of these institutional options for veto rights can depend on the context 
of a specific case. I will discuss this point in the following section with regards to Kirkuk. 
The above different types of veto rights and the way they are exercised in practice might 
be confusing. Therefore, McEvoy (2013: 258-62) has made an attempt to offer a clearer 
framework. Her framework makes distinction between three elements of the mutual veto: 
1- veto players, 2-veto issues and 3- veto points. For McEvoy (2013: 259), veto players 
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(who has veto power) are ‘actors who have the capacity to block decisions in the name of 
group protections’ Such veto players, according to McEvoy (2013: 259), can be identified 
in two ways: by pre-determination (pre-determined groups specified in the constitution or 
peace agreement) and self-determination (self-determined on the basis of success in 
elections). By veto issues (what issues veto players can veto), McEvoy (2013: 260), means 
‘decisions and legislation that groups may choose to block in power-sharing systems.’ She 
suggests defining veto issues clearly in legislation and restricting them to questions 
pertinent to identity such as culture, language and symbols. By veto points, she (2013: 261) 
means ‘where groups have the capacity to veto the agreed issues covering vital interests.’ 
Veto procedures may exist at various points in the political process and veto rules may be 
exercised in the assembly and executive. However, she (2013: 262) suggests avoiding a 
complex set of veto rules at various points as ‘too many veto points can cripple the system.’ 
Thus, this framework can be helpful to examine whether mutual veto encourages 
cooperation among groups in a grand coalition government.  
Table 6.2 A framework makes distinction among three aspects of vetoes58 
Elements of Veto Extent of Veto Veto types 
Veto players Restrictive veto 
(conditional veto) 
Delaying veto 
Veto issues Permissive veto 
(absolute veto) 
Indirect veto 
Veto points  Direct veto 
Now, after presenting the above theoretical framework on veto rights, it is important to 
understand how vetoes are employed and applied in several cases. This is significant, 
because without understanding how veto rights are used in other cases, one cannot have a 
good insight into which type of veto should be adopted in Kirkuk. This is a crucial point, 
particularly because the whole research is a normative one and without learning lessons 
from other cases, it is difficult, if not impossible, to be able to suggest a specific type of 
veto for Kirkuk in the future. The following section, therefore, discusses some cases with 
veto rights to understand what lessons they may have for the case of Kirkuk. 
                                                          
58 Compiled by author from different sources. 
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6.2 Mutual Veto: Cases and Lessons 
As just noted, understanding how veto rights are exercised in some cases with mutual veto 
is important for Kirkuk. In this section, I discuss the nature of minority vetoes in four cases, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, Belgium and Brussels. The choice of these four 
cases is dictated by three considerations. Firstly, these cases are different in terms of 
entrenching the formality or informality of their minority vetoes. This consideration is 
useful for Kirkuk normatively, because the main aim of this chapter is to examine what 
lessons can be learnt for Kirkuk from these cases and if mutual veto as an element of 
consociation were to be adopted in Kirkuk, should it be formal, informal or a combination 
of them. Secondly, selecting Brussels is deliberate as it is a regional rather than a national 
level consociation. The whole of this study argues for making Kirkuk a regional or a 
governmental consociation within the national consociation of Iraq. The case of Brussels 
is important to be considered in this respect. Finally, these cases share many features in 
common with Kirkuk in terms of communal diversity and conflict. In short, policy makers 
can learn important lessons from these cases for considering mutual veto by taking 
advantage from the effective examples and avoiding the ineffective ones. 
The Dayton Agreement produced a new constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. 
This constitution embedded veto powers formally which have been one of the contentious 
issues since then. In terms of veto players, the three constituent peoples (Bosniac, Croat 
and Serb) have the right of veto in Bosnia. These three groups can exercise this right 
through the Parliamentary Assembly and the Presidency Council (veto points) (See table 
3). According to Article IV of the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Parliamentary Assembly consists of two chambers: the House of Peoples and the House of 
Representatives. The House of Peoples comprises five members from each ethnic group 
whereas the House of Representatives comprises 28 members from the Muslim-Croat 
Federation and 14 from Republika Srpska that makes decisions on a majority basis (Article 
IV; Sebastián, 2007: 2). On the other hand, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
consists of three Members: one Bosniac, one Croat and one Serb (Article V). One of the 
members of the tripartite presidency or a majority delegation from one of the three 
constituent peoples in the parliamentary assembly can veto decisions deemed destructive 
to the vital interests of their respective ethnic group. In other words, with regard to veto 
issues in the above two chambers, ‘a proposed decision of the Parliamentary Assembly may 
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be declared to be destructive of a vital interest of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb people’ 
(Article IV, emphasis added).  
Furthermore, one of the three members of the Bosnian state presidency can consider a 
‘Presidency Decision’ to be destructive of a vital interest of their respective entity. In terms 
of veto extent, as McCulloch (2014: 46) points out, there are two kinds of vetoes at the state 
level in Bosnia: the vital interests veto (restrictive) and entity voting (permissive). The vital 
interests vetoes are mostly related to culture, education, language, use of symbols, personal 
identification and local self-government (Bieber, 2005: 97). Entity voting, on the other 
hand, stipulates that decisions in the state parliament require the support of at least one-
third of delegates from each of the two entities in both the House of Peoples and House of 
Representatives (McCulloch, 2014: 46). Finally, once it comes to veto procedures, as 
Schneckener (2002: 221) notes, a direct veto is exercised to block issues deemed 
destructive to the vital interests of the groups, whereas an indirect veto is used by the 
Assembly Parliament to block decisions if two-thirds of deputies of one entity (Croat-
Muslim federation or Republika Srpska) vote against a piece of legislation. The 
Parliamentary Assembly, according to Article X, can amend the constitution, i.e. it has been 
given another indirect veto. 
However, veto right is one of the most problematic issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Based on her analytical framework mentioned above, McEvoy (2013: 266) notes that veto 
problems are mainly related to veto issues and veto points. Veto players, she argues, are 
the predetermined groups which are unlikely to change as the nationalist parties would not 
agree to move to a system of self-determination. Veto issues, on the other hand, remain a 
difficult issue as the areas seen as Vital National Interest (VNI) by the groups are too broad. 
On the other hand, there are many veto procedures at different levels in Bosnia such as the 
VNI procedure in the presidency, both VNI and entity vetoes in the state parliament, and 
the procedure for entity voting in the House of Representatives which is particularly 
contentious. This is so because the House of Representatives lacks a mechanism to prevent 
deadlock due to not having a mediation mechanism like the joint commission in the House 
of Peoples. When a majority of Bosnic, Croat, or Serb delegates objects to the veto in the 
House of Peoples, a joint commission is set up to resolve the issue. If the commission does 
not agree within five days, the issue is referred to the Constitutional Court for review 
(Article IV). Without such a procedure, entity delegates in the House of Representatives 
 
 
172 
are urged to block legislation rather than compromise (McEvoy, 2013: 267). Thus, as 
Bieber (2004: 7) states, any group in Bosnia-Herzegovina can veto any decision without 
any specific limitation at the state level which might be the most problematic usage of veto 
rights. 
This controversial mechanism has very negative repercussions on the process of decision 
making in Bosnia. Bahtic´-Kunrath (2011: 899), for instance, argues that entity-voting 
enables the veto players ‘to “hijack” the parliament for their exclusionary ethnic interests 
and discourages cooperation and compromise between the veto players,’ and this is a 
significant factor for ‘the country’s orientation towards the political status quo.’ Moreover, 
the multiple ethnic veto points have contributed to ‘reinforcing the “ethnification” of 
Bosnian democracy,’ and made the system susceptible to entrenched ethnic and political 
divisions that provoked and prolonged the conflict (Sebastián, 2007: 16). Thus, veto rights 
are widely seen as being responsible for the ungovernability of the country (Bieber, 2004: 
7). McEvoy (2013: 266) argues that it is necessary to ‘define and clarify the areas of 
legislation that may be subject to VNI.’ This is important as vital interests can be interpreted 
broadly, and ‘leaving room for vetoing virtually any decision’ (Bieber, 2005: 97). 
Moreover, defining and restricting the areas in which VNI veto could be used would 
‘remove one of the greatest obstacles to efficient and effective governance in Bosnia’ (Hays 
and Crosby, 2006: 4). Thus, veto rights have been one of the most serious obstacles in 
Bosnia that need reform. However, there was justification for veto procedures in Bosnia to 
end the war, on one hand, and ensure that the Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats would enjoy 
authentic participation in the decision-making process after the war, on the other hand. In 
other words, taking the special situation of Bosnia at the time of enforcing Dayton 
Agreement, can, at least partly, justify the positive sides of various veto points and veto 
issues in that country. The lesson to be taken from this is that to avoid Balkanization, 
deadlock and immobilism in Kirkuk, the veto issue and the veto points should be as 
restrictive as possible in the case of the adoption of consociational power-sharing.  
Northern Ireland is another case where power-sharing arrangements have been agreed upon 
in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in which veto rights have been informally 
embedded. According to the GFA, groups are represented by members of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly who designate as ‘nationalist,’ ‘unionist’ or ‘other’ (GFA, Strand one: 
No. 6). As for veto players (See table 3), a cross-community voting procedure was 
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introduced in this agreement in which the Nationalist and Unionist groups were granted 
mutual veto rights for certain veto issues in the Northern Ireland Assembly such as the 
election of the chair of the assembly, the first minister and deputy first minister, standing 
orders and budget allocations. The Nationalist and Unionist groups (veto players) can enjoy 
veto rights through two veto points: the Assembly and the executive government. To protect 
the interests of the unionist and nationalist groups, key decisions are required to be taken 
in the assembly on a cross-community basis: through either parallel consent (i.e. a majority 
of those members present and voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist 
designations present and voting) or a weighted majority [i.e. a weighted majority (60%) of 
members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist 
designations present and voting] (GFA, Strand one, No. 5). Due to putting these conditions 
to be met to pass legislation in the assembly by the Members of the Legislative Assembly 
(MLAs), the veto rights in the Northern Ireland could be considered as indirect veto. 
Following from a series of multi-party discussions between the British and Irish 
governments and Northern Ireland's political parties in 2006, new veto mechanisms were 
introduced in the St. Andrews Agreement. According to this new and reformed agreement 
(Annex A, No. 2), ‘there would be arrangements to ensure that, where a decision of the 
Executive could not be achieved by consensus and a vote was required, any three members 
of the Executive could require it to be taken on a cross-community basis.’ Thus, restrictive 
veto rights over certain veto issues (named above) can be used by the Unionists and 
Nationalists in both the Assembly and the executive bodies in Northern Ireland.     
In other cases, aside from the above-mentioned veto issues, thirty MLAs (out of a total 108) 
can trigger a ‘petition of concern’ to vote on any specific issue to be taken on a cross-
community basis. The ‘petition of concern’ measure was designed to protect minority rights 
in Stormont's power-sharing assembly. When a petition of concern is presented to the 
assembly speaker, a vote on proposed legislation will only pass if supported by a weighted 
majority. These procedures (parallel consent, weighted majority and petition of concern) 
are particularly important to safeguard nationalists from the dominance of unionists 
(O’Leary, 1999: 1640). However, the ‘Other’ group is less protected in the Assembly.59 
They can be outvoted by a simple majority and due to their small numbers, they are unable 
to trigger a petition on their own which means they hold less political power than Unionist 
                                                          
59 The ‘others’ are non-designated MLAs.  As such, they may be ‘cross-cutting’ in ethnic orientation 
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or Nationalist Assembly members (Kelleher, 2005: 4; O’Leary, 1999: 1640). This can be 
seen as discrimination against the ‘other’ group and contributes to the entrenchment of 
Northern Ireland's already deep ethnic divisions. However, O’Leary (1999: 1640) argues 
that the ‘Other’ group has not been at the heart of Northern Ireland conflict and thus it is 
not surprising if they are not at the heart of agreements, therefore, he maintains that it is not 
accurate to claim that they are excluded from the Agreement. O’Leary’s argument may be 
right, but the ‘other’ group could have played a positive role in the conflict resolution if 
they had been given a veto right, especially once it comes to avert the Nationalist/Unionist 
divisions.  
Although the record of powe-sharing in general and veto rights in particular in Northern 
Ireland appears to suggest that they have worked relatively better than power-sharing and 
veto institutions in Bosnia, Northern Ireland’s mutual veto has not been without problems. 
For example, Northern Ireland's controversial Welfare Reform Bill has recently failed to 
pass at Stormont. Despite the fact that the political parties of Northern Ireland had agreed 
a deal on Westminster's welfare reform measures last December, Sinn Féin withdrew its 
support in March 2015 and the Welfare Reform Bill was defeated by a petition of concern 
lodged by Sinn Féin, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the Green Party 
(bbc.co.uk, 2015). Even though a majority of MLAs voted in favour of the legislation (58 
MLAs unionists and ‘others’ voted ‘Yes’ and 39 nationalists voted ‘No’), it fell because it 
failed to receive the support of a majority of both nationalists and unionist members of the 
Assembly (niassembly.gov.uk, 2015). Thus, the bill did not pass and this crisis ‘has thrown 
the future of the power-sharing Executive in Belfast into real doubt’ (Young and McHugh, 
2015). The veto points and issues in Northern Ireland are less than those in Bosnia which 
is commendable; however, the crisis over the Welfare Reform Bill provides a useful 
example of how veto rights may become a threat to a power-sharing system even under the 
best of circumstances. Here, the main lesson for Kirkuk is that the right of veto itself may 
not safeguard any future power-sharing arrangements in the city; rather, mutual veto works 
well only when the political elites choose to cooperate and show willingness to 
compromise. This can be realized only when the parties believe that power-sharing 
government is better than other scenarios and when they genuinely want to see it succeed.   
Belgium is another relevant case. As noted in the previous section, Belgium had both 
informal and formal veto arrangements under its original consociational arrangement. 
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Belgium has been divided between its Flemish and Walloon communities.60 There are three 
political regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) in Belgium and the country has become 
de facto subdivided into two monolingual regions, i.e. Flanders and Wallonia and one 
bilingual region of Brussels (Schneckener, 2002: 206). There are also three communities: 
Flemish community, French community and German-speaking community. The Flemings 
and the Walloons are Belgiums’ veto players. The normal rule of decision making in the 
parliament is simple majority, but the minority has a veto power called ‘alarm bell 
procedure’. According to Article 54 of the Belgian constitution, whenever three-quarters 
of the members of one of the linguistic groups believe that a proposal might be harmful to 
their interests, they can activate the alarm bell. In that case, the parliamentary procedure is 
suspended for thirty days, during which the federal government would be asked to find a 
solution within 60 days (Deschouwer, 2006: 902). The importance of the alarm bell is that 
the government, due to parity in its composition and unanimity rather than majority in 
decision-making, is obliged to find a negotiated solution and a compromise that is 
acceptable to both language groups (Deschouwer and Parijs, 2009: 11). One of the 
advantages of the ‘alarm bell procedure’ is that the Dutch speakers cannot impose their 
majority will on the demographic minority of French speakers. 
The alarm bell procedure has not frequently been used in Belgium. One reason for this, as 
Kelleher (2005: 1) notes, is probably because of granting each community a high-level of 
autonomy over their vital interests such as language, education and culture. Article 2 of the 
Belgian Constitution, for example, states that ‘Belgium is made up of three Communities: 
the French Community, the Flemish Community, and the German-speaking Community.’ 
This safeguards the vital interests of the groups by law and when the vital interests of 
communities are guaranteed in the constitution, the likelihood of resorting to veto rights 
will be less on one hand and the veto issues will be restrictive on the other hand. Kelleher 
defines the ‘Alarm Bell Procedure’ as ‘soft veto’. He argues that this ‘soft veto’ encourages 
mediation between different communities to reach a mutually acceptable solution and end 
post-veto deadlock, thereby avoiding the destabilizing impact of traditional ‘hard vetoes’ 
which create winners and losers. For him (2005, 8), soft veto has the effect of suspending 
                                                          
60 The Flemish comprise approximately 58% of the population who speak Dutch and are concentrated in the 
region of Flanders in the north of the country, whereas Walloons comprise approximately 31% of the 
population who speak French and are concentrated in the region of Wallonia in the south and also the capital 
city of Brussels. For more information on Belgian population, see: 
http://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/country/Population/ 
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a draft law or measure but not destroying it, and triggering a formal mediation procedure 
aimed at a mutually acceptable solution, whereas a ‘hard veto’ is a veto that has the effect 
of destroying a draft law or measure, creating ‘a clear win/lose situation,’ and which fails 
to help resolve any political crisis or deadlock that may happen after using veto.61 Thus, 
another advantage of the ‘alarm bell procedure’ is that it avoids creating a win/lose situation 
and reduces the possibility of a political crisis by suspending rather than destroying the 
draft laws. Despite Kelleher’s praise for the peaceful settlement of political problems in 
Belgium, as Caluwaerts and Reuchamps (2015: 278) note, ‘the recent elections of 2007 and 
2010 have shown that the search for a compromise has become particularly hard.’ The first 
political crisis was in 2007-2008 when after 194 days the new government was formed. 
The second crisis was even more complicated when after 541 days of negotiation, parties 
succeeded in forming the new government. Thus, ‘over a four-year period (2007– 2011), 
737 days (196 days +541 days) were days of deadlocks and conflicts’ (Caluwaerts and 
Reuchamps, 2015: 282). Thus Belgium broke Iraq’s world government formation record 
of 249 days in 2010. However, the delay in forming governments in Belgium (and Iraq as 
well) was mainly related to the inability and unwillingness of politicians to compromise 
rather than the mutual veto per se. 
The Brussels region has very similar institutions to those of the Belgian state. Brussels is 
Belgium’s capital which, in effect, lies across the fault line between Northern Dutch-
speaking and southern Francophone areas that is contested by ‘the strong Francophone 
majority in the city and historic claims of its Flemish’ (Bollens, 2013: 332). In contrast to 
Bosnia and Northern Ireland, Brussels is a regional consociation within the consociational 
framework of the Belgian federal state (Wolff, 2004). In Brussels, the Dutch-speaking 
people are estimated to be ‘15±20 per cent of the nationals’ while ‘80±85 per cent’ are 
estimated to be French-speaking (Jacobs, 2000: 289). The Flemings and the Walloons are 
also Brussels’ veto players. The same logic of governing together and trying to avoid a veto 
by one of the two main language groups has been established in the institutions of Brussels 
(Deschouwer and Parijs, 2009: 11). For example, elites have separated into two language 
groups, each group has an equal number of minsters (except for the Prime Minister who is 
designated for the French speakers) and an alarm-bell procedure has been in place in 
Brussels (Deschouwer, 2006: 904). However, unlike Belgium as a state, the Dutch-
                                                          
61 Kelleher’s ‘soft veto’ and ‘hard veto’ typology appears to be roughly similar to Schneckener’s ‘delaying 
veto’ and ‘indirect veto’ typology. 
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speaking Flemish are the minority in Brussels. Yet, they still have the right to invoke an 
‘alarm bell procedure’. Therefore, the Dutch-speaking minority of Brussels are probably 
the most well protected minority in the world (Van Damme, 2003: 53). In short, the alarm 
bell procedure has been built into both Belgium as a state and Brussels as a fully-fledged 
region. The Francophones are in a minority position in the country, while the Flemish are 
a minority in the Brussels region. However, both language groups can protect their rights 
by blocking any decision if they deem it to be in violation of their interests. Brussels is like 
Kirkuk in that the Flemings in the former and the Arabs in the latter are in a minority 
position, while at the national level they are in a majority, i.e. the Franco- phones are 
smaller than the Flemish community in Belgium and the Kurds are smaller than the Arabs 
in Iraq. However, one of the main lessons here is that Kirkuk can become a regional 
consociation within the framework of Iraq just like Brussels within Belgium. McGarry and 
O’Leary (1993: 35) also emphasize that the principles of consociationalism ‘can operate at 
the level of an entire state, or within a region of a state characterized by ethnic conflict.’ In 
other words, it is possible to have consociational power-sharing, with mutual veto as one 
of its important elements, both at the national and regional/governmental levels. 
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Table 6.3 The detail of veto rights in five cases62 
Country
/ City 
Formal and  
informal 
regulation of 
veto rights 
Veto Players Veto Issues Veto points Extent of Veto  Veto types 
Bosnia  Formal Bosniacs, 
+ 
Croats and 
+ 
Serbs 
Vital National Interests + 
legislation + Constitutional 
amendment 
Presidency Council 
+ 
Parliamentary 
Assembly (i.e. House 
of Peoples and House 
of Representatives) 
Restrictive 
+ 
Permissive 
Direct veto 
+ 
Indirect Veto 
Northern 
Ireland 
Informal Nationalists 
+ 
Unionists 
Election of the chair of the 
Assembly, the first minister, 
deputy first minister 
+ 
standing orders and the 
budget 
+ 
any issue can become subject 
to a petition of concern 
The Assembly 
+ 
The executive 
(introduced in St. 
Andrews Agreement) 
Restrictive indirect Veto 
Belgium Formal + informal Flanders 
+ 
Walloons 
Legislation House of 
Representatives 
Restrictive Delaying Veto 
+  
Indirect Veto 
Brussels  Informal Flanders 
+ 
Legislation 
+ 
Parliament + 
government 
Restrictive Delaying Veto 
+ 
                                                          
62 Compiled by author from different sources. 
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Walloons decision making Indirect Veto 
Iraq Informal63 Shiites  
+     
Kurd  
+   
Sunnis 
Constitutional amendment Council of 
Representatives 
Restrictive indirect Veto 
                                                          
63 Veto was formally entrenched in the interim constitution of Iraq and it was practised from 2005 until 2009 by the Presidency Council which consisted of a Kurd (president) 
and two Shiite and Sunni deputies.  
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In conclusion, several broad lessons can be learnt from the implementation and use of 
minority vetoes in the above four cases. Firstly, as illustrated in the case of Bosnia, the 
more restrictive the veto issues and the veto points, the better it is for the functioning of a 
consociational power-sharing. In short, fewer vetoes are better than more.  In the case of 
adopting mutual veto, reducing these two issues would be advisable in Kirkuk, mainly to 
avoid immobilism and deadlock. Secondly, as McEvoy (2013) suggests, it is preferable that 
veto players would be self-determined groups rather than pre-determined. One of the 
advantages of this is that assigning veto players on the basis of self-determination gives 
‘equal chances to all ethnic or other segments’ and it avoids ‘fixing groups’ representation 
on the permanent or semi-permanent basis’ (McEvoy, 2013: 259). This is in line with 
Lijphart’s preference (1995) of self-determination of groups to predetermination. Thirdly, 
the willingness of political leaders to cooperate is essential so that mutual veto can work. 
Even in the case of Belgium which is often praised for its ‘Alarm-Bell’ procedure as a soft-
veto, immobilism can occur. By considering these points in the case of Kirkuk, mutual veto 
might be able to foster inter-group cooperation. I now turn to discuss in more detail the 
possibility of adopting such a kind of veto in Kirkuk in the light of the lessons learnt from 
the above cases and the inspiring case of Iraq itself. 
6.3 The Feasibility of Mutual Veto in Kirkuk 
Before dealing with the feasibility of mutual veto in Kirkuk and what lessons can be learnt 
from other cases with mutual veto, it is important to shed light on how mutual veto has 
been adopted in the post-Saddam Iraq. The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) which 
is also known as the ‘Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period’ 
came into effect in 2004 in which the Kurds were able to include some provisions that gave 
them an effective veto over amending any future Iraqi constitution. For example, Article 
61 (c) of the TAL stated that ‘the general referendum will be successful and the draft 
constitution ratified if a majority of the voters in Iraq approve and if two-thirds of the voters 
in three or more governorates do not reject it.’ As Iraqi Kurds constitute a majority in the 
three provinces of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Dohuk, this provision gave them an important 
veto power. Moreover, according to article 36 (c) the decisions of the Presidency Council 
(President of the State and two Deputies) must be unanimous which means giving each 
member a veto power. In addition, that council also had limited powers to veto legislative 
bills (article 37). Since 2005 the office of the president of Iraq has been held by a Kurd and 
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his two deputies have been Shiite Arabs and Sunni Arabs. Thus, the major communities 
could block any legislation opposed to the interests of their respective groups. 
Furthermore, the Kurds and Sunni Arabs were given an effective veto later in the Iraqi 
permanent constitution. According to article 142 of the constitution, constitutional 
amendments require the support of the majority of voters and must not be rejected by two-
thirds of the voters in three or more governorates. As noted above, the Kurds make up the 
vast majority of voters in three governorates; therefore, this article could be translated into 
a de facto Kurdish veto. This would be the same for the Sunni Arabs. If they were unified 
they could reject the constitution in 2005, as they constitute the majority in at least three 
provinces in Iraq. The Shiite Arabs can easily veto any constitutional amendment if they 
wish to since they constitute the majority in ten Iraqi governorates. Moreover, Article 138 
of the constitution extended retaining the right of veto by the members of the Presidency 
Council for the first term after approving the constitution, i.e. from 2005-2009. During that 
time a number of legislative bills were vetoed by the Presidency Council members.  For 
example, as mentioned in chapter three, the two members of the presidency council 
(Kurdish president, Jalal Talabani, and his Shiite deputy, Adel Abdul Mahdi) vetoed Law 
24 of the provincial election by the Iraqi parliament that called for an equal power-sharing 
formula in Kirkuk on the basis of a 32-32-32-4 distribution of positions among the main 
groups (Visser: 2008a). Thus, the attempt to mandate equal power-sharing for Kirkuk was 
blocked by using the veto right by the Presidency Council.  
Regarding the question of mutual veto and the possibility of adopting this element of 
power-sharing in Kirkuk, like many other divided societies, Kirkuk has experienced 
antagonism and mistrust between its ethnic groups. As McGarry et al. (2008, 60) explain, 
rigid consociations created amid high historic antagonism and mistrust may grant veto 
rights to each partner to the consociation to enable them to block constitutional or 
legislative changes that threaten their vital interests. In other words, for a complete 
protection of minorities, both the inclusion of the minorities in the grand coalition 
government and providing veto rights are deemed necessary. However, as noted in chapter 
four, the vital interests of the groups (i.e. segmental autonomy) in Iraq have already been 
protected in the constitution, at least to an appreciable extent. Hence, one may ask that if 
the cultural rights of the groups have already been guaranteed, then why provide for veto 
in the first place? That is a fair question. However, as I explain in more detail below, 
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protecting cultural rights and designing an informal veto should not be mutually exclusive. 
If veto rights are going to be adopted in Kirkuk, some crucial questions should be answered. 
For example, what precise form or forms of veto should be adopted?  What issues should 
be eligible for veto? Who should become veto players? How might political gridlock be 
avoided as a result of using veto? The following paragraphs, in the light of the typologies 
shown in table 3, try to answer these questions in the context of Kirkuk.  
In terms of formal and informal regulation of veto rights, an informal veto appears to be 
preferable for Kirkuk for three reasons. First, the constitution of Iraq has recognized the 
cultural rights of the minorities which makes it different from the case of Bosnia in which 
these rights are considered ‘vital national interests’ which are protected by the formal veto 
right. In other words, as the cultural rights of the groups have already been guaranteed in 
the constitution, entrenching formal veto would be unnecessary in the context of Kirkuk. 
In this sense, Kirkuk could be similar to Belgium in which the cultural rights of the Dutch-
speaking Flanders and Francophones have been protected by the Belgian constitution and 
thus an informal veto of the ‘alarm bell procedure’ has been designed to protect the interests 
of the groups in areas that have not been explicitly mentioned in the constitution. Secondly, 
the fact that an informal veto is already in place in Iraq makes such a veto more likely to 
be adopted in Kirkuk as well. In other words, replicating a pre-existing Baghdad institution 
in Kirkuk should be easier than establishing a new one from the scratch. Thirdly, a kind of 
informal and unwritten veto has been in place in the post-2003 Kirkuk. As Jwan Hussen 
(2013), a Kurdish member of the KPC, explains, ‘there have been issues that have not been 
passed because of the veto of Arabs and Turkmen.’ However, one may question that the 
constitutional recognition of minorities’ cultural rights can make veto rights unnecessary 
in the first place. One answer for such a question is that only cultural rights of the groups 
have been guaranteed in the constitution. In other words, like Belgium or Brussels, there 
are other issues in Kirkuk which I turn to below that are important for all parties but not 
mentioned in the constitution. In that case, a sort of informal veto would be necessary. In 
short, as not all rights of the groups have been protected in the constitution, veto appears to 
be important. Once it comes to choosing the form of veto that is advisable to be adopted, I 
would suggest the informal veto for the three reasons mentioned above.  
The question of veto players is another important issue that should be settled if veto rights 
are to be adopted in Kirkuk. In her assessment, as mentioned earlier, McEvoy (2013) 
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prefers veto players to be self-determined groups rather than predetermined ones. As shown 
earlier, veto players in Bosnia are the predetermined groups of Bosniac, Serbs and Croats. 
In Kirkuk, groups might not agree upon a self-determined form of veto, because the 
nationalist parties are strong and they probably favour a predetermined veto. However, a 
mix of self-determined and pre-determined vetoes could also be acceptable. This would be 
possible by allowing the four ethnic and religious groups (Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and 
Christians) to enjoy veto rights, but at the same time allowing any other group that may 
emerge as a result of winning elections in the future to enjoy the same veto right. The 
crucial point here to consider is not to impose particular form of veto rights in general and 
veto players in particular. In an interview that I conducted with Abdulrahman Mustafa 
(2013), the former governor of Kirkuk, he told me that ‘if all of the groups agree upon 
mutual veto, it could be possible.’ In other words, any veto arrangement should be a 
domestic demand in the first place. In short, it seems to be reasonable to go for a 
combination of self-determined and pre-determined veto players if mutual veto were to be 
adopted in Kirkuk. This recommendation is in line with the solution that I already suggested 
in chapter three in which I argued in favour of the same solution once it comes to adopting 
power-sharing, i.e. a mix of corporate and liberal forms of consociation. 
As Table 3 illustrates, veto issues and veto points are two other important aspects that 
should be considered once mutual veto is the preferred choice. The policy areas that should 
be subject to veto issues should be restricted to sensitive issues related to local self-
government such as the election of the governor, his two deputies and the election of the 
KPC chairman, electoral reforms and the budget. The case of Northern Ireland can be 
inspiring for Kirkuk in this regard. Any veto should be based on gaining the consent of the 
majority and avoiding the creation of political deadlock in Kirkuk. With regards to veto 
points, policy makers should avoid adopting the multiple ethnic veto points of Bosnia in 
Kirkuk in order not to reinforce the lines of ethnicity and not deepen the political divisions 
in the city. Veto points could be specific to either the provincial council (if Kirkuk becomes 
an autonomous region in the future) alone or could be exercised on both the provincial 
council and the election of the governor and his two deputies. Based on the experience of 
other cases, one can safely suggest that the fewer the veto issues and veto points, the better 
for the governability of the city. 
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Furthermore, a restrictive veto with a delaying or an indirect effect can be effective in better 
protecting the interests of the minority groups on one hand, and preventing a dysfunctional 
power-sharing government on the other hand. As noted earlier, the permissive nature of 
veto in Bosnia that gives the right to groups to veto a broad number of issues is problematic, 
while the Belgium and Brussels vetoes are much more restricted. Taking this into 
consideration, a constraint form of veto appears to be necessary in Kirkuk. This is to avoid 
political outbidding and using a veto for the political agenda by the ethnic players. To avoid 
such a consequence, a restrictive veto to some specific veto issues, as suggested in the 
previous paragraph, is recommended for Kirkuk. In terms of veto types, the choice is 
recommended to be between a delaying veto and an indirect veto. As noted earlier by 
Schneckener (2002: 221), the delaying veto aims at delaying decisions by reconsidering a 
matter via parliamentary mediation or referral to the constitutional court, whereas an 
indirect veto requires specific conditions to be met to pass legislation in parliament such as 
a concurrent majority in the assembly. The ‘Alarm Bell Procedure’ in Belgium and Brussels 
is an example of delaying veto while Northern Ireland’s veto can be seen as an indirect one. 
Either would be better than the direct veto which blocks the decisions, however, an indirect 
veto would probably be easier to adopt in Kirkuk, partly because a sort of an indirect veto 
is already in place in Iraq (See table 3).  
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Table 6.4  A proposed veto procedure for Kirkuk in case of adopting consociational power sharing 
 
City Formal and  informal 
regulation of veto rights 
Veto Players Veto Issues Veto points Extent of 
Veto 
Veto types 
 
Kirkuk  
 
Informal  
 
Kurds 
+ 
Arabs 
+ 
Turkmen 
+ 
Christians 
+ 
any other group 
that can win seats 
in elections 
 
Elections of the 
governor, his deputy 
and chair of KPC (or 
speaker of 
parliament if Kirkuk 
will become an 
autonomous region 
+ 
Electoral reform 
+ 
Budget 
 
Governorship board 
(governor 
 + 
 his deputy 
 + 
Chairman of KPC) 
 
+ 
 
Kirkuk Provincial 
Council (or 
parliament, should 
Kirkuk becomes an 
autonomous region). 
 
Restrictive 
 
An indirect 
veto  
 
or  
 
a delaying 
veto 
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Further, it is important that the mediation process will be activated once a veto is invoked. As 
Bieber (2005: 99) notes, a veto without mediation puts an end to the respective law or decision 
and thus can cause gridlock in the decision-making process. He (2005: 99) adds, if there are no 
mechanisms to bridge policy gaps, ‘the use of the veto can exacerbate interethnic relations.’ If 
Kirkuk becomes an autonomous region, it might be necessary to establish a constitutional court 
to interpret the articles of the constitution of such a region and settle the disputes between the 
political parties of different ethnic groups. Or a committee representing all participant parties 
in the provincial council (or Assembly) should seek to negotiate a compromise and settle any 
dispute or conflict between communities once a veto is invoked. If the committee does not 
reach a compromise, the issue should be referred to the constitutional court as a higher body. 
Another option is to take advantage from the experience of Macedonia in which there is a body 
called ‘the Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations’ that includes seven Macedonians and 
Albanians and one representative from other communities. This body is responsible for 
mediating disputes arising from the double majority system (Bieber, 2008: 25). Thus, these are 
some theoretical normative suggestions that could be useful for Kirkuk if it were to adopt veto 
in the future. However, a more detailed work will be necessary in practice that should be left 
for negotiation between the communities. 
Finally, three broad conclusions can be drawn from the above discussions. First, providing 
legal protection for the cultural rights of the ethnic groups in Kirkuk would not exclude the 
possibility of adopting a veto. Second, whatever kind of veto is adopted, it is important to 
choose the one that is preferred by all parties and avoid a winner/loser situation. Third, there is 
a mixed reaction by the elites of different communities of Kirkuk regarding the veto issue. The 
Kurds generally reject the idea of adopting mutual veto but support providing legal guarantees 
for all the groups of Kirkuk. Khalid Shwani’s (2013) opinion, which is compatible with the 
view of the governor of Kirkuk, may reflect the overall view of the Kurds when he told me ‘I 
am not going for veto, but each nation should be given legal and constitutional rights.’ The 
Arabs and Turkmen do not have a uniform view on this issue. While, as noted earlier, some of 
the Turkmen elites support the idea of veto rights, Tahseen Kahya (2013), a Turkmen member 
of KPC, thought that ‘the problem of Kirkuk is solved through consensus among the groups 
without veto rights. Veto means having no consensus among the constituents.’ Nevertheless, 
unlike Yasin Al-Ubaindi, for example, Mohammed Khalil (2013), an Arab member of the KPC 
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told me, ‘we are for veto for all. Each group should have veto in Kirkuk to resort to it when a 
right of any group is violated.’ I noticed that the opponents of mutual veto had a formally 
entrenched Bosnian- style veto in mind when opposing the idea of veto rights for they fear the 
Balkanization of politics in Kirkuk. In other words, I believe that they have problems with a 
hard, formal and permissive veto with a direct effect on blocking decisions, whereas they could 
be more open to a soft, informal and restrictive veto with either a delaying or an indirect effect 
as proposed in table 4. 
Conclusion 
Although mutual veto is now considered a secondary element of consociation, it is 
recommended to be adopted as part of any power-sharing arrangement in the future in Kirkuk. 
The adoption of veto rights is possible as veto was formally embedded in the post-Saddam era 
in TAL and tacitly enshrined in the Iraqi constitution later. Moreover, although the Iraqi 
constitution has guaranteed the cultural rights of the minorities, there are still other issues such 
as budget and self-government institutions that are of great importance for the ethnic groups of 
Kirkuk. Therefore, I suggest that key decisions would be taken on a cross-community basis. 
This is important, because a power-sharing arrangement without veto leaves an awful lot to the 
goodwill of the majority, which is a fairly unstable basis for power sharing. The case of Kirkuk 
is similar to Belgium and Brussels in that cultural rights of minorities have been guaranteed by 
the constitution but the difference is that in Belgium and Brussels, along with that guarantee, 
groups can use veto rights in some areas which are not mentioned in the constitution, while 
veto is not still in place in Kirkuk. Therefore, an informal and an indirect veto which is 
restricted to a specific number of issues is suggested to be adopted. These issues could be 
settled via negotiation and compromise between the groups themselves and the international 
actors can help them to do so. 
In terms of veto players, it is important to design a mix of self-determined and predetermined 
veto rather than a predetermined-based veto such as the case of Bosnia. Although a self-
determined-based veto seems to more attractive in theory, it might prove problematic in 
practice, mainly because the strong nationalist parties from different groups might not open to 
go that far in this stage. A veto based on a mix of the predetermined and self-determined veto 
players, however, could be more likely. If the communities’ elites are assured that they retain 
the veto right, they might be more open to allow any other group, that may emerge as a result 
of winning elections, to enjoy the same right in the future. To prevent political deadlock, the 
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veto points are suggested to be restricted to the legislature body and government. Moreover, it 
is important that the mediation process will be activated once a veto is invoked. This could be 
done by forming a committee representing all groups or by establishing a constitutional court 
(if Kirkuk were to become an autonomous region) to settle the disputes that may arise between 
the political parties once a veto is invoked. 
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Conclusion 
The issue which this thesis has sought to address is to analyse whether consociation is an 
appropriate institutional mechanism for managing conflict and providing political stability in 
Kirkuk. The research reached two broad conclusions. Firstly, it found that the background 
conditions for power-sharing in Kirkuk were far from being unfavourable, i.e. prospects for 
adopting consociational power-sharing are reasonably good. Secondly, consociation is a 
necessary, but insufficient, requirement for a stable government in Kirkuk. It has to be 
supplemented by elements of integrationism of the sort entailed in a civil society approach. In 
other words, although consociation is often seen as the standard prescription for protracted 
ethnic conflicts in divided societies (O’Leary, 2005), a genuine political stability and a 
sustainable peace cannot be achieved in Kirkuk merely by adopting consociational power-
sharing. These conclusions were deduced based on conducting interviews with 29 prominent 
local and national elites in Kirkuk and Baghdad and consulting Iraqi legal documents, including 
the Iraqi constitution and the various laws issued by the CoR. The themes of this conclusion 
are discussed in three sections. In the first section, I summarise key findings of the research. 
Section two discusses the theoretical and policy implications of the findings. In the final 
section, I discuss limitations of this study and outline directions and recommendations for 
further research. 
Summary of Findings 
In this section, I present the overview of the significant findings of this study. Some of the 
findings reinforce existing research, while others suggest new scholarship and policy in both 
theoretical and practical respects. Theoretically, some of the findings suggest developments to 
the theory of consociation. Practically, these findings could be useful for policy makers with 
regard to solving the problem of governance in Kirkuk. I will illustrate the summary of the 
findings of this research in eight points.  
1- The roots of ethnic conflict in Kirkuk  
The political and economic conflicts and developments that afflicted Kirkuk after World War 
1 shaped the identities of the different ethnic groups in the city. In the late 1920s when oil was 
discovered in the city, the lines of ethnicity became visible and gradually politicized until they 
eventually hardened. The theories of ethnic conflict such as instrumentalism rather than the 
theories of ethnicity (primordialism and constructivism) should be utilized when it comes to 
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understanding the current politicized ethnic identity of the groups in Kirkuk. In addition, it 
should be noted that different strategies have been tried in Kirkuk with the aim of eliminating 
ethnic differences, ranging from ethnic expulsion and one party rule, to genocide under 
Saddam’s regime. These strategies proved to be dangerous as they undermined the historical 
peaceful coexistence among different communities in the city. Therefore, a new strategy which 
manages the ethnic differences peacefully and democratically should be formally adopted to 
replace the past ones. Formalizing a consociational power-sharing in a legally binding 
agreement is important so that the disputed parties will remain loyal to the principle of an 
inclusive government and not relinquish it under any pretext. The problem with the current 
existing political arrangement is not because of its power-sharing nature, rather it is because 
the existing powersharing is temporary and has not been entrenched in any document. 
Therefore, as noted in the introduction of this research, the Kurds have now taken the position 
of the KPC chairman for over a year and do not intend to pass it over to the Turkmen. According 
to the informal agreement between the Kurds and Turkmen in 2011, this position belongs to 
the Turkmen. To prevent such scenarios in the future, it is important that the parties will adopt 
power-sharing formally and preferably under the supervision of an international actor such as 
UNAMI. 
2- The feasibility of adopting consociational power-sharing 
The findings indicate that consociation is not only the most appropriate solution but also the 
most likely to be accepted.  In short, the prospects for the possibility of its adoption are more 
likely than other alternatives. It is worth mentioning that there are no legal obstructions with 
regard to adopting consociation in Kirkuk. The TAL established the foundations for a 
democratic state based on consociation for the first time in the history of Iraq in 2004. For 
O’Leary (2005b: 68-69), the TAL marked an overall defeat for the integrationists who were 
arguing for a national, centralist and majoritarian federalist structure in Iraq. In other words, it 
was a victory for the advocates of the consociational approach who were seeking a consensual, 
decentralized and a multi-national federation for Iraq. The 2005 Iraqi constitution also 
reinforced the consociational option as a preferred political system for the country. In addition, 
the consociational experience at the state level can make its duplication in Kirkuk more 
feasible. Further, the small size of the city and the prior existence of a tradition of elite 
accommodation can be promising [two of Lijphart’s (1977) famed ‘favourable conditions’].  
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More than a decade of elite accommodation makes Kirkuk distinctive even within Iraq: 
whereas consociation was adopted in Iraq soon after the fall of Saddam’s regime without any 
prior accommodation among political leaders, the political leaders of Kirkuk have worked 
together for more than a decade prior to that fall. This does not only make the adoption of 
consociation feasible, but can also make it sustainable in the future, if adopted. More 
importantly, all of the 29 respondents for this research asserted that the city cannot be run 
unilaterally by one ethnic group and, therefore, they called for an inclusive government in 
which decisions are made unanimously. This could be an indication that the situation is ripe 
for embracing consociational power-sharing. Moreover, the elite demand for consociation 
makes Kirkuk different from cases where consociation has been imposed by outside actors 
such as the case of Bosnia. Hence, the local demand for consociational power-sharing can make 
its establishment and functioning thereafter more likely. Thus, the background conditions are 
promising (or ‘favourable’). However, without examining the four major elements of 
consociationalism separately and deeply, one cannot confidently suggest prescribing 
consociational power-sharing. The findings of this study show that the prospects for adopting 
each of those elements individually are also good. 
Grand Coalition: As noted in chapter two, in theory, grand coalition governments have two 
fundamental features, namely inclusion and elite cooperation. These principles have been 
present in the post-2003 Kirkuk to a large extent. For example, the four ethnic and religious 
groups in Kirkuk (Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and Christians) have been included in the three 
municipal and provincial councils formed in the city since 2003. Moreover, cooperation among 
political elites of these groups have gradually improved in the past 12 years. In other words, a 
sort of informal grand coalition has already been in place. Therefore, the important point is to 
adopt grand coalition either through an agreement among the ethnic groups of the city or by 
entrenching it in the future constitution if Kirkuk were to become an autonomous region. 
Finally, as I shall reiterate below, I suggest adopting a combination of corporate and liberal 
forms of consociational power-sharing in Kirkuk. This can be achieved by distributing the three 
senior positions (governor, deputy governor and KPC chair) between the three main groups 
and distributing other lower positions based on the elections outcome. 
Segmental autonomy: The Iraqi constitution explicitly recognizes the cultural rights of the 
religious and linguistic groups in the country. This right has been unequivocally entrenched in 
the constitution and the relevant laws issued by the Council of Representatives (CoR). Now, 
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four languages are practically employed in the institutions of Kirkuk. This means, among other 
things, that each group can speak and educate their children in its own language. In addition, 
the signs on the governmental institutions have been written in four languages. More 
importantly, none of my interviewees raised concerns regarding protecting the cultural rights 
of their groups. As Sisk et al (2001: 76) put it ‘as long as the rules are regarded by all people 
in the community as fair, and no major group seeks to change the rules, the conflict is 
considered resolved.’ Hence, one can argue that there is no problem related to protecting the 
cultural rights of the ethnic and communal groups of Kirkuk. However, the communities of 
Kirkuk enjoy these rights as a result of entrenching the right of segmental autonomy for ethnic 
and religious groups. These rights can be defined more clearly and expanded in a way that fit 
Kirkuk, once consociation is adopted. The local communities of Kirkuk should be given a 
chance to determine which areas they want to have exclusive rights to run. In short, it is fair to 
conclude that the principle of segmental autonomy is already being exercised in the city and 
the ethnic groups, if consociation were to be the choice, will face little difficulty to adopt it as 
part of a power-sharing arrangement. 
Proportionality: This element of consociation involves political representation of different 
groups, the allocation of financial resources and public sector employment. The proportional 
electoral system facilitates fair political and economic representations of the groups at all levels 
of government. Taking this into consideration, this study indicates that, just like the grand 
coalition element, an informal proportionality has been in place for the past decade in Kirkuk. 
The only governorate election of Kirkuk in 2005 and the other elections to elect Kirkuk’s 
representatives for CoR have been conducted based on a PR electoral system. In other words, 
the consociationalists’ preferred PR electoral system has already been adopted in Iraq which is 
applicable on Kirkuk as well. In terms of representations, the three main groups (Kurds, Arabs 
and Turkmen) are represented in the executive, legislative and judicial areas. However, the 
main problem in this regard is that each group claims that they have been underrepresented in 
one or more sectors. This can be solved if the groups can agree upon a clear criteria to distribute 
the positions among themselves within a consociational power-sharing arrangement. 
Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the conditions are favourable for adopting proportional 
representation formally. My suggestion is that any group (ethnic or not) that may win elections 
in the future should be proportionally represented in government. 
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Mutual veto: The adoption of veto rights is also far from being impossible. Veto rights were 
formally embedded in 2004 in the TAL and tacitly entrenched in the Iraqi constitution in 2005. 
The Arab and Turkmen boycott of the KPC during 2006-2007 can be seen as a kind of veto as 
any decision by the Kurds in the KPC without the endorsement of them would not gain 
legitimacy. Comparing this to the other three elements of consociational theory, my 
respondents in this research showed less enthusiasm for adopting mutual veto. One explanation 
for this, however, is that they seemed to have a formal, direct and permissive veto in mind 
which, experience suggests, usually results in immobilism and political deadlock, as in the case 
of Bosnia. This study states that the political leaders would probably be more open for an 
informal and an indirect veto that would be restricted to a specific number of issues. To avoid 
the experience of Bosnia, as argued in chapter six, this study suggests embracing a combination 
of self-determined and predetermined veto rather than a predetermined-based veto. Moreover, 
this study argues that the less complex the veto regulation the better for functioning vetoes and 
avoiding political deadlock. However, a better understanding of mutual veto by political 
leaders is essential before its possible adoption in Kirkuk. Future negotiations aiming to solve 
the problem of governance would address this issue and perhaps convince the conflicting 
parties, especially the Kurds, of the importance of mutual veto before adopting it.  
Importantly, as noted in chapter two, Lijphart (2004) now makes a distinction between primary 
and secondary elements of consociation and considers proportionality and mutual veto as 
secondary ones. However, this research suggests that proportionality and mutual veto should 
not be treated as secondary elements in any future consociational arrangement in the context 
of Kirkuk. In other words, the possibility of durable peace could arguably be greater in Kirkuk 
if the four elements of consociation are adopted together, i.e. making no distinction between 
primary and secondary elements as some advocates of consociationalism now suggest. 
3- The inclusion of radical political parties in the legislative and executive bodies of 
Kirkuk has been effective in moving those parties to take a more moderate 
position. 
One of the main criticisms of centripetalists against consociational theory is that 
consociationalism favours inclusion over moderation which, in turn, negatively affects the 
realization of political stability in divided societies. Centripetalists consider the inclusion of 
the extremes in the grand coalition government as a threat to the government’s stability. 
However, the case of Kirkuk disproves this claim. It seems from the Kirkuk case that there is 
 
 
194 
evidence that inclusion has not posed threats to the political stability in the city, rather it has 
even encouraged moderation. All major parties of the three main ethnic groups have been 
included in the three municipal councils formed in the post-2003 period. While many of the 
political elites had an extreme view towards other ethnic groups in the aftermath of the fall of 
Saddam’s regime, they have now moved to the centre ground in a way that they may be viewed 
as ‘moderate’. As noted in chapter three, the local elites now work together and vote 
unanimously in the KPC to approve projects related to public service and everyday needs of 
people. Thus, the gradual and steady improvement of relations between political leaders of 
different communities confirm consociationalists’ argument that inclusion of the extremists in 
a government will make them moderate and less extreme. 
4- Adopting a hybridity of corporate and liberal forms of consociation is both 
necessary and feasible 
The findings indicate that a combination of the two forms of consociation (corporate/ liberal 
or pre-determined/self-determined) is both necessary and feasible in Kirkuk. It is necessary in 
that it can lead to the overcoming of the problem of governance in the city. As already 
mentioned, there has been a sort of an informal grand coalition government in the city for the 
last decade. One reason for not formally adopting consociational power-sharing has been the 
inability to agree upon a precise form of government. While the Kurds prefer governing the 
city based on the outcome of elections which is compatible with liberal form of consociation, 
the Arab and Turkmen push for a pre-determined power-sharing on the 32-32-32-4 basis among 
the four ethnic groups. This research bridges this gap by suggesting a hybridity of the elements 
of both corporate and liberal forms of consociation in the city. Based on my research, my claim 
is that the three senior positions in the city (governor, deputy governor and the KPC chairman) 
should be given to the Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen respectively. Other lower positions should 
be divided among the communities of Kirkuk based on the results of the elections. I extend the 
same suggestion once it comes to identifying veto players in case of embracing mutual veto. 
Such a hybridity can work better than just adopting either corporate or liberal consociation. In 
this same spirit, McCulloch (2014b: 509) shows that, ‘if we turn to the cases that combine 
aspects of liberal and corporate rules, they, on average, appear as considerably more stable.’ In 
the context of Kirkuk, such a hybridity would have the potential to work in the future. By 
adopting a combination of corporate and liberal forms of consociation, the demands of all 
groups can be addressed and a zero-sum game would also be avoided. More importantly, this 
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combination appears to be feasible in Kirkuk for two reasons. Firstly, as noted in chapter three, 
some of my respondents called for such a solution. Secondly, the adoption of a hybridity 
consociational arrangement would be able to address the demands of the Kurds on one hand 
and the Arabs and Turkmen on the other hand. Hybridity choice, thus, is a form of ‘halfway 
house’ between the liberal and corporate models of consociation that can be expected to work 
better than the choice of either corporate or liberal forms of consociation alone. 
5- Complex consociation (‘consociational plus’) rather than simple consociation 
As noted above, consociation is the most appropriate mechanism to manage conflict over 
Kirkuk. It is also feasible.  However, a simple consociation with the four elements (i.e. grand 
coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality and mutual veto) would be unable to realize an 
authentic political stability in Kirkuk. Therefore, this research suggests that if consociation 
were to be adopted (which I suggest) in Kirkuk, it should be ‘consociation plus,’ or ‘complex 
consociation’ rather than simple consociation. As noted in chapter two, complex consociations 
‘involve at least one additional strategy other than consociation’ (O’Leary, 2005: 34). In order 
to promote stability, as McCulloch (2014: 147) concludes, ‘consociation should be used as part 
of a wider package of conflict-management tools known as complex consociation.’ Northern 
Ireland’s consociation is an example of complex consociation where, for instance, cross-border 
institutions have been mandated to enable both the Irish and the British governments to be 
involved in the Good Friday Agreement in general and the management of cross-border and all 
island issues in particular. In Kirkuk, apart from the adoption of the four elements of 
consociation, Baghdad and Erbil should be involved in any future settlements, because without 
their involvement, consociation might not work. All Kurdish political parties in the city, for 
example, are rooted either in Erbil or Sulaimani and may not be able to act against the will of 
their political leaders in the broader Kurdistan region. The UNAMI seems to be well positioned 
to play the facilitator role in any future agreement as it has already been involved in trying to 
find a solution for the problem of Kirkuk. Complex consociation or consociational plus, thus, 
is important since the problem of Kirkuk extends well beyond its local stakeholders. In other 
words, consociationalism appears more likely to promote political stability in Kirkuk but only 
on condition that it be implemented in a revised, more extensive or encompassing form, i.e. 
consociation plus.   
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6- Embracing both top-down and bottom-up strategies 
The findings suggest that consociational power-sharing can play a greater role in the 
stabilization of the city if it is enhanced with some integrative elements based on, or in the 
spirit of, social capital theory. A civil society perspective, especially creating bridging social 
capital at the grassroots level, is vitally important in the context of Kirkuk to rectify the bitter 
experience of the Arabization policy which has negatively influenced the historic peaceful 
coexistence. In this way, one of the major findings of this study is that the ability of power-
sharing institutional design (alone) to facilitate political stability in divided societies is 
insufficient. Authentic political stability and lasting peace, however, needs both top-down 
(consociational power-sharing) and bottom-up (bridging social capital) simultaneously. In 
other words, a consociational power-sharing arrangement at the top, supported by the 
community-based initiatives at the bottom, could be the most appropriate way of realizing an 
authentic peace in the city. Taking advantage of elements of different approaches is important 
for Kirkuk because the ultimate purpose here is to realize political stability, democracy and 
sustainable peace in the city. This finding is consistent with the argument of Cochrane who 
highlights that ‘peace-building needs to be a proactive endeavour and one that connects grass-
roots communities through civil society representatives to the political elites’ (Cochrane, 2012: 
187). 
7- Empowering local elites and compromise 
Given the ability of local elites to work within the current existing political system in the city 
and the interviews that I have conducted for this research into consideration, I believe that local 
elites are more likely to compromise than elites from Baghdad and Erbil. They are also 
expected to be able to lead their communities to accept compromises, partly because they live 
in the same place and feel the daily needs of their constituents and better know how to convince 
the members of their ethnic communities. However, at the moment, senior politicians (at least 
in the case of Kurds) outside of the city determine whether they make compromises or not. 
Therefore, although Baghdad and Erbil need to be involved, local leaders should be given a 
greater role in any future agreements over the city. Empowering local elites undermines various 
Iraqi parties’ nationalist rhetoric who give themselves the right to speak for their ethnic 
kinsmen in Kirkuk. It is important to put an end to the divisive rhetoric that those parties tend 
to develop to strengthen their position within their communities. This finding is compatible 
with the conclusions reached by Hanauer and Miller (2012) who call for strengthening local 
elites vis-à-vis the national parties. They (2012: 48-49) argue that if local elites are given a 
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greater voice in discussions over the fate of Kirkuk, ‘they may be better able to promote a 
negotiated settlement… which would reduce the chance that interethnic violence would erupt 
in the city.’ The local political leaders should also be empowered once it comes to solve the 
problem of governance in the city.  
8- The need for compromise and a grand bargain 
In the absence of concessions by Kirkuk’s key stakeholders, no solution will be reached. One 
reason for not being able to reach a solution to the problem of governance in the city until now 
is because it is usually linked to the question of territory, i.e. the future status of the city. The 
settlements of ethno-territorial conflicts have generally proven difficult and solutions to 
conflicts over territory are generally more elusive than those over political interests (Engström: 
2011). In Kirkuk, due to the emotional and historical claims over disputed territories and the 
centrality of territory in the problem, even if leaders could reach an agreement, they find it 
difficult to justify compromises to their constituents. With regard to finding a solution for the 
problem of Kirkuk, Anderson and Stansfield (2009: 243) point out that ‘there are two crucial 
dimensions of compromise with respect to Kirkuk. The first pertains to its administrative 
location (inside or outside the Kurdistan region), and the second involves its governance 
(power-sharing or majority control).’64 A real solution can only be achieved through a 
compromise in which all the disputed parties make concessions in order to reach an agreed 
outcome. 
The problem of governance, therefore, should be solved as part of a grand bargain by 
addressing both the problems of governance and the future status of the city with the 
involvement of both Baghdad and the KRG. A grand bargain such as the example of the Good 
Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland (in which apart from the internal communities of 
Northern Ireland, both the British and Irish government were involved in forming a grand 
bargain) appears to be important to follow in the case of Kirkuk. Such a grand bargain is 
crucially important in the context of Kirkuk, because both Baghdad and Erbil have generally 
                                                          
64 As noted in the introduction of this dissertation, oil constitutes one of the three elements which together form 
the problem of Kirkuk. However, Anderson and Stansfield (2009: 234-5) rightly argue that ‘there is little about 
Kirkuk’s recent history that can be understood without reference to oil. Despite this, the post-2003 struggle for 
Kirkuk has had very little to do with oil’. Their conclusion is not surprising, as the constitution of Iraq has already 
settled this issue in article 112, by distinguishing between ‘present’ and future oil fields, ‘the federal government, 
with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas 
extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the 
population distribution in all parts of the country.’ The oil fields of Kirkuk obviously lie within the category of 
‘present’ field.  
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taken the position that ‘nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to’ (Kane, 2011: 3).65 
The disputed parties should compromise through making concessions over one of these two 
afore-mentioned issues (i.e. future status of the city and its governance problem). This is 
important, as one of the essential features of compromise is to make concessions, i.e. it is unlike 
outright victory or capitulation which is unilateral; rather all the claimants ‘agree to’ a 
compromise and ‘enter into’ it (Jones and O’Flynn, 2013: 119). Taking the post-Mosul political 
situation into consideration which strengthened the Kurdish position, it is difficult to expect 
the Kurds to share power with the Arabs and Turkmen while Kirkuk remains outside the 
Kurdistan region. The reasonable compromise could be achieved by joining Kirkuk to the 
Kurdistan region (based on article 140 of the constitution) and, in return, the Kurds should give 
a special status to Kirkuk within the Kurdistan region. In other words, adopting formal 
consociational power-sharing and giving the two senior positions of deputy governorship and 
the chairmanship of KPC to Arabs and Turkmen respectively. In short, in trying to find a 
solution for the governance problem, it is important to avoid a win-lose equation. This can be 
achieved through compromise in which every party should make some concessions for the 
other or others and gain something in return. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the grand 
bargain might have a better chance of succeeding if it is supported by bridging social capital at 
the mass level.   
Implications of the Findings 
In the following section I will highlight implications of the research for expanding the theory 
of consociation, suggesting policy for policy makers and taking lessons from Kirkuk to other 
cases.  
Theoretically, the findings of this research take us beyond traditional consociational theory, 
which tends to take a sceptical view of the role of civil society in managing conflict (O’Leary, 
2005, 2013). For example, McGarry et al. (2008, 74) are sceptical about the role of civil society 
organizations in resisting elite ethnocentrism in the deeply divided places because these 
                                                          
65 Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie (2003) argue that the more conflict settlements institutionalize power-
sharing across four dimensions—political, economic, military and territorial the more stable they are. Reaching 
an agreement on the future status of Kirkuk and its governance problem covers two of these dimensions, i.e. the 
territorial and political ones. Oil and military forces (e.g. Peshmerga) could be part of the grand bargain that I 
suggest, and thus the four dimensions identified by Hartzell and Hoddie will be covered and thus a more 
sustainable political stability might be brought about. Despite that, I already suggested a bottom-up societal 
initiative, if a more durable political stability and a lasting peace is to be the goal in Kirkuk. 
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organizations are likely to be ethnically driven and appeal to ethnocentrism. However, this 
research challenges this view. It argues that if civil society organizations, at least in the context 
of Kirkuk, are supported by the external actors such as UNAMI, they will be able to play a 
significant role in authentic and sustainable stability in the city. This is important because I do 
not defend just my application of consociation to the case of Kirkuk, but also additional 
developments that I apply to the theory of consociation itself.  One important development is 
the idea that accommodation (consociation) and integration (social capital theory characterized 
in civil society organizations) should not be seen as mutually exclusive principles, rather they 
can be reconciled and applied together on a particular case to maximize the chance of stability 
and peace. In other words, authentic sustainable stability and peace requires both. This research 
suggests expanding the theory of consociation further and argues that a good consociation 
should adopt favourable elements from other theories. In this way, one of the implications of 
this research is that both accommodation and integration can be combined so that they together 
play a greater and a more influential role in bringing a sustainable political stability in divided 
societies. Reframing the consociational approach in this way to also embrace the elements of 
the civil society approach in Kirkuk does not necessarily contradict consociationalism; rather, 
it enhances it. 
In terms of policy making, this study is timely and well suited to be utilized for solving the 
governance problem in Kirkuk. As noted in chapter two, consociationalism was essentially an 
empirical or descriptive theory but later morphed into a normative one. In other words, this 
theory has important evaluative implications and can have clear impacts on the ground. To 
date, many solutions have been proposed to solve the problem of Kirkuk such as the UNAMI 
and the ICG recommendations discussed on in the introduction of this research. These solutions 
have been mainly dedicated to settling the administrative future status of the city. However, 
there is no academic research available dealing with solving the problem of governance in such 
a comprehensive and lengthy way as laid out here. Therefore, this research could be utilized 
by the policy makers and UNAMI for settling the problem of governance in the governorate. 
In other words, this study can serve as a road map for those who are charged with finding a 
reasonable solution to govern the city.  
The case of Kirkuk may also be inspiring for other cases. It seems to be that the academic 
literature predominantly focuses either on a top-down or a bottom-up solution in divided 
societies. However, the case of Kirkuk suggests that the two approaches should be pursued 
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simultaneously to realize a durable settlement for the conflict over the city. In other words, 
alongside the emphasis on the role of elites in solving ethnic conflicts, a bottom-up civil society 
approach should be considered in tandem. In terms of grassroots-level initiatives, civil society 
organizations that can create cross-communal ties and promote intercommunal dialogue should 
be encouraged rather than those that are dominated by single ethnic groups. Because, the 
former can reduce tensions among multiple ethnic groups, whereas the latter are effective at 
mobilizing along ethnic lines and thus complicate ethnic tensions. Crucially, by reducing 
interethnic tensions, civil society organizations can set the stage for politicians to make 
compromise without having to fear being undercut by hard-line rivals from within their own 
community for appearing ‘soft’. In those places where ethnically-mixed civil society 
organizations are absent or weak, authentic political stability and peace is far from being 
realized. Jerusalem is a case in point in this respect. Therefore, the findings of this research 
implies that considering both bottom-up and top-down approaches is probably a wise solution 
to be pursued in other divided societies. 
Limitations of the Study and Recommendations 
This study has particularly investigated the problem of governance in Kirkuk, specifically 
focusing on finding an appropriate democratic institutional mechanism to tackle that problem 
with the aim of realizing political stability in the city.  However, as noted in the introduction 
of this thesis, the issue of governance constitutes only one aspect of the problem of Kirkuk. 
The future status of the city and its vast amount of oil constitute two other crucial aspects of 
the Kirkuk problem. The investigation is thus limited to one aspect of the problem of Kirkuk. 
The findings throughout the research have inspired us to recommend that future research might 
need to examine some important but underdeveloped aspects regarding the issue of Kirkuk and 
addressing new developments that have recently occurred in Iraq which could have 
ramifications for Kirkuk in the future. Therefore, I propose future research in the following 
areas: 
A) Data limitations only permit us to look at top-down elite-level solution in any detail in 
this study. The analysis in this thesis is constrained by the available data. I have relied 
on qualitative interview data to examine the problem of governance and thereby suggest 
an appropriate institutional mechanism to tackle it. Elite interviewing takes us a long 
way by providing important insights on the current situation and what should be done 
on the political level. In future research, however, individual level data on ‘grassroots’ 
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social contacts will be necessary. The scarce resources at my disposal made it 
impossible for me to also collect individual level data in this study. However, this 
research has demonstrated, in theory, the usefulness of a civil society approach to ethnic 
conflict and conflict resolution in Kirkuk. I hope that this study will inspire future 
research to continue along these lines, to further test its normative and theoretical 
claims. 
B) On June 9, 2014, the ISIS captured Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. Since then, the 
political landscape has changed in Kirkuk which has weakened the positions of both 
Arabs and Turkmen and strengthened the Kurdish position. At the time of concluding 
this dissertation, the predominantly Arab areas in western Kirkuk province such as 
Hawija, Rashad, al-Abbasi, al-Zab, and Riyadh are under ISIS control. The vast 
majority of Arabs live in these areas. Currently a small number of Arabs live inside 
Kirkuk city that they do not have a big political impact. In other words, the post-Mosul 
political situation is different from the pre-Mosul period. Therefore, further research 
will be needed to address the implications of the new era on the problem of Kirkuk in 
general and the governance problem in particular.  
C) The current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced sweeping political 
reforms on 9 August 2015. The reforms included the elimination of several high-
ranking posts such as the removal of the three deputy Prime Ministers (one Shiite, one 
Sunni and one Kurd) and the three Vice Presidential posts (two Shiites, one Sunni) 
which resulted in the elimination of Maliki’s position as Iraq’s first vice president (the 
former prime minister). The reform asserts that political appointments should not be 
based on sectarian or party quotas. The reform package has passed the Council of 
Ministers (CoM) and been ratified by the Council of Representatives (CoR). Al-Abadi’s 
decisions to reform came as a response to the massive demonstrations that took place 
in Iraq over electricity and water shortage and were supported by Iraq's most revered 
cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistan. The reform aimed at combating corruption and removing 
officials from their positions regardless of their ethnic background. However, this move 
may have critical consequences for the future of power-sharing in the country. On 10 
August 2015, the governor of Kirkuk announced his support for Al-Abadi’s reform 
package and called for finding a strategy to uproot sectarianism and appointing people 
in the public sector based on competency in the city. It is important that future research 
should investigate the implications that these reforms may have on the future of power-
sharing in Iraq as a whole and the future of governance in Kirkuk in particular.  
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Overall, this study argues that consociationalism can offer an appropriate institutional 
mechanism for managing conflict and building a stable government in Kirkuk. However, as 
the issue of governance is linked to the future status of the city, this research recommends that 
all the disputed parties make concessions to each other in a grand bargain. The scenario that is 
most likely to work in the future is that Kirkuk becomes part of the Kurdistan region and the 
Kurds, in return, give up their political control over Kirkuk and allow establishing a genuine 
power-sharing arrangement among the four ethnic groups as entrenched in a formal agreement. 
The most crucial point to reiterate is that the current interim and fragile political arrangement is unlikely 
to continue taking the post-Mosul situation into consideration. Consociational power-sharing is a 
suitable solution but on the condition that a combination of corporate and liberal forms of consociation 
are adopted. Further, consociational power-sharing on the political level should be supplemented by the 
grass-roots level of creating bridging social capital so that a durable political stability is achieved in the 
city. Only in these ways will a lasting peace be realized in Kirkuk.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Article 58, Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) 
(A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission 
and other relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice 
caused by the previous regime’s practices in altering the demographic character of certain 
regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling individuals from their places of 
residence, forcing migration in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to the region, 
depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting nationality. To remedy this injustice, the Iraqi 
Transitional Government shall take the following steps: 
(1) With regard to residents who were deported, expelled, or who emigrated; it shall, in 
accordance with the statute of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other measures within 
the law, within a reasonable period of time, restore the residents to their homes and property, 
or, where this is unfeasible, shall provide just compensation. 
(2) With regard to the individuals newly introduced to specific regions and territories, it shall 
act in accordance with Article 10 of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission statute to ensure 
that such individuals may be resettled, may receive compensation from the state, may receive 
new land from the state near their residence in the governorate from which they came, or may 
receive compensation for the cost of moving to such areas. 
(3) With regard to persons deprived of employment or other means of support in order to force 
migration out of their regions and territories, it shall promote new employment opportunities 
in the regions and territories. 
(4) With regard to nationality correction, it shall repeal all relevant decrees and shall permit 
affected persons the right to determine their own national identity and ethnic affiliation free 
from coercion and duress.  
(B) The previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative boundaries for political 
ends. The Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall make 
recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the 
permanent constitution. 
In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of 
recommendations, it shall unanimously appoint a neutral arbitrator to examine the issue and 
make recommendations. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree on an arbitrator, 
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it shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a distinguished 
international person to be the arbitrator. 
(C) The permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, shall be deferred until 
after these measures are completed, a fair and transparent census has been conducted and the 
permanent constitution has been ratified This resolution shall be consistent with the principle 
of justice, taking into account the will of the people of those territories. 
Appendix B: Article 140, Iraq Constitution, 2005 
First: The executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the 
implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional 
Administrative Law. 
Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional 
Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law shall extend and 
continue to the executive authority elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that 
it accomplishes completely (normalisation and census and concludes with a referendum in 
Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), by a date not to 
exceed the 31st of December 2007. 
Appendix C: Article 23 of Elections Law No. 36 (2008)  
First: The elections of Kirkuk governorate and its affiliated Districts and Sub-Districts shall be 
held after implementing the process of dividing the administrative and security powers and 
public posts including the position of the chairman of the Provincial Council, governor and 
deputy governor, among the components of Kirkuk governorate in equal percentages among 
the main components. The component with the majority in the Provincial Council shall have 
the right to choose one of the highest three positions: the Governor, the Deputy Governor or 
the chairman of the Provincial Council. 
Second: A committee, made up of two representatives from the main three components of 
Kirkuk governorate, shall be established from among the COR members representing the 
Kirkuk governorate and selected by the representatives of the three components in the Council 
of Representatives and one representative for the Christian component no later than November 
1, 2008. The Committee shall have the right to seek the assistance of two experts from each 
component, the representatives for the parliamentarian blocs and relevant ministries in order to 
give advice and consultation in addition to the UN technical assistance. The Committee shall 
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take decisions by agreement. The operation of the Committee shall not conflict with any Article 
of the Iraqi Constitution that is relevant to Kirkuk. The Committee shall submit its report to the 
COR concerning the following affairs: The mechanism of division of powers in Kirkuk as 
stated in (First) above. Identifying the trespasses on the public properties in Kirkuk before and 
after April 9, 2003. The Iraqi government shall guarantee correction of such trespasses through 
the mechanism used all over Iraq in accordance with the applicable laws. Reviewing and 
scrutinizing all data and records related to the demographic situation including the registry of 
voters and submitting binding recommendation by agreement to the Independent High 
Electoral Commission, based on the results reached. The Committee shall submit its report to 
the COR no later than March 31, 2009. The COR shall oversee and follow up the operations of 
the Committee.  
Third: The election of Kirkuk Provincial Council shall be held after the Committee has 
submitted its recommendations and concluded results to the COR, according to which the COR 
shall enact a law for the election of Kirkuk Provincial Council for one term. 
Fourth: The Federal Government and the Local government in Kirkuk shall equally pledge to 
provide all requirements for the Committee to accomplish its functions in accordance with the 
law.  
Fifth: The present Kirkuk Provincial Council shall continue to exercise its functions in 
accordance with the laws that were valid before the enforcement of Law No. 21 of 2008. The 
status of Kirkuk governorate in accordance with the Constitution shall remain as it is until 
elections are held there.  
Sixth: The Provisions of Article 55/Second of the Law No. 21 of 2008 shall apply to Kirkuk 
Provincial Councils.  
Seventh: In case the Committee failed to submit its recommendations to the COR, the Council 
shall enact a law for the elections of the Kirkuk Provincial Council. If this cannot be done, the 
three presidencies (The Presidency Council, the Cabinet’s Presidency and the COR Presidency) 
shall specify, with international assistance through the UN, the appropriate conditions for 
holding elections in Kirkuk.  
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Appendix D: The governorates of Iraq, including Kirkuk and the provinces of KRG. 
 
Adapted from: Law of governorates not incorporated into a region’ by USAID. Available at: 
http://iraq-lg-law.org/en/webfm_send/765 
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Appendix E: List of Interviews 
Names Ethnicity Institutional Position Date and Place  
Abdulrahman Mustafa    Kurd Former governor of Kirkuk (2003-2011) 2 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Abdul Satar Al-Ka’bi     Arab Independent writer based in Baghdad 15 January 2015, via Facebook. 
Adward Oraha                           Christian Member of KPC 8 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Arshad Salhi                                 Turkman President of ITF and member of CoR 23 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Awat Mohammed Ameen                                Kurd Member of KPC 10 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Burhan Muthir                             Arab Member of KPC 2 October 2013, Kirkuk. 
Dlawer Ala’aldeen                       Kurd President of Middle East Research Institute (MERI)  20 February 2015, via email.  
Gulen Ahmed                            Turkman Member of KPC 11 October 2013, Kirkuk. 
Hasan Turan                                 Turkman Chairman of KPC 16 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
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Ibrahim Khalil Kurd Member of KPC 22 August 2013, Kirkuk. 
Khalid Shwani Kurd Member of CoR 19 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Jalal Jawhar                               Kurd Senior political leader of Movement of Change 6 October 2013, Sulaimani. 
Jwan Hussen                                 Kurd Member of KPC 1 April 2015, via Facebook. 
Latif Mistafa                                 Kurd Member of CoR 12 September 2013, Sulaimani. 
Mahmood Othman                    Kurd Member of CoR 17 February 2015, via telephone.  
Mohammed Kamal    Kurd Senior member of KDP and Member of KPC 23 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Mohammed Khalil Arab Member of KPC 1 October 2013, Kirkuk. 
Mohammed Khursheed                   Kurd Senior political leader of KDP 9 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Najat Hasan                                  Turkman Member of KPC 15 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Najmadeen Kareem                    Kurd Current governor of Kirkuk  16 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
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Rakan Saeed                                 Arab Deputy governor 25 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Ramla Al-Ubeidy                             Arab Member of KPC 10 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Rebwar Said Gull                          Kurd Senior member of KIU in Kirkuk 2 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Rebwar Talabani                          Kurd Deputy chairman of KPC 15 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Rzgar Ali                                        Kurd Former chairman of KPC and PUK’s politburo 
member 
8 October 2013, Sulaimani. 
Saman Abdullah Saeed                         Kurd Senior member of KIG in Kirkuk 13 September 2013, Chamchamall. 
Sdiq Kaka Rash                             Kurd Member of KPC 3 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Tahseen Kahya       Turkman Member of KPC 15 September 2013, Kirkuk. 
Yaseen Al-Ubaidi                Arab Member of CoR 19 January 2015, telephone call. 
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Appendix F: PUK’s Organizations and Associations in Kirkuk—Separated by Ethnicity 
Organization or 
association 
 
 
No. of members 
 
Kurds 
 
Arabs 
 
Turkmens 
 
Christians 
Teachers 
 
          1555 
 
695 (45%) 350 (23%) 425 (27%) 85 (5%) 
Students (high 
school) 
12,800 8033 (63%) 3420 (27%) 754 (6%) 593 (5%) 
Rural engineers             433 272 (63%) 81 (19%) 74 (17%) 6 (1%) 
Health (employed)           1493 
 
1013 (68%) 243 (16%) 212 (14%) 25 (2%) 
Photographers             523 373 (71%) 40 (8%) 100 (19%) 10 (2%) 
Ferh Centre             233 168 (72%) 49 (21%) 12 (5%) 4 (2%) 
Workers             4177 3120 (75%) 596 (14%) 430 (10%) 31 (1%) 
Geologists             147 125 (85%) 5 (3%) 14 (10%) 3 (2%) 
Students (college and 
university) 
            6998 6412 (92%) 386 (5%) 143 (2%) 57 (1%) 
Artists             171 157 (92%) 3 (2%) 6 (3%) 5 (3%) 
Roj Handicap Centre             1150 1086 (94%) 34 (3%) 26 (2%) 4 (–) 
Technicians             908 857 (94%) 23 (3%) 23 (3%) 5 (1%) 
Chemists and 
physicists 
            150 143 (95%) 2 (1%) 4 (3%) 1 (1%) 
Young people (Azadi 
Lawan) 
            9872 9472 (96%) 200 (2%) 150 (2%) 50 (0.5%) 
63+ (retired persons)             2000 1950 (97%) 20 (1%) 30 (2%) – 
Farmers 16,596 16,507 (99%) 81 (0.5%) 8 (–) – 
Total 59,206 50,383 (85%) 5533 (9%) 2411 (4%) 879 (1.5%) 
Source: Anderson, L. and Stansfield, G. (2009) Interethnic relations in Northern Iraq: Brokerage, social capital and the potential for 
reconciliation.  Anderson and Stansfield have adapted these figures from PUK’s Bureau of Democracy (Kirkuk) in 2006.
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